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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW,
AND CLAIMS OF FAIRNESS (WITH LESSONS FROM
WASHINGTON STATE)
Timothy V. Kaufmnan-Osbom*
Abstract: This Article explores the adequacy of one of the safeguards adopted by many states
to ensure that the death penalty is applied fairly, following the reinstatement of capital
punishment in 1976. Relying chiefly on evidence drawn from Washington State, this Article
asks whether the practice of comparative proportionality review has ensured that there is now
a rational basis for distinguishing between those who are sentenced to die and those who are
not. An analysis of the trial judge reports employed by the Washington State Supreme Court
in reviewing death sentences, as well as the method used by the court in conducting its
reviews over the course of the past two decades, indicates that the death penalty remains
arbitrary and capricious in its administration. The failure of comparative proportionality
review furnishes yet another reason for concluding that capital punishment cannot be
conducted in a way that comports with claims of fairness.
"[C]apital punishment [must] be imposed fairly, and with
reasonable consistency, or not at all."'
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is now immersed in the most urgent debate about
capital punishment in decades. This controversy is most often framed,
explicitly or implicitly, through reference to the concept of fairness.2 The
debate encompasses a broad range of questions, including the possible
execution of the innocent, the deficient legal representation afforded
those charged with capital crimes, the effective restriction of the death
penalty to those who are impoverished, the racially discriminatory
administration of capital punishment, and the execution of those who
were minors at the time they committed their crimes.3 Each of these
2. See generally MIKE GRAY, THE DEATH GAME: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE LUCK OF THE
DRAW (2003) (arguing that the administration of the death penalty is a rigged lottery); ROBERT JAY
LIFTON & GREGG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH? (2000) (arguing that concerns about the fairness
of the death penalty will soon lead to its abolition); AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS (2001)
(arguing that those opposed to the death penalty should frame their claims in the language of
fairness); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 2003) (arguing that the death penalty violates the norms of
due process).
3. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau, An Abolitionist's Survey of the Death Penalty in America
Today, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 15
(Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell eds., 2004) (reviewing abolitionist arguments, including the
claim that the death penalty cannot be administered fairly); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination,
Death, and Denial: Race and the Death Penalty, in MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY REGIME 45 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow eds., 2002) (arguing that the
death penalty perpetuates the racist history of lynching in the Unites States); J. Michael Martinez,
"Freakishly Imposed" or "Fundamentally Fair"? Legal Arguments Against the Death Penalty, in
THE LEVIATHAN'S CHOICE 227-47 (J. Michael Martinez et al., eds., 2002) (arguing that the
administration of capital punishment is infected by inequities based on race, poverty, mental
capacity, and age); Elizabeth Theiss Smith, Fatal Flaws: The Implementation of the Death Penalty
in the States, in THE LEVIATHAN'S CHOICE 159 (J. Michael Martinez et al., eds., 2002) (examining
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questions raises concerns about whether the death penalty is now (or can
ever be) applied in a way that is equitable.
Recently, yet another question regarding the fairness of the death
penalty's administration has received considerable media attention. That
question, phrased in the language of proportionality, was raised in
dramatic fashion by the plea bargain struck by the so-called "Green
River killer," Gary Ridgway.4 On November 5, 2003 in a Seattle
courtroom, Ridgway confessed to murdering forty-eight young women,
making him the most prolific serial killer in U.S. history.5 In return for
providing information to the sheriffs office about these killings, the
prosecuting attorney for King County agreed not to seek the death
penalty.6 Not surprisingly, this decision provoked considerable public
furor, exemplified by the response of Mike Carrell, a Republican
member of the Judiciary Committee of the Washington State House of
Representatives: "If Ridgway does not deserve the death penalty, then
what situation and who does deserve it?"' 7 If Ridgway, with a body count
of four dozen, is not condemned to die, then how can one justify
sentencing to death a defendant who has murdered far fewer? How can
one explain the Ridgway plea bargain to the ten persons now on death
row in Washington, a majority of whom were convicted of murdering a
single individual? Some speculate that these questions of fairness will
make it more difficult to persuade courts in Washington, and perhaps
elsewhere, to sentence those convicted of far less heinous crimes.8
Indeed, the executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center,
Richard Dieter, has suggested that legal challenges predicated on the
and explaining the error rate in capital convictions); Bryan Stevenson, Close to Death: Reflections
on Race and Capital Punishment in America, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD
AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 76 (Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004) (exploring the
influence of conscious and unconscious racial bias in the administration of the death penalty);
Mandy Welch & Richard Burr, The Politics of Finality and the Execution of the Innocent: The Case
of Gary Graham, in MACHINERY OF DEATH: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY REGIME
127 (David R. Dow & Mark Dow eds., 2002) (arguing that innocent persons are convicted,
sentenced to death, and sometimes executed).




7. Joseph Turner, Bill Would Ban Plea Bargains in Serial Killings, Mass Murders, NEWS TRIB.,
Nov. 6, 2003, at A9.
8. Gene Johnson, In Theory and in Fairness, Gary Ridgway Case Could End Death Penalty for
Entire Country, NEWS TRIB., Nov. 6, 2003, at A8; Patrick McMahon & Laura Parker, Killer's Deal
Could Spare Others, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 2003, at 3A.
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Ridgway case may in time attract the attention of the U.S. Supreme
Court: "There will be appeals, and there may well be a review about the
whole country's use of the death penalty." 9
The roots of the controversy provoked by the Ridgway deal, as well
as the broader question of proportionality, can be traced to Furman v.
Georgia.10 Consisting of a brief per curiam opinion, followed by nine
separate opinions in a five to four vote, the Furman Court invalidated
Georgia and Texas statutes that permitted defendants to be sentenced to
death at the unfettered discretion of a judge or jury. 11 The Court held that
these laws, and by extension the death penalty statutes of thirty-seven
additional states along with various federal statutory provisions,
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 12 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
maintained that a legal order that allows death sentences to be
"wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed is "cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."' 13 Justice White
expressed much the same point, stating that "there is no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not."'14 Justice Douglas, endorsing the
constitutional conclusion of Justices Stewart and White on somewhat
different grounds, explained that the death penalty statutes in question
were unconstitutional not because their administration was capricious,
but rather because their application to particular categories of persons
was all too predictable: "We know that the discretion of judges and
juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively
applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and
despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or
unpopular minority."' 15 Regardless of the rationale, the Furman Court
9. Johnson, supra note 8, at A8. Even prior to announcement of the Ridgway deal, attorneys for
two defendants accused of killing a woman in Snohomish County sought and secured a delay in
prosecutors' decision whether to seek the death penalty against their clients. See Ian Ith, Ridgway
Deal Could Change Criteria for Death Penalty, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at Al. The
attorneys argued that this decision should turn on the results of the Ridgway negotiations. Id. at
AI5.
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
11. Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 239-40.
13. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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required states to incorporate procedural safeguards designed to regulate
the otherwise standardless deliberations of judges and juries., 6 Absent
such checks there can be little reason to believe that capital punishment,
the most severe sanction prescribed by law, is reserved for the most
blameworthy defendants found guilty of the most heinous offenses.
Today, some three decades after Furman, but just short of the thirty-
year anniversary of Gregg v. Georgia,17 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court authorized the states to resume capital punishment, 18 many of the
concerns expressed by the Court in 1972 are being voiced once again.
Perhaps the most dramatic echo of these worries was heard in Illinois
when, on January 31, 2000, Governor George Ryan imposed a
moratorium on executions in that state. 19 His decision to do so, he
explained, was prompted by questions about the fairness of capital
punishment. 20 Specifically, he noted that while twelve inmates had been
executed since the death penalty was reinstated in Illinois in 1977,
thirteen had been exonerated and freed from death row.21 Shortly after
this announcement, Governor Ryan appointed a commission and
instructed it to furnish an explanation for this record of error and to
advance recommendations aimed at reforming the administration of
capital punishment in the state.22
Two years later, the governor's commission called for a sweeping
overhaul of the death penalty in Illinois, although its members conceded
that "no system, given human nature and frailties, could ever be devised
or constructed that would work perfectly and guarantee absolutely that
no innocent person is ever again sentenced to death. 23 Aggravating this
16. Id. at 400-01 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("While I would not undertake to make a definitive
statement as to the parameters of the Court's ruling, it is clear that if state legislatures and the
Congress wish to maintain the availability of capital punishment, significant statutory changes will
have to be made.").
17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
18. Id. at 207 (plurality opinion).




22. Dirk Johnson, No Executions in Illinois Until System Is Repaired, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000,
at 20.
23. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 220 (April 2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html (last visited June 27, 2004) [hereinafter
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION].
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concern, a study appended to the commission's report reached two
conclusions. First, the race of homicide victims is a statistically
significant predictor of who is and is not sentenced to death in Illinois.2 4
Second, the frequency of death sentences varies markedly from region to
region throughout Illinois.2 5 Responding to these findings, in January,
2003, Governor Ryan commuted every death sentence then in effect to
prison terms of life or less: "The facts that I have seen in reviewing each
and every one of these cases," he declared, "raised questions not only
about the innocence of people on death row, but about the fairness of the
death penalty system as a whole. Our capital system is haunted by the
demon of error: error in determining guilt and error in determining who
among the guilty deserves to die.",
26
Governor Ryan's worries about the justice of capital punishment in
Illinois have been articulated throughout the United States, and major
24. GLENN PIERCE & MICHAEL RADELET, RACE, REGION, AND DEATH SENTENCING IN ILLINOIS,
1988-1997 iii (April 2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
techinicalappendix/reasearch report.html (last visited June 27, 2004).
25. Id. Contrary to the contention of Justice Douglas in Furman, the study by Pierce and Radelet
did not find statistically significant evidence of disparate treatment based on the race of the
defendant, holding aggravating factors constant. Id. However, the study did caution that, because its
inquiry was limited to defendants convicted of first-degree murder and because earlier stages in the
judicial process were not examined, "estimates of arbitrariness and/or discrimination ... may under-
represent the effects of extra-legal factors." Id.; see also RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF
RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 33 (2003) (finding that black killers of white victims are nearly
three and a half times as likely to be sentenced to die as are blacks who kill blacks in Maryland, in a
recent study demonstrating significant racial bias in the capital punishment system), available at
http://www.urhome.umd.edu/newsdesk/pdf/finalrep.pdf (last visited June 27, 2004); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY (1988-2000) (2000)
(conducting a comparable inquiry into racial bias and geographic disparity in the administration of
the federal death penalty statute), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html (last
visited June 27, 2004).
26. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issue of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1. A 2000 study conducted under the auspices of Columbia University
provides empirical support for the Illinois governor's concerns about error. See James Liebman et
al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1846-61
(2000); JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART : ERROR RATES N CAPITAL CASES,
1973-1995, at 34 (June 2000) [hereinafter BROKEN SYSTEM I] (concluding that of 4578 death
sentence appeals conducted between 1973 and 1995, more than two-thirds were successful in state
or federal courts, chiefly because of incompetent defense counsel; police and prosecutors who had
suppressed exculpatory evidence or committed some other form of professional misconduct; juries
that had been misinformed about the law; or, finally, biased judges and/or juries), available at
http://justice.policy.net/cjedfind/dpstudy (last visited June 27, 2004). But see generally M. Christine
Cagle & J. Michael Martinez, Social Science Data and the Death Penalty, in THE LEVIATHAN'S
CHOICE 141 (J. Michael Martinez et al. eds., 2002) (providing various criticisms of the Liebman
study).
780
Conduct of Comparative Proportionality Review
death penalty studies have recently been conducted in Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Virginia, and at the federal level.2 7 In
addition, legislatures in thirty-seven of the thirty-eight states that now
provide for the death penalty considered reforms to its administration
during their legislative sessions in 2001, with twenty-one of those states
adopting at least one such reform.28 Statements by public figures and in
opinion polls also show a growing concern about the death penalty's
fairness. For example, several long-time supporters of the death penalty,
including George Will, the Reverend Pat Robertson, and Oliver North
have expressed reservations about the death penalty based on concerns
29
about the fairness of its administration. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
a longtime advocate of the death penalty, delivered two speeches in 2001
in which she noted that "serious questions" have been raised in recent
years "about whether the death penalty is being fairly administered in
this country. ' 30 Attesting to the cumulative effect of the publicity
afforded to such concerns, a Gallup poll conducted in 2000 indicated
that a bare majority of Americans (51%) believe that the death penalty is
applied fairly, while 41% believe that it is not.31 Moreover, support for
the death penalty in national polls has dropped from about 77% to 63%
since 1996.32 In 2000, while 53% of Americans "favored a nationwide
suspension of executions until a study is completed on the fairness of
27. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2002: YEAR END REPORT
4 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/yrendrpt02.pdf (last visited June 27,
2004); DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2001: YEAR END REPORT
5-7 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEndReport200l.pdf (last visited
June 27, 2004).
28. See The Justice Project, 2001 State Legislation on Death Penalty Reform at a Glimpse, at
http://justice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=27021 &PROACTIVE_ID=cececfcbc8
cdcfc7c6c5cecfcfcfc5cececbc6cbcac8ccc9c9c5cf (last visited June 30, 2004).
29. See ABC This Week: Roundtable Discussion of the Death Penalty Moratorium (ABC
television broadcast, Apr. 9, 2000) (discussing the death penalty, George Will expressed his
conviction that innocent persons have been executed, and Pat Robertson expressed his support for a
moratorium on executions because of concern about capital punishment's unfairness to the poor and
minorities); see also Robert Reno, Support for Death Penalty Goes Wobbly, DES MOINES REG.,
June 12, 2000, at 7A (quoting Oliver North: "I think capital punishment's day is done in this
country. I don't think it's fairly applied.").
30. Editorial, Second Thoughts, WASH. POST, July 4, 2001, at A18.
31. Press Release, Jeffrey M. Jones, The Gallup Organization, Slim Majority Think Death
Penalty Applied Fairly in this Country (June 30, 2000), available at http://www.gallup.com/content/
login.aspx?ci=2761 (last visited July 10, 2004).
32. Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Support for Death Penalty Eases: McVeigh's Execution
Approved, While Principle Splits Public, WASH. POST, May 3, 2001, at A9.
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how the death penalty is used," only 29% opposed this
recommendation.33
Together, these concerns about the death penalty's fairness pose
questions about whether the procedural reforms adopted by the states
after 1972 and approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 have
rendered the death penalty any less arbitrary and capricious than it was
deemed in Furman. A mounting body of evidence suggests that the
safeguards affirmed in Gregg do not in fact ensure the equitable
administration of the death penalty demanded by Furman.34 If that is so,
then it is hard to escape the conclusion of James Liebman and his
associates, authors of a comprehensive national study of error rates in
capital cases: "the time has come to fix the death penalty, or end it."
35
The purpose of this Article is to examine the efficacy of one of the
less frequently discussed safeguards commended by the Gregg plurality
in authorizing the reinstatement of capital punishment.36 Specifically,
this Article evaluates the adoption and implementation of comparative
proportionality review throughout Washington's judicial system.
Comparative proportionality review is a statutorily mandated procedure
intended to combat the two problems that arise when excessive
discretion is granted to a jury vested with the authority to impose the
death penalty.37 By comparing any given death sentence with the
penalties imposed on others convicted of death-eligible crimes,
comparative proportionality review is intended to serve two purposes.38
First, it is intended to ensure that there is a rationally defensible basis for
distinguishing those sentenced to die from those who are not.39 Second,
it is intended to prevent death sentences predicated on constitutionally
impermissible factors such as economic status or racial identity, whether
33. Henry Weinstein, Support for Executions Declines, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000, at A26.
34. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); see supra note 3
(citing articles examining some of the mounting evidence against the equitable administration of the
death penalty).
35. JAMES LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART 1I: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN
CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 478 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter BROKEN
SYSTEM II], available at http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/dpstudy (last visited June 27, 2004).
36. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976) (plurality opinion).
37. Id. at 188-89 (plurality opinion) (expressing concern about excessive discretion on the part of
sentencers).
38. Id. at 204-06 (plurality opinion) (discussing comparative proportionality review as a remedy
for prejudice and arbitrariness).
39. Id.
Vol. 79:775, 2004
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of the defendant or the victim. 40
The evidence adduced in this Article is drawn chiefly from
Washington, and many of its claims are specific to that state's
comparative proportionality review. However, the flaws identified by
this analysis suggest a broader conclusion: the implementation of
comparative proportionality review over the last three decades has not
provided, and indeed cannot provide, an adequate safeguard against the
arbitrary and capricious administration of capital punishment. The
predicaments encountered by the Washington State Supreme Court in its
conduct of comparative proportionality review are indicative and, in
part, constitutive of the defining dilemma that courts have struggled to
resolve over the course of the past three decades in attempting to craft a
constitutionally coherent doctrine regarding capital punishment.4 1
Specifically, the deficiencies of comparative proportionality review in
Washington mirror the judiciary's difficulties in fashioning a principled
standpoint that will ensure that the death penalty is administered in a
way that meets the standards of fairness in two distinct and arguably
incompatible senses of the term. First, administration of the death
penalty must be fair in the sense that it must be restricted to, as well as
consistently applied to, only the most heinous criminals found guilty of
the most heinous crimes.42 Second, it must be fair in the sense that the
judicial processes that generate, review, and affirm death sentences must
provide full consideration to the individualized character and
circumstances of each capital defendant.43 Insofar as the practice of
comparative proportionality review in Washington founders on the
competing claims of these two understandings of fairness, this Article
indicates why, of the two options proposed by Liebman and his
associates, to fix or to abolish the death penalty, only the latter is
compatible with the diverse imperatives of justice.
Parts I and II of this Article offer two contexts for understanding the
40. Id.
41. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 357, 417-18
(1995).
42. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (stating that capital punishment is "an extreme
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes").
43. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that a
"process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the
ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from
the diverse frailties of humankind").
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practice of comparative proportionality review as it is currently
conducted in Washington. Part I examines the ethical and legal
justifications as well as the constitutional history behind this practice.
Part II looks at the logic of comparative proportionality review, i.e., the
principal conceptual questions that must be answered in order to
translate an abstract statutory commitment into a coherent judicial
practice. Part II.A addresses the question of how to define the universe
of cases deemed relevant to the conduct of such review. Part II.B
addresses the question of how to extract from this universe the smaller
pool of cases considered similar to any given case on appeal. Part II.C
addresses the question of how to designate the criteria necessary to
generate and sustain the conclusion that a death sentence under review is
or is not proportionate. Part III then examines the history of comparative
proportionality review's adoption in Washington. Part IV analyzes the
principal deficiencies of comparative proportionality review as currently
practiced. Specifically, Part IV.A examines deficiencies in the database
of cases that the Washington State Supreme Court is statutorily required
to consider in conducting comparative proportionality review, and Part
IV.B critiques the way in which the court has actually conducted its
proportionality reviews. Finally, Part V returns to the broader
implications of comparative proportionality review for the current
controversy regarding the fairness of capital punishment in
contemporary America.
I. COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: ITS
JUSTIFICATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Within the context of capital punishment jurisprudence, comparative
proportionality review is a procedure by which a court determines
whether a death sentence is consistent with the usual pattern of
sentencing decisions in similar cases.44 The justification for such review
is predicated on the concept of fairness. As Margaret Radin has argued,
the commitment to such review is a logical extension of our collective
endorsement of a Kantian concept of justice and, more particularly, our
dedication to fairness.45 Because all individuals are entitled to equal
dignity under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
44. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-05 (plurality opinion).
45. Margaret J. Radin, Proportionality, Subjectivity, and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165,
1165-66 (1985).
Vol. 79:775, 2004
Conduct of Comparative Proportionality Review
Amendment,46 fairness dictates that like crimes should be punished
alike. By extension, it is unfair to mete out harsher punishment to certain
members of a class of persons convicted of the same crime.47
Conversely, it is unfair to impose a less harsh punishment on some
convicted of the same crime (leaving aside for now the complications
involved in determining what qualifies as the "same" crime).48
Determination of consistency in the context of capital punishment
necessarily involves assessing the proportionality of a death sentence by
comparing it to similar cases in which the death penalty has or could
have been imposed. Granted, in particular cases, comparative analysis
may not be imperative in order to determine whether a death sentence
has been imposed as a result of constitutionally impermissible
considerations such as race. Such comparative analysis, however, is a
crucial means of determining whether a systematic pattern of arbitrary
(in the sense of discriminatory) sentencing exists in any given
jurisdiction and hence, whether fairness (in the sense of equal treatment)
has been achieved.
A general commitment to proportionality as a vital ingredient of
fairness is expressed in the text of the U.S. Constitution.49 The Eighth
Amendment prohibits "excessive" bail and fines, and proscribes
"unusual" punishments.5° Obviously, neither what is "excessive," nor
what is "unusual," can be determined absent consideration of some norm
from which such punishments are said to depart. What is less apparent is
whether the U.S. Constitution specifically requires comparative
proportionality review or, as some have argued,51 only "inherent"
proportionality review. 52 The latter requires that any given punishment
be commensurate to the offense in question.53 On this account, a specific
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. Radin, supra note 45, at 1166.
48. Id.
49. See Daryl P. Rush, Note, Constitutional Law--Safeguarding Eighth Amendment Rights with a
Comparative Proportionality Review in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 28 How. L.J. 331,
333-34 (1985) (providing an account of the English origins of the U.S. Constitution's commitment
to proportionality as an element of fair sentencing).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5 1. See Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (with
Lessonsfrom New Jersey), 64 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1162-63 (2001).
52. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984) (elaborating on the distinction between these
two forms of proportionality review).
53. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382
(1910).
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punishment may be deemed unconstitutional because it is excessive per
se, without reference to sentences imposed on others for the same
crime.54 For example, in Coker v. Georgia,55 a plurality of the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that the death penalty is always
disproportionate to the crime of rape of an adult. 6 Justifying this
conclusion, the Court first asked whether the death penalty, when
imposed for this crime, advances either of the constitutionally
permissible purposes of capital punishment: retribution or deterrence. 7
Unless the death penalty significantly contributes to one or both of these
goals, as the Court later elaborated in Enmund v. Florida,58 "it 'is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment., 59 Second, the
Court asked whether the punishment imposed, "is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime., 60 Because rape, unlike murder,
does not involve the taking of life, the Coker plurality concluded that
death is an excessive and hence unconstitutional penalty for this
category of offense.61
Unlike the Court in Coker, the Furman Court's principal concern was
not that of the inherent disproportionality of death as a punishment for a
particular category of crimes, but rather the comparative inconsistency
between sentences imposed on different persons found guilty of similar
62crimes. Because of the unbridled discretion vested in judges and juries,
existing capital punishment statutes generated a pattern of death
54. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01; Weems, 217 U.S. at 382.
55. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). There are two principal antecedents to Coker, each of which rests on the
concept of inherent disproportionality. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 (holding that, according to "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," deprivation of
citizenship is an excessive punishment for a conviction imposed by a court martial for the offense of
wartime desertion); Weems, 217 U.S. at 382 (holding that fifteen years of incarceration with hard
labor is an excessive punishment for the crime of falsifying a public document).
56. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
57. Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
58. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
59. Id. at 798 (citation omitted).
60. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion). Arguably, the Coker plurality advanced a second
rationale for its conclusion as well. In 1977, when Coker was decided, only three states authorized
the death penalty for rape. Id. at 595-96 (plurality opinion). In two of these states, the victim had to
be a child in order to warrant a death sentence. Id. On this basis, the Court concluded that the
penalty of death for rape was no longer consistent with public opinion, as reflected in state statutes,
and, as such, was no longer congruent with contemporary norms of appropriate punishment. Id.
61. Id. at 598 (plurality opinion).
62. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
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sentencing, which, according to Justice Brennan, "smacks of little more
than a lottery system., 63 In part, that "lottery" is problematic because, as
Justice Douglas suggested, one can explain why some are sentenced to
death while others are not only by citing forms of discrimination that
offend the principles of equality under the law.64 However, it is also
problematic because it may generate too many as well as too few death
sentences. 65 On the one hand, Furman implied a concern about the
problem of overinclusion. If death penalty statutes fail to provide juries
adequate guidance in determining what counts as the most death-worthy
offenses, an offender may be sentenced to death for a crime that does not
so qualify.66 On the other hand, Furman also implied a concern about the
problem of underinclusion. If the death penalty is imposed in only a
small number of the cases for which it is legally available, it may prove
difficult, if not impossible, to articulate a coherent basis for
differentiating between the few who are sentenced to death and the many
who receive life sentences.67 As Justice Brennan summarized, "[w]hen
the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in
which it is legally available "the conclusion is virtually inescapable that
it is being inflicted arbitrarily.
68
The immediate effect of Furman was to prompt state legislatures to
revise their death penalty statutes in an effort to address the Court's
concerns about excessive discretion.69 The Court first evaluated the
constitutionality of these efforts in Woodson v. North Carolina.70 In that
case, the Court struck down a North Carolina statute that mandated the
death penalty for everyone convicted of first-degree or felony murder.71
While the statute was intended to eliminate inconsistent sentencing
patterns, Justice Stewart concluded that such a mandatory sentencing
63. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
65. See Donald H. Wallace & Jonathan R. Sorenson, A State Supreme Court's Review of
Comparative Proportionality: Explanations for Three Disproportionate and Executed Death
Sentences, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 207, 251-52 (1998) [hereinafter Explanations].
66. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 38-45 (1986) (providing an account of the state legislative activity generated by the
Furman ruling).
70. 428 U.S. 280(1976).
71. Id. at 305 (plurality opinion).
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provision does not allow for "particularized consideration of relevant
aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant before
the imposition upon him of a sentence of death. 72 Predicated on the
belief that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence
of imprisonment, however long, the Woodson Court insisted that
"individualiz[ed] sentencing" is a "constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of death. 73
In contrast, in Gregg v. Georgia74 the Court found Georgia's revised
statute to be constitutional.75 The Georgia legislature sought to meet
Furman's concerns by adopting three reforms.76 First, it bifurcated
capital proceedings into an initial phase to determine guilt or innocence
and a subsequent phase to determine the appropriate sentence to be
imposed upon those found guilty.77 Second, in order to guide jury
deliberations, it required that juries consider and, if applicable, weigh
statutorily prescribed aggravating factors against mitigating factors
before determining the appropriateness of a death sentence. 8 Third, and
of principal interest here, it mandated appellate review of all death
sentences, including the requirement that the Georgia State Supreme
Court conduct comparative proportionality analyses.79
More precisely, the Georgia law required its highest court to
determine whether any given death sentence "is excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant. 8 ° Should the court determine that
72. Id. at 303 (pluraiity opinion). At the same time, a plurality of the Court found unconstitutional
a Louisiana statute, which, like its North Carolina counterpart, also required the imposition of death
sentences for certain crimes. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329 (1976) (plurality opinion). In
addition to arguing that such a procedure fails to allow particularized consideration of any given
defendant's character and record, the Woodson and Roberts pluralities concluded that this
requirement offends contemporary standards of decency and perpetuates the concerns about
arbitrariness identified in Furman, specifically by encouraging the practice of jury nullification. Id.
at 347 (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion).
73. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion).
74. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
75. Id. at 207 (plurality opinion).
76. Id. at 153-54 (plurality opinion).
77. Criminal Law-Provisions for Imposition of Death Penalty Made, 1973 Ga. Laws 74 § I
(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2(c) (1996)).
78. Criminal Law-Provisions for Imposition of Death Penalty Made, 1973 Ga. Laws 74 § 3
(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (1996)).
79. Criminal Law-Provisions for Imposition of Death Penalty Made, 1973 Ga. Laws 74 § 4
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Georgia juries do not generally impose the death penalty in factually
similar cases, even if otherwise properly imposed, that sentence was to
be set aside and the case remanded for resentencing. 81 Commending this
requirement, the Gregg plurality predicted:
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-
sentencing system serves as a check against the random or
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the
proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an
aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not
impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the
appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted
under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death.82
In addition, the plurality commended the statutory provision that
required trial judges to complete and submit a standard questionnaire to
the state's highest court within ten days of sentencing.83 That
questionnaire required the trial judge to determine the influence, if any,
of "passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor" 84  in the
deliberations of the sentencing authority and, in addition, to assess
whether the evidence adduced at trial sustains the finding of at least one
aggravating circumstance, which is a statutory prerequisite for the death
sentence's imposition.85 Finally, the Georgia statute required the state's
highest court to include express "reference to those similar cases which
it took into consideration" in rendering its judgment regarding
proportionality,86 thereby ensuring that its rationale would be expressly
81. See id.
82. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion). Additionally, Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, predicted that "if the Georgia Supreme Court
properly performs the task assigned to it under the Georgia statutes, death sentences imposed for
discriminatory reasons or wantonly or freakishly will be set aside." Id. at 224 (White, J.,
concurring).
83. Id. at 167-68 (plurality opinion).
84. Criminal Law-Provisions for Imposition of Death Penalty Made, 1973 Ga. Laws 74 § 4
(codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(1) (1996)).
85. Id. (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(2) (1996)).
86. Id. (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(e) (1996)). The Court's commitment to the
importance of using comparative proportionality review was effectively reaffirmed in Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876 (1983). In Zant, the Georgia death penalty statute was once again
upheld, in part because of its comparative proportionality review provision. Id. at 876-77. At issue
was whether invalidation of one of the three aggravating factors supporting the death sentence
invalidated the sentence imposed. Id. at 864. The Court concluded that the narrowing function
performed by the two valid factors adequately distinguished the case under review from other
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articulated.
In the wake of Gregg, virtually all states whose death penalty statutes
were invalidated by Furman re-crafted their laws, with many adopting
the Georgia statute as their model. 87 Indeed, twenty-six states enacted
reformed statutes that included comparative proportionality review
provisions similar or, in many cases, identical to those adopted by the
Georgia legislature. 88 Three additional states adopted comparative
proportionality review as a result of state court decisions. 89 However,
while Gregg established that Georgia's death penalty statute was
sufficient to meet the concerns articulated in Furman,90 it did not resolve
the question of whether any or all of the specific procedural safeguards
adopted by that state were necessary in order to render any given capital
statute consonant with the U.S. Constitution and, more particularly, the
Eighth Amendment.
The Court answered that question in Pulley v. Harris,9' in 1984,
holding that comparative proportionality review of death sentences is not
constitutionally required.92 Writing for the Court, Justice White
acknowledged that the Gregg plurality had "made much" of Georgia's
adoption of comparative proportionality review. 93 However, he insisted,
the Court had not declared "that comparative review was so critical that
without it the Georgia statute would not have passed constitutional
muster., 94 Moreover, Justice White noted that when the Court decided
Gregg, it simultaneously approved a revised Texas death penalty statute
Georgia murder cases in which the death penalty had not been imposed. Id. at 879. Moreover, the
Court upheld the sentence on the grounds that the Georgia State Supreme Court had reviewed the
sentence to determine whether it was disproportionate. Id.
87. See Latzer, supra note 51, at 1168 n.29 (listing the states that adopted comparative
proportionality review by statutory reform during the decade following Furman).
88. Id.
89. Arizona adopted proportionality review in State v. Richmond, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (Ariz. 1976).
Arkansas did so in Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 106, 119 (Ark. 1977). Florida followed suit in
Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 1995).
90. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion).
91. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
92. Id. at 43-44.
93. Id. at 45.
94. Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the grounds that comparative proportionality
review has been shown to "eliminate some, if only a small part, of the irrationality that currently
surrounds the imposition of the death penalty," and thus should be required by the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 60-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that did not include a provision for comparative proportionality review.95
While the California statute at issue in Pulley, did not provide for
comparative proportionality review, it did endeavor to limit the
discretion of juries. 96 Specifically, the statute "minimize[d] the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action" by bifurcating capital trials into
separate guilt and sentencing phases, as well as by requiring
consideration of aggravating and mitigating. factors.97 Justice White
acknowledged that a statute of the sort approved in Pulley "may
occasionally produce aberrational outcomes," but insisted that "such
inconsistencies are a far cry from the major systemic defects identified
in Furman."98 Therefore, while every valid death penalty statute must
incorporate some "means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and
consistent imposition of death sentences," 99 those means need not
include comparative proportionality review.' 00
Shortly after Pulley was decided, nine states repealed their statutory
comparative proportionality review requirements; and several others that
had been required to adopt comparative proportionality review by state
supreme court mandate abandoned the practice as well.' 0° On this basis,
95. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 48; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
96. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45.
97. Id. at 53.
98. Id. at 54.
99. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
100. The Court's retreat from its endorsement of comparative proportionality review in Gregg
was further cemented by its ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, a
black man convicted of murdering a white police officer sought habeas corpus relief in federal
court, alleging that the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered in a racially
discriminatory manner and, as such, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 286. In
support of this claim, McCleskey offered a statistical study on the imposition of the death sentence
in Georgia that demonstrated significant disparities based, most significantly, on the race of the
murder victim. Id. at 286-87. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's claim, holding that in
order to prevail he was required to prove that the judge or jury in his particular case had acted with
discriminatory purpose. Id. at 297-98. The net effect of this decision was to undercut one of the two
central rationales for comparative proportionality review: that of preventing the sort of prejudicial
decision-making that can only be determined by comparing any given sentence with the overall
pattern of death sentencing in the relevant jurisdiction.
101. See Latzer, supra note 51, at 1168 n.31 (listing the states that repealed comparative
proportionality review following Pulley); see also Penny J. White, Can Lightning Strike Twice?
Obligations of State Courts After Pulley v. Harris, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 813, 848-49 (1999)
(discussing why Arkansas and Arizona abandoned the mandatory practice of comparative
proportionality review following Pulley). It should be noted, however, that three other state
legislatures adopted comparative proportionality review after Pulley. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(Xi)(c) (1996); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2001); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1997). In fact, Tennessee reinstated this practice in 1997 after
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Leigh Bienen concluded that, following Pulley, "the majority of state
high courts reduced proportionality review to a perfunctory exercise."'' 2
Moreover, of the state appellate decisions in capital cases rendered
between 1975 and April 1996, only fifty-five death sentences were
vacated on the ground of disproportionality, while 1376 death sentences
were affirmed. 0 3 Despite this record, twenty of the thirty-eight states
that provide for capital punishment continue to require comparative
proportionality review by statute.10 4 In addition, the State Supreme
Courts of Florida and Arkansas continue to incorporate comparative
proportionality review into their death sentence reviews, although not
required to do so by statute. 0
5
Neither the infrequent and often superficial conduct of such review,
nor the lack of an Eighth Amendment mandate for such review, answers
the question of whether the determination of comparative proportionality
is crucial in order to fashion a system of capital punishment that is
consonant with the claims of fairness. That question acquires additional
urgency in light of the contemporary controversy over the death penalty.
One of the principal recommendations of the commission on capital
punishment convened by Governor Ryan is that "the Illinois Supreme
Court should consider on direct appeal ... whether the sentence of death
was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
repealing it in 1992. Latzer, supra note 51, at 1168 n.3 1.
102. Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After
Gregg: Only "The Appearance of Justice"?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 133 (1996).
103. Donald H. Wallace & Jonathan R. Sorenson, Comparative Proportionality Review: A
Nationwide Examination of Reversed Death Sentences, 22 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 13, 35 (1997)
[hereinafter Nationwide Examination].
104. The states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. I1, § 4209(g)(2)(a) (1995); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1997); Kentucky, KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Michie 1999); Louisiana, LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.9.l(1)(c) (West 1997); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (1999); Missouri, MO.
ANN. STAT. § 565.035.3(3) (West 1999); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310(l)(c) (1999);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03 (1995); New Hampshire. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(X1)(c) (1996); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I1-3(e) (West 1995); New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(4) (Michie 2000); New York, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(3)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 2001); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1999); Ohio, OHIO
REV. CODE. ANN. § 2929.05(A) (Anderson 1999); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(c)(3)
(Law. Co-op. 1985); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-12(3) (Michie 1998);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1997); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN.
§ 17.1-313(c)(2) (Michie 1999); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (1990).
105. See Wallace & Sorenson, Nationwide Examination, supra note 103, at 16 (providing a table
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cases." 0 6 Echoing the statutory provisions commended in Gregg, the
commission also urged that information "be collected at the trial level
with respect to prosecutions of first-degree murder cases, by trial judges,
which would detail information that could prove valuable in assessing
whether the death penalty is, in fact, being fairly applied."' 1 7 Among
other recommendations, the national study of error rates in capital cases
conducted by Liebman and his colleagues concluded by exhorting each
jurisdiction to consider "using comparative review of murder sentences
to identify what counts as 'the worst of the worst' in the state, and
overturning outlying death verdicts."' 1 8  Finally, in 2001, The
Constitution Project, a bipartisan, nonprofit organization, recommended:
Every state should adopt procedures for ensuring that death
sentences are meted out in a proportionate manner to make sure
that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, non-
arbitrary, and even-handed fashion, to provide a check on broad
prosecutorial discretion, and to prevent discrimination from
playing a role in the capital decision-making process. 10 9
In sum, we are now in the midst of a national debate about capital
punishment fueled by renewed articulations of the concerns, initially
advanced in Furman, about the arbitrary and/or discriminatory
imposition of the death penalty. In response to these concerns,
comparative proportionality review is once again being offered as a
possible remedy for that worry. Especially in light of the Ridgway plea
bargain, challenges in future murder cases will almost certainly be
mounted on the grounds of disproportionality. For all of these reasons, it
behooves us to ask whether in principle or in practice such review can be
conducted in a way that effectively responds to the concerns about
fairness that first prompted its adoption.
106. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 23, at Recommendation 70.
107. Id. at Recommendation 84.
108. BROKEN SYSTEM I1, supra note 35, at 7.
109. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: EIGHTEEN REFORMS TO THE
DEATH PENALTY 27 (2001); see also RACHEL KING, BROKEN JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY IN
VIRGINIA 55 (Nov. 2003) (recommending, among other reforms, that the "Virginia Supreme Court
should keep a database of all murder convictions-those where the death penalty was imposed and
those where it was not-to use for proportionality reviews," in a study by the American Civil
Liberties Union of Virginia and the ACLU Capital Punishment Project endorsed by groups as
diverse as the Rutherford Institute and Amnesty International USA), available at
http://www.acluva.org (last visited July 29, 2004).
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II. THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW
There is no single model of comparative proportionality review to
which all state appellate courts adhere, and, as indicated below, no
model is without problems. That said, the logic of this task requires a
jurisdiction to perform three basic steps in order to implement
comparative proportionality review.110 First, a court must select the
universe of cases to be considered when such reviews are conducted."'
Second, a court must choose the pool of cases deemed "similar" to a
specific case on appeal." 12 Third, a court must decide whether a specific
case is proportionate when measured against the pool of similar cases. 113
Because any judgment about the comparative proportionality of a death
sentence is relative in the sense that it is determined through reference to
whatever other cases are included for the purposes of comparison,
resolution of the first two steps will go a long way toward dictating the
results of the third. This also means that any problems in a jurisdiction's
resolution of each of the earlier steps will taint those that follow.
110. See Richard Van Duizend, Comparative Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases:
What? How? Why?, 8 ST. CT. J. 9,9-13 (1984).
111. Id. at 11-12.
112. Id. at 10-11.
113. Id. at 12-13. Some commentators have assessed how states other than Washington have
addressed the three-step analysis of comparative proportionality review. See generally Rhonda
Hartman, Critiquing Pennsylvania's Comparative Proportionality Review in Capital Cases, 52 U.
PITT. L. REV. 871 (1991) (assessing Pennsylvania's analysis of comparative proportionality
review); Ellen Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique of Proportionality
Review, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1433 (1985) (assessing Georgia's analysis of comparative
proportionality review); Lawrence S. Lustberg & Lenora M. Lapidus, The Importance of Saving the
Universe, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1423 (1996) (assessing New Jersey's analysis of comparative
proportionality review); Joseph H. Rodriguez et al., Proportionality Review in New Jersey: An
Indispensable Safeguard in the Capital Sentencing Process, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (1984) (arguing
that New Jersey's conduct of comparative proportionality review is essential to the fair
administration of the death penalty); Wallace & Sorenson, Explanations, supra note 65 (assessing
Missouri's analysis of comparative proportionality review). Others have given cross-state
assessments. See generally DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
280 (1990) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE] (analyzing the effectiveness of different methods of
conducting comparative proportionality review); Bienen, supra note 102 (criticizing the conduct of
comparative proportionality review on the ground that it provides only an illusion of fairness);
Wallace & Sorenson, Nationwide Examination, supra note 103 (providing a national examination of
death sentences reversed on the ground of disproportionality).
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A. Determining the Universe of Cases for Comparison
Most state statutes provide little or no guidance about how to
determine the universe of cases for comparison.' 14 Appropriating the
language adopted in Georgia, most mandate merely that appellate courts
decide whether a particular death sentence is "excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant." ' 1 5 Accordingly, appellate courts must
independently determine the universe of cases relevant to such
comparisons. In this task, a court has a number of options. For the sake
of illustrating the range of possibilities, as well as what is at stake in the
choice of one as opposed to another, this section will outline the most
restrictive as well as the most expansive methods of determining the
universe of cases for comparison.
Most restrictively, a court can limit its comparative review to only
those cases that resulted in death sentences upheld on appeal. 116 Or,
somewhat more broadly, it can limit review to all cases advancing to
penalty-phase trials, regardless of whether those proceedings did or did
not result in death sentences.' 1 7 This method is intuitively appealing
114. White, supra note 101, at 842.
115. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c) (2003); Steven M. Sprenger, Note, A Critical Evaluation
of State Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA L. REV. 719,
727, 738-40 (1986) (making the claim that after the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia statute a
"majority of states with statutory authorization for the death penalty adopted similar or identical
comparative proportionality review legislation").
116. See, e.g., Sanbom v. State, 892 S.W.2d 542, 556 (Ky. 1994) (considering all cases in which
death penalty was imposed, as required by statute), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 854 (1995); State v.
Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 737 (Neb. 1986) (finding the universe of death-sentenced cases to be "a
threshold requirement for comparative study"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987); State v.
Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63, 74 (S.C. 1982) (relying only on death-sentenced cases because "fact
findings of the trial court . . . provide a fundamental line of demarcation" and because a larger
universe would cause the court to "enter a realm of pure conjecture" and to engage in "intolerable
speculation"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 (1983).
117. See, e.g., Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 139 (Del. 1980) (declaring it "inherently fair,
logical and necessary to prevent disproportionate sentencing that this Court compare the sentence
below to the facts and circumstances of cases in which a capital sentencing proceeding was actually
conducted, whether the murderers have been sentenced to life imprisonment or death"), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 865 (1985); State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 685 (Mo. 1982) (finding that "inquiry would
be unduly slanted were [the court] to compare only those cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed" and deeming "similar those cases in which both death and life imprisonment were
submitted to the jury") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137 (1983); State v. Rhines, 548
N.W.2d 415, 455-56 (S.D. 1996) (finding that "because the aim of proportionality review is to
ascertain what other capital sentencing authorities have done with similar capital murder offenses,
the only cases that could be deemed similar.., are those in which imposition of the death penalty
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because, on its face, it seems reasonable to determine the proportionality
of any given death sentence by comparing it to other cases deemed
sufficiently heinous to warrant the same punishment. That said, this
method suffers from an obvious deficiency. To examine only those cases
that culminated in death sentences, or those in which this sentence was
considered by a jury during the penalty phase, is to deprive an appellate
court of any means of calculating the relative frequency with which this
penalty is imposed in the larger class of first-degree murders. Doing so
defeats the very purpose of comparative proportionality review because
an appellate court is thereby deprived of any basis for determining how
many persons convicted of first-degree murder were spared the death
penalty. The New Jersey State Supreme Court, in State v. Marshall,'1
8
offered the following hypothetical to illustrate this point:
On the assumption that 100 robbery-felony-murder cases are
prosecuted as capital crimes, all defendants are convicted and
one defendant is sentenced to death, a comparison of the death-
sentenced defendant's punishment with the punishment imposed
only on other death-sentenced defendants would exclude from
the proportionality-review process the ninety-nine robbery-
felony-murder defendants that juries did not sentence to death.
Indisputably, the determination whether that single death
sentence is disproportionate can be made only by comparing it
with the life sentences imposed on the ninety-nine defendants
convicted of the same crime." 19
Absent such comparison, this method constructs a universe of cases
that tilts comparative proportionality review in favor of upholding any
given death sentence. 2° Equally important, it fails to answer the
question posed by Justice White in Furman: How is one to meaningfully
distinguish the few cases in which death sentences are imposed from the
many that result in sentences of life imprisonment? 121
At the opposite end of the spectrum, in determining the relevant
universe of cases, a court may elect to review all cases in which the facts
was properly before the sentencing authority for determination") (citation omitted), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1013 (1996).
118. 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).
119. Id. at 1071.
120. Sprenger, supra note 115, at 738-40 (concluding that states that exclude life sentence cases
from the universe of comparative cases engage in the least effective approach to identify
disproportionate sentences).
121. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
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provide the legal basis for a possible capital prosecution, regardless of
whether such prosecution actually ensues.122 The National Center for
State Courts recommended such a position in 1984, when it proposed
that "the pool of cases for a proportionality review system should
contain, as a minimum, all cases in which the indictment included a
death-eligible charge, and a homicide conviction was obtained."'' 23 This
method overcomes the principal deficiency of the first because, by not
limiting its universe to those crimes that culminate in death sentences, it
provides a more inclusive indication of the diverse ways that the law
disposes of first-degree murders. Additionally, this method seeks to
remedy not merely the problems occasioned by the discretionary
authority of juries, but also by the discretion exercised by prosecutors
when they choose whether or not to seek the death penalty in any given
case. 124 Building on the hypothetical cited above, the New Jersey State
Supreme Court explained:
Were we to assume that the remaining ninety-nine defendants
were prosecuted and convicted of non-capital murder because of
prosecutorial decisions not to seek the death penalty, the
disproportionality of the single defendant's death sentence
would arise not because of a disproportionate jury determination
but because the prosecutorial decision to seek the death penalty
was unique. That type of disproportionate death sentence could
not be identified by a proportionality-review process that was
limited to [capital cases tried to] a penalty phase; it could be
122. New York, for example, has defined a broad universe encompassing some homicide cases
that were not capitally prosecuted. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 211-a (McKinney 2003); N.Y. CT. R.
§ 510.18 (authorizing collection of case data for every criminal action in which defendant is
indicted for first-degree murder).
123. THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, USER MANUAL FOR PROTOTYPE
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW SYSTEMS A-8 (1984) [hereinafter USER MANUAL]. The report noted:
In most jurisdictions, this guideline will mean all cases in which the defendant was charged
with first degree murder and convicted of first- or second-degree murder or manslaughter. It
is to include convictions resulting from a plea of guilty as well as those following a trial, and
life sentences resulting from the absence of any aggravating circumstances as well as those
stemming from a jury's apparent determination to exercise mercy after finding a defendant
legally eligible for capital punishment.
Id.
124. See Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1070-73 (arguing on behalf of a broad-based universe of cases
and explaining that the exclusion of non-capital murder cases, for example, could lead to
disproportionality due to prosecutorial discretion); BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 113, at
211-12 (arguing that a restrictive specification of the universe of similar cases renders prosecutorial
discretion immune to judicial oversight).
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identified, however, by a universe that included clearly death-
eligible homicides that were not prosecuted as capital cases.
125
This expansive method of determining the scope of the universe also
suffers from serious flaws. 126 For example, a prosecutor's decision to
seek the death penalty may not be the best way to determine which cases
should be included in the universe of cases for comparison because,
often, for a number of reasons, prosecutors will elect not to seek a death
sentence even when the facts of a case render this option available.
Courts are therefore put in the position of engaging in independent
discovery of the cases they deem death-eligible. As such, this method
imposes an exceedingly expensive and time-consuming burden on the
judiciary. In addition, because this method requires courts to render this
determination absent the full range of information available to
prosecutors, it introduces a highly speculative element into a given
universe's composition. Finally, because this method requires that courts
second-guess the judgments of prosecutors, it arguably poses
constitutional problems regarding the proper separation of powers
between the judicial and executive officers of state government and,
more particularly, the measure of discretion justifiably left to the
latter. 127
B. Specifying the Pool of Similar Cases
Once courts determine how to specify the relevant universe of cases,
they must then establish the criteria that enable determination of the
smaller pool of cases considered "similar" to that currently on appeal.'
2
As with the question of determining the universe of cases, this section
briefly discusses several ways of defining a pool of similar cases. 
29
125. Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1071 (emphasis in original).
126. See generally Latzer, supra note 51 (criticizing this method when examining the practice of
the New Jersey Supreme Court).
127. See Latzer, supra note 51, at 1204.
128. Of course, a court can simply duck this second issue by presupposing that all cases in
whatever universe it has specified are by definition "similar." However, that once again defeats the
very purpose of comparative proportionality review and thus does nothing to remedy the concerns
about the inconsistent application of capital punishment. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the
Washington State Supreme Court's post-1995 conflation of the categories of universe and pool).
129. See USER MANUAL, supra note 123, at A-4 to A-6 (stating the recommendations of the
National Center for State Courts on this question). See generally Baldus, supra note 113 (analyzing
the effectiveness of different methods of conducting comparative proportionality review); Bienen,
supra note 102 (criticizing the conduct of comparative proportionality review on the ground that it
provides only an illusion of fairness); Rhonda Hartman, Critiquing Pennsylvania's Comparative
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These differ from one another not so much in kind, but, rather, in degree
of abstraction from the concrete facts of the case being appealed. Each
suffers from significant practical and conceptual difficulties.
130
The most obvious, and perhaps the most intuitive, way to select a pool
of similar cases is to identify cases whose facts are the same as the case
under review. Literally construed, this method is impossible because no
two cases are ever identical. Moreover, if the notion of similarity is
construed in strictly factual terms, then a small number of concrete
differences will suffice to render any two cases distinguishable, which,
in turn, will render a court unable to fulfill its statutory mandate. 131 This
difficulty may be answered by identifying more general fact patterns that
are common to several cases. 32 A court, for example, might compare
cases that involved invasion of a victim's private residence, that were
Proportionality Review in Capital Cases, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 871 (1991) (assessing Pennsylvania's
analysis of comparative proportionality review); Ellen Liebman, Appellate Review of Death
Sentences: A Critique of Proportionality Review, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1433 (1985) (assessing
Georgia's analysis of comparative proportionality review); Lawrence S. Lustberg & Lenora M,
Lapidus, The Importance of Saving the Universe, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1423 (1996) (assessing
New Jersey's analysis of comparative proportionality review); Joseph H. Rodriguez et al.,
Proportionality Review in New Jersey: An Indispensable Safeguard in the Capital Sentencing
Process, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 399 (1984) (arguing that New Jersey's conduct of comparative
proportionality review is essential to the fair administration of the death penalty); Gregory M. Stein,
Distinguishing Among Murders When Assessing the Proportionality of the Death Penalty, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1786 (1985) (seeking to distinguish capital murder from other types of first-degree
murder); Wallace & Sorenson, Nationwide Examination, supra note 103 (providing a national
examination of death sentences reversed on the ground of disproportionality); Wallace & Sorenson,
Explanations, supra note 65 (assessing Missouri's analysis of comparative proportionality review).
130. As with different ways of specifying the universe of cases, these are not the only
conceivable methods by which a court might determine "similarity." Moreover, it is worth noting
that many courts have issued proportionality determinations absent any statement of the method
employed to determine similarity. See, e.g., DeYoung v. State, 493 S.E.2d 157, 168 (Ga. 1997)
(referring without discussion to appendix listing similar cases where the death penalty was upheld),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1141 (1998); Davis v. State, 660 So. 2d 1228, 1261-62 (Miss. 1995)
(referring without discussion to an appendix with list of capital cases the court previously affirmed),
cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192 (1996); Commonwealth v. Uderra, 706 A.2d 334, 342 (Pa. 1998)
(making passing reference to statistical data without mention of similar cases).
131. See, e.g., State v. Correll, 715 P.2d 721, 737 (Ariz. 1986) (finding no cases similar on every
factual point); Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 106, 122 (Ark. 1977) (determining no similar cases
because this was the first case reviewed under the new statute); State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d 619, 630
(S.C. 1984) ("Lacking precisely identical cases with which to compare these verdicts, we are
convinced that the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate in light of this crime
and these defendants.").
132. See, e.g., Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332, 350-51 (Miss. 1985) (concluding that all
robbery/murder cases were similar); State v. Lawson, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (N.C. 1984) (requiring
"roughly similar" fact patterns); Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407, 422 (Va. 1985)
(concluding that all murder for hire cases were similar).
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unprovoked, and that were preceded by the infliction of severe physical
abuse. However, this approach in and of itself does not answer the
question of which features are to be deemed sufficiently salient to merit
incorporation into a given fact pattern. For example, for the purposes of
identifying a pool of cases similar to one on review, is it relevant if all of
the victims were young African-American men or if all of the
perpetrators used a specific sort of weapon in committing their crimes?
Absent specification of the criteria to distinguish between significant and
insignificant similarities, such questions cannot be answered.
These problems are compounded when a court takes seriously the
standard statutory mandate to consider not just the nature of the crime,
but also the character of the defendant. Assessment of the latter typically
involves consideration of mitigating factors that may or may not have
been introduced during the sentencing phase of a trial. 133 However, any
attempt to render defendants comparable on this basis is likely to defy
categorization, because defendants are constitutionally permitted to
introduce all mitigating factors they deem relevant, including those that
are not expressly provided for by statute. 134 Mitigating factors, for
example, can include the death of a parent while a defendant was a child,
recent loss of a job, or prior service to the community. Should a court
elect to ignore mitigating factors because it determines that these
difficulties in comparing facts are insurmountable, it will fail to take into
account an indispensable measure of a defendant's culpability.
To overcome these difficulties in identifying a pool of similar cases,
courts often interpret the concept of similarity more broadly. 35 In
133. See David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of
the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 668-70 (1983) [hereinafter Georgia
Experience].
134. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (holding that any aspect of a defendant's
character or record may be introduced during the sentencing phase of a capital trial); Rhonda G.
Hartman, supra note 113, at 893-99 (discussing the difficulties involved in comparing cases on the
basis of mitigating factors).
135. See Baldus, Georgia Experience, supra note 133, at 671-72 (discussing the difference
between a fact-specific approach to identifying similar cases as opposed to an approach that seeks to
render a judgment regarding overall culpability); Baldus, Georgia Experience, supra note 133, at
675-78 (discussing the Georgia State Supreme Court's struggle with this question); BALDUS,
EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 113, at 285 (discussing the difficulties inherent in fact-specific
definitions of similar cases as well as the need for more general measures of defendant culpability);
Liebman, supra note 113, at 1438 (discussing the difficulties inherent in fact-specific as opposed to
broader methods of defining similar cases); Liebman, supra note 113, at 1442-58 (discussing the
Georgia State Supreme Court's varying definitions of similar cases in terms of "the same crime,"
"similar crimes," and "similar defendants"); Wallace & Sorenson, Nationwide Examination, supra
note 103, at 19-20.
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practice, courts most often accomplish this by identifying the relevant
features of a given case with whatever statutorily defined aggravating
factors were found applicable at trial.136 This might include the fact that
the offense in question was committed during the course of an armed
robbery, that the victim was a police officer, that the offender was
previously convicted of one or more homicides, etc.137 Alternatively, the
pool of similar cases is sometimes established not by identifying those
that share the same or similar aggravating factors, but, rather, those in
which the number of aggravating factors is the same or nearly so. 13 8
Because each of these approaches abstracts from the concrete
circumstances of any given case, all are capable of generating the
conclusion that cases differing markedly in strictly factual terms are
nonetheless comparable in terms of their overall type or level of
aggravation. That determination in turn is taken as an indicator of the
degree of heinousness of any given murder and thus the measure of
culpability to be ascribed to its perpetrator. 1
39
These approaches, however, are insufficient to differentiate
aggravated first-degree murder cases in which death sentences are
imposed from those in which this sentence is not imposed. The vast
majority of cases in which aggravating factors are found applicable do
not result in death sentences, no matter what their number, even when
those factors are identical to those of cases in which death sentences
were imposed.1 40 In addition, an approach that defines similarity in terms
136. See Baldus, Georgia Experience, supra note 133, at 670-72; Wallace & Sorenson,
Nationwide Examination, supra note 103, at 20; BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 113, at 201-
02.
137. See Baldus, Georgia Experience, supra note 133, at 670-72; Wallace & Sorenson,
Nationwide Examination, supra note 103, at 20; BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 113,201.
138. See Baldus, Georgia Experience, supra note 133, at 670-72; Wallace & Sorenson,
Nationwide Examination, supra note 103, 20; BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 113, at 201-02.
139. See, e.g., State v. Croggins, 716 P.2d 1152, 1158-61 (Idaho 1985) (vacating death sentence
imposed on one of two co-defendants on the ground of lesser culpability); State v. Windsor, 716
P.2d 1182, 1193-94 (Idaho 1985) (using culpability measure when comparing intracase sentences);
State v. Williams, 287 N.W.2d 18, 29 (Neb. 1979) (employing aggravating factors to determine
comparative culpability of different defendants); State v. Gaskin, 326 S.E.2d 132, 147 (S.C. 1985)
("The facts are not the same in any two cases and, accordingly, our review of the facts relate largely
to degrees of culpability of the defendants and the viciousness of the killing."); State v. Carter, 714
S.W.2d 241, 251 (Tenn. 1986) (using an assessment of culpability to distinguish accomplice's life
sentence); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 422, 440 (Va. 1985) (comparing defendant's
future dangerousness and vileness of the crime with previous defendants).
140. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2053-57
(2000) (stating that on average only three hundred of the approximately 21,000 homicides
committed in the United States each year result in death sentences, and that of the 6700 persons
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of statutorily defined factors is likely to disregard those which, although
not specified by law, a jury may find relevant in determining the
sentence. Hence, a focus on aggravating factors alone will not take into
account a defendant's willingness to cooperate with authorities or a
defendant's remorsefulness, while an approach that seeks to overcome
this difficulty by discovering what factors actually influenced sentencing
decisions is beset by its own difficulties. For example, while one jury
may conclude that prior drug use renders a crime less excusable, another
may deem it a mitigating factor. By the same token, the, existence of an
intimate relationship between offender and victim may lead one jury to
conclude that a murder is more inexplicable and so more heinous, while
another jury may conclude that such a relationship renders a murder
more understandable and hence its perpetrator more worthy of mercy.
In sum, approaches to the identification of a pool of similar cases that
rely on strictly factual similarity founder due to their concrete
specificity, whereas approaches that move away from the imperatives of
strictly factual congruence stumble over the pitfalls of abstraction. The
latter enables a court to assemble a group of cases for the purpose of
engaging in comparative proportionality review. However, in doing so, it
risks glossing over the facts that distinguish a case on review from other
members of the group to which it belongs, thereby jeopardizing the
principle that the fairness of the death penalty demands particularized
consideration of specific individuals and their crimes. The former
enables a court to engage in such particularized consideration, but, in
doing so, renders it difficult, if not impossible, to generate the
comparisons that assure us that any given death sentence is not arbitrary.
C. Identifying a Test of Proportionality
Once a court has identified the universe of cases to be considered and
specified the pool of cases deemed similar to the current case, it must
then resolve the final step in the logic of comparative proportionality
review: determination of whether a case under review is (or is not)
proportionate to others in the pool it has defined. Methods of answering
this question range from the intuitive to the statistical, and all suffer
from serious flaws.
14 1
sentenced to die between 1973 and 1999, only 598 were executed).
141. See USER MANUAL, supra note 123, at A-10 to A-I I (providing recommendations of the
National Center for State Courts on this question). See generally BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra
note 113 (analyzing the effectiveness of different methods of conducting comparative
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The least systematic approaches to this question involve an appeal to
some unarticulated notion of "reasonableness" in defending the
conclusion that a specific death sentence is or is not proportionate,1 42 or,
alternatively, a precedent-seeking approach. 43  The former is
unacceptable because, in employing it, courts fail to specify the criteria
that inform their judgments, thereby rendering their decisions
undefended and uncontestable. 144 Using the latter approach, regardless
of whether similarity is defined in terms of factual congruence or like
aggravating factors, courts attempt to discover one or more similar cases
in which the death penalty was previously imposed and upheld (ignoring
the difficulties noted above in specifying the criteria of similarity).145
Arguably, this approach encourages ad hoc assessments based on
unarticulated or insufficiently articulated notions of similarity, and, as
such, does little if anything to meet Furman's concerns about patterns of
inconsistent death sentencing. 146 Moreover, because this sort of inquiry
presupposes restriction of the pool of comparable cases to those in which
sentences of death were imposed and upheld, it is biased in favor of
affirmation. This predisposition proves still more troublesome when one
considers that the affirmed cases cited in order to justify a death sentence
may themselves have been arbitrarily imposed. When that is so, a
precedent-seeking method will simply perpetuate and exacerbate the
injurious effects of a chain of problematic sentences, as the most
proportionality review); Bienen, supra note 102 (criticizing the conduct of comparative
proportionality review on the ground that it provides only an illusion of fairness); Hartman, supra
note 113 (assessing Pennsylvania's analysis of comparative proportionality review); Liebman, supra
note 113 (assessing Georgia's analysis of comparative proportionality review); Lustberg & Lapidus,
supra note 113 (assessing New Jersey's analysis of comparative proportionality review); Rodriguez,
supra note 113 (arguing that New Jersey's conduct of comparative); Wallace & Sorenson,
Explanations, supra note 65 (assessing Missouri's analysis of comparative proportionality review).
142. See Raymond Paternoster & Ann Marie Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty
in South Carolina: Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C. L. REv. 245, 396-401 (1988)
(discussing the reliance of courts on unarticulated notions of reasonableness in justifying the results
of comparative proportionality reviews).
143. See generally BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 113 (discussing precedent-seeking
approaches to the conduct of comparative proportionality review).
144. USER MANUAL, supra note 123, at A-5 to A-6 (criticizing an "intuitive approach" on the
ground that it renders courts unable to demonstrate that their reasoning is consistent and fair across
cases).
145. See Baldus, Georgia Experience, supra note 133 at 669-70 (criticizing the precedent-
seeking approach because courts are "satisfied upon finding one or two prior cases, the
circumstances of which make them suitable benchmarks for the death sentence on appeal," which is
insufficient to determine whether the death penalty is generally applied in comparable cases).
146. See Baldus, Georgia Experience, supra note 133, at 718-20.
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recently affirmed now becomes available for citation as precedent in
future cases.
Because these first two approaches rely on either intuitive notions of
reasonableness or on identification of a handful of comparable
precedents, they appear inconsistent with Gregg. In conducting
comparative proportionality review, the Gregg plurality stated, courts
should ask whether juries do or do not "generally ... impose the death
sentence in a certain kind of murder case. 147 This exhortation suggests a
third method of proportionality analysis, involving an assessment of the
frequency with which capital sentences are imposed among cases
deemed similar. Unlike the precedent-seeking approach, this requires
that courts consider not merely death-sentenced cases, but also those
similar cases that resulted in some other sentence, most typically life
imprisonment. Only then can a court determine whether imposition of
the death penalty in a case on review is comparatively excessive because
this penalty is imposed so infrequently in the larger class of cases to
which it is similar.
The basic premise of frequency analysis is that the greater the
frequency of death sentences within any given comparison group, the
more confident a court can be in adjudging any given sentence in that
group to be proportionate. 148 The effort to calculate such frequencies is
not without its problems, however. For example, in order to evaluate a
defendant's character, a review must take into account mitigating
factors. However, for reasons indicated above, any attempt to categorize
such factors for the purpose of determining their relative frequency
appears to be a fool's errand. Specification of how to take mitigating
factors into account is additionally complicated by the fact that juries
need not be unanimous when determining mitigation and because they
need not elaborate their reasons for imposing or refusing to impose a
death sentence. 149 As such, the commitment to frequency analysis of the
mitigating factors that account for a jury's determination represents an
attempt to quantify that which is most often unknown and that even if
known does not lend itself to quantification. More generally, as the
example of mitigating factors suggests, the conduct of frequency
analysis draws a court away from careful consideration of the
qualitatively distinct features of prior cases, and so compromises its
147. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion).
148. See BALDUS, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 113, at 281-82.
149. See Latzer, supra note 51, at 1220.
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effort to give full weight to the unique characteristics of defendants, their
crimes, and their respective degrees of culpability.
Leaving aside the complex methodological questions regarding just
how frequency analysis should be conducted,1 50 a court committed to
this method must decide what rate of death sentence imposition is
sufficient to sustain the conclusion that a sentence under review is not
disproportionate. Just what that percentage should be is susceptible to
disagreement, depending in large measure on what a court takes to be
the principal purpose of comparative proportionality review. If the
primary purpose of such review is to ensure that patently aberrant
sentences are set aside, then a low threshold of frequency (e.g., 33%) in
similar cases could be considered sufficient to guarantee capital
punishment's fairness. Alternatively, if the primary purpose of such
review is to ensure that death sentences are only upheld when, in similar
cases, this punishment is "generally" imposed, then arguably a much
higher threshold (e.g., 75%) is required.
In a similar vein, a commitment to frequency analysis does not in and
of itself specify what percentage of similar cases is required in order to
accomplish retribution and deterrence, capital punishment's two
constitutionally permissible rationales. 151 Determination of that rate,
moreover, may well vary if one considers one of these purposes more
central than the other. For example, if one believes that capital
punishment is justified chiefly as a deterrent, as Justice White's opinion
in Furman suggests,5'5 then the death penalty must be imposed
sufficiently often in specified categories of murder to deter effectively.
That in turn may suggest that findings of disproportionality should be
confined to cases that are grossly out of line with those previously
appealed. However, if one believes that capital punishment is justified
chiefly in retributive terms, as Justice Stewart's opinion in Furman
suggests, 153 then the frequency of capital punishment's imposition
becomes a less significant concern, and so a court may conclude that a
lower threshold is sufficient to justify a finding of disproportionality.
150. Because my aim in this section is to outline the basic logic of comparative proportionality
review, these methodological questions, while crucial for some purposes, are not essential to my
argument. See generally David C. Baldus et al., Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of
Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1980) (reviewing the statistical methods
appropriate to this task).
151. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
152. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Finally, a commitment to frequency analysis may render it necessary
for a court to choose between competing claims of fairness. On the one
hand, in order to avoid the charge of arbitrariness, a court may specify a
precise criterion of frequency that warrants imposition of the death
penalty on the members of a group of defendants whose character and
crimes are deemed comparable. In doing so, however, a court opens
itself to the criticism that it is employing an overly formalistic procedure
that renders it impossible to take into adequate account the idiosyncratic
features that may render this particular defendant less worthy of death
than another, and so denies the constitutional imperative of
individualized sentencing in death penalty cases. 114 On the other hand, a
court may refuse to specify a settled frequency standard so as to ensure
its ability to engage in individualized sentencing. In doing so, however,
it is susceptible to the charge of arbitrariness on the ground that it is then
free to select among different frequencies in order to ratify results
determined on other and possibly undeclared bases.
III. COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN
WASHINGTON
The current Washington statute dealing with aggravated first-degree
murder and capital punishment requires the Washington State Supreme
Court to review all death sentences imposed in the state.'55 On review,
the court must determine whether there was "sufficient evidence" to
justify the jury's determination that leniency was not warranted; 156
whether the death sentence was "brought about through passion or
prejudice";1 57 whether the defendant was "mentally retarded"; 158 and,
finally, of principal interest here, "[w]hether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant."1 59 Should the court
answer the first of these questions in the negative, or any of the
remaining three questions in the affirmative, the death sentence under
review shall be invalidated and the case remanded to the trial court for
154. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 153, 304 (1976).
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(1) (2004).
156. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(a).
157. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(c).
158. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(d).
159. Id. § 10.95.130(2)(b).
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resentencing. 160
This statute, which became effective in 198 1,161 is the fruit of a
complex political struggle that was provoked by the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Furman. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated a
Washington death sentence based on Furman.'62 Three years later, the
Washington State Legislature abolished the death penalty altogether.
163
However, in the November general election of 1975, Washington voters
approved Initiative Measure No. 316, which required imposition of a
death sentence in all cases of aggravated first-degree murder.' 
64
Washington State Attorney General Slade Gorton declared that initiative
unenforceable based on Woodson, 16 5 which invalidated mandatory death
sentence statutes on the ground that they prevented juries from taking
into account the individualized character and circumstances of particular
defendants. 1
66
Following Gregg, Gorton recommended that any new capital
punishment statute adopted in Washington follow the model of
Georgia.167 Specifically, he suggested that the statute provide for a
bifurcated trial, include a mandatory appeal to the State Supreme Court,
and require that court to conduct comparative proportionality reviews in
order to ensure "that the death penalty imposed is consistent with other
sentences imposed in other trials under similar circumstances."'
168
Following receipt of these recommendations, during the 1977 legislative
session Representative Earl Tilly drafted and introduced House Bill 615,
which was closely patterned after the Georgia statute and incorporated
verbatim its comparative proportionality provision. 69 The final version
of that bill, which retained this provision without alteration, became law
on June 3, 1977.170
The 1977 statute required the clerk of the trial court, within ten days
160. Id. § 10.95.140(1).
161. Murder, Sentencing, ch. 138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535, 535-47.
162. Smith v. Washington, 408 U.S. 934, 934 (1972).
163. Washington Criminal Code, ch. 260, § 9A.92.010(125), 1975 Wash. Laws 862.
164. Death Penalty-Aggravated Murder, ch. 9, 1975-76 Wash. Laws 17-19.
165. See State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 444-47, 588 P.2d 1370, 1378-79 (1979) (declaring the
initiative unconstitutional, heeding the attorney general's advice).
166. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
167. Op. Att'y Gen. 15, 12-13 (Wash. 1976).
168. Id. at 13.
169. H.B. 615, 45th Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (Wash. 1977).
170. Death Penalty-Aggravated Murder, ch. 206, § 7(3)(b), 1977 Wash. Laws 774, 778.
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of receipt of the transcript of any trial culminating in a death sentence, to
transmit that record to the State Supreme Court, along with a notice
providing basic information about the case as well as "a report prepared
by the trial judge ... in the form of a standard questionnaire prepared
and supplied by the supreme court of Washington."' 171 In addition, the
statute authorized the court to affirm the death sentence or remand the
case for resentencing by the trial court judge, who is to be furnished with
"[the] records of those similar cases referred to by the supreme court of
Washington in its decision and the extracts prepared therefor.', 172 The
1977 statute, however, did not furnish any additional guidance on either
the information to be collected via the required questionnaire or the use
of the reports generated by that information by the Washington State
Supreme Court.173 The statute also did not indicate the universe of cases
to be considered for the purpose of conducting comparative
proportionality review.' 74 Moreover, the statute did not specify the
criteria to be employed in determining which cases are similar, or how to
determine whether any given sentence is or is not "excessive" or
"disproportionate."' 175 Finally, the statute did not specify exactly what a
trial judge was to do on remand with the records of similar cases or, for
that matter, what sentence to impose if the State Supreme Court found
that a given death sentence was disproportionate.
176
One year later, in 1978, in response to a request by Chief Justice
Wright, and taking the Georgia equivalent as her prototype, a
commissioner of the Washington State Supreme Court formulated a
draft questionnaire to be completed by trial court judges. 177 After
approving temporary use of this initial version,' 78 the court established a
Task Force on the Death Penalty Questionnaire to revise that draft. 79
171. Id. § 7(l).
172. Id. § 7(5)(b).
173. See id. § 7.
174. See id. However, by requiring the submission of trial records and questionnaires only in
death penalty cases, the statute arguably implied that the court's comparison would be similarly
restricted. See id. § 7(1).
175. Id. § 7(3)(b).
176. Id.§7.
177. Memorandum from Joan Smith Lawrence, Commissioner, to the Washington State Supreme
Court (Feb. 15, 1978).
178. In re Trial Judge's Report-Death Penalty Cases, No. 25700-B-186 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Feb.
17, 1978) (order approving questionnaire for trial judge's report).
179. The task force was created in April 1978 by the Washington State Supreme Court via its
Judicial Council. Its purpose, according to minutes of its initial meeting, was "to assist the Supreme
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This group met from May 1978 to February 1979, at which time it
proposed a final version of this questionnaire as well as a rule to
implement its use.18
0
The minutes of the task force indicate a marked gap between its
expectations with regard to the purpose of the trial judge reports and the
subsequent practice of the Washington State Supreme Court in
conducting comparative proportionality review.181  The judges and
attorneys who participated in that task force repeatedly affirmed their
belief that the results generated by these questionnaires were to play a
central role in informing the court's performance of its statutorily
mandated reviews: "[t]he purpose of the [trial] report is to aid the
Supreme Court in its review of a death sentence by providing the Court
with all possible information regarding the defendant and the
proceedings, particularly by eliciting from the trial judge his own unique
perspective of the trial."'182 Furthermore, the members agreed that "such
a perspective could be most effectively communicated by a report that
was less a checklist of information also appearing in the record and more
a report that included general questions calling for analysis, by the trial
judge, of any extraneous factors not appearing in the record that may
have influenced the jury's verdict."' 183 Finally, the members expressed
their collective view that "[b]ecause the conduct of this report has the
potential of influencing a decision upon which a defendant's life
depends, it is imperative that it be properly completed, without
oversight. A conscientious trial judge will ensure that the report is
carefully completed and factually correct,"' 184 and that it be completed in
Court and the Judicial Council in the development of a permanent questionnaire." See Mins., Task
Force on the Death Penalty Questionnaire, at 1 (May 12, 1978).
180. Mins., Task Force on the Death Penalty Questionnaire (Feb. 1, 1979). Not long after the task
force submitted its recommendation, the 1977 capital punishment statute was found unconstitutional
as a result of Washington State Supreme Court rulings in 1980 and 1981. See State v. Frampton, 95
Wash. 2d 469, 478-79, 627 P.2d 922, 926-27 (1981); State v. Martin, 94 Wash. 2d 1, 2, 614 P.2d
164, 164 (1980). As a result, the task force's questionnaire was never formally adopted by the State
Supreme Court or employed by trial court judges. The adoption of this questionnaire would not
have required legislative approval because the 1977 statute mandated that the State Supreme Court
prepare and supply such a form. See Death Penalty-Aggravated Murder, ch. 206, § 7(3)(b), 1977
Wash. Laws 778. With relatively minor alteration, the text of the task force's proposed
questionnaire was incorporated into the aggravated first-degree murder and capital punishment
statute in 1981. Murder, Sentencing, ch. 138, 1981 Wash. Laws 535, 535-47.
181. See infra Part IV.B.
182. Mins., Task Force on the Death Penalty Questionnaire, at 1 (Aug. 25, 1978).
183. Id.
184. Rough Draft Questionnaire (attached to Agenda, Task Force on the Death Penalty
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a timely fashion, defined by the task force as thirty days after
sentencing.
85
Of equal significance, in considering the appropriate universe of cases
to be examined for the purposes of comparative proportionality review,
and departing from the clear implication of the 1977 statute, the task
force recommended that this questionnaire be
required in every case in which a defendant is charged with, and
convicted of, murder in the first degree... and a special
sentencing proceeding is held .... The report is required
regardless of whether the death penalty is imposed at the
conclusion of the sentencing proceeding and regardless of
whether the defendant pursues an appeal. 186
Justifying this recommendation, which was eventually incorporated
into its proposed criminal rule for superior courts, the task force
concluded that:
this approach was necessary to furnish the Supreme Court with
the data it needs to compare the propriety of the death sentence
in a particular case with the propriety of sentences in other
cases. The task force did not feel it would be appropriate to
compare a death penalty case only to other cases in which the
death penalty was actually imposed.
87
Following discussion and revision of multiple drafts, the task force
recommended to the Washington State Supreme Court a questionnaire
that is similar and, in many respects, identical to the one currently
employed.188 Both are divided into multiple sections, and both request
information about the chronology of the case; the defendant; the trial;
the special sentencing proceeding, if conducted; the victim; the legal
representation provided to the defendant; and, finally, "general
considerations," which deals with the race, ethnic, and sexual orientation
of the various participants in the trial, including the jury, as well as the
Questionnaire (Aug. 25, 1978)).
185. Proposed Criminal Rule for Superior Court I (attached to Letter from Karl B. Tegland, Staff
Attorney, Washington Judicial Council, to John J. Champagne, Clerk, Washington Supreme Court
(Feb. 1, 1979)) (citation omitted). The task force allotted an additional ten days to the prosecution
and defense counsel to offer comments prior to final submission of the report.
186. id.
187. Letter from Karl B. Tegland, Staff Attorney, Washington Judicial Council, to John J.
Champagne, Clerk, Washington State Supreme Court 2 (Feb. 1, 1979).
188. See App. A, infra pp. 868-80.
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demographics of the county in which the trial was conducted. 89
Included in the task force recommendation, but excluded from the form
currently in use, is a question asking the trial court judge to "state
anything not evoked by this questionnaire which may have affected the
trial or the sentence imposed, or which you believe should be brought to
the attention of the Supreme Court." 190 That question has been replaced
in the current form by a comprehensive request for "[g]eneral comments
of the trial judge concerning the appropriateness of the sentence,
considering the crime, the defendant, and other relevant factors."' 91
Not long after the task force submitted its recommendation, the 1977
capital punishment statute was found unconstitutional as a result of 1980
and 1981 Washington State Supreme Court rulings, each of which held
that this law chilled a defendant's right to trial by permitting those who
pled guilty to avoid a sentence of death. 92 A new capital punishment
proposal, House Bill 76, was introduced in the legislature in 1981.193
Following a series of amendments, 94 it became law on May 14, 1981 .95
Four features of that bill's initial formulation and subsequent revision
are crucial to an understanding of the present conduct of comparative
proportionality review in Washington.
189. See Mins. (Feb. 1, 1979), supra note 180.
190. Proposed Report of the Trial Judge (attached to Letter from Karl B. Tegland, Staff Attorney,
Washington Judicial Council, to John J. Champagne, Clerk, Washington State Supreme Court (Feb.
1, 1979)).
191. See App. A, infra p. 880, at (6)(k). Also included in the task force recommendation, but
excluded from the form currently in use, is a question asking the judge to comment on the conduct
of the defendant in the presence and absence of the jury as well as "any other significant conduct,
characteristics, or other factors concerning the defendant." See Proposed Criminal Rule for Superior
Court 10 (attached to Letter from Karl B. Tegland, Staff Attorney, Washington Judicial Council, to
John J. Champagne, Clerk, Washington State Supreme Court (Feb. 1, 1979)). In addition, excluded
from the form currently in use is a question aimed at ensuring that the report be submitted to
prosecution and defense counsel, each of whom were then to be given an opportunity to propose
corrections of factual data. See id. at 1. This opportunity is effectively afforded to counsel by the
statute currently in force, which invites both sides to "submit briefs within the time prescribed by
the court and present oral argument to the court." WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(1) (2000).
192. In 1980, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that the 1977 statute did not allow for
imposition of a death sentence if a defendant pled guilty to aggravated first-degree murder. State v.
Martin, 94 Wash. 2d 1, 2, 614 P.2d 164, 164 (1980). One year later, in light of Martin, the court
found the 1977 capital punishment statute unconstitutional because it permitted a defendant to
escape the death penalty by pleading guilty, whereas those who elected to contest their guilt
remained candidates for death, thus impermissibly chilling the former's right to trial. State v.
Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 478-79, 627 P.2d 922, 926-27 (1981).
193. H.B. 76, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1981).
194. S.H.B. 76, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1981).
195. Murder, Sentencing, ch. 138, § 12, 1981 Wash. Laws 535, 541-43.
Washington Law Review
First, unlike the 1977 statute, which did not specify the content of the
trial judge report, the 1981 bill enumerated each of the specific questions
to be answered as well as the factual information to be provided by the
trial judge. 196 This section was incorporated into the law enacted later
that same year without amendment. 197 As the explanatory memorandum
introduced in conjunction with this bill stated, the section of the 1981
bill that specified the content of the trial judge report was in large part
derived from the form submitted by the task force two years prior. 198 By
codifying that questionnaire, the bill's sponsors arguably endorsed the
task force's understanding of its purpose and role in State Supreme
Court reviews of death sentences.
Second, the original version of the 1981 bill, as in the 1977 statute,
required that trial judge reports be filed only in cases in which a
defendant was sentenced to death. 199 This provision, however, was
eventually rejected in favor of a requirement that such reports be filed
"[i]n all cases in which a person is convicted of aggravated first-degree
murder., 200 Thus, by expanding the universe of cases, the legislature
indicated its appreciation of one of the key prerequisites of meaningful
comparative proportionality review. Specifically, this provision
expressed the legislature's belief that the State Supreme Court's ability
to determine why the death penalty is imposed in a few cases but not in
most is impossible if it considers only those aggravated first-degree
murder cases that culminate in capital sentences.20'
Third, as initially formulated, the 1981 bill defined "similar cases" as
those "reported in the Washington Reports or Washington Appellate
Reports since January 1, 1965. "2o2 This language notably omits reference
to the trial judge reports, and had it been adopted, it is likely that review
of specific cases would not have included examination of the reports.
This reading is borne out by the explanatory memo: "Frankly, the [trial
judge] report is of marginal value since the Supreme Court in its
196. H.B. 76, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1981).
197. Murder, Sentencing, ch. 138, § 12, 1981 Wash. Laws 535, 541-43.
198. Explanatory Material for "An Act Concerning Murder and Capital Punishment," Dec. 31,
1980, at 18 ("The form of the report contained in this proposal [HB 76] is largely the product of a
task force which was appointed by the supreme court to develop a form under our current statute.
There are, of course, modifications to accommodate this revised capital murder scheme.").
199. See H.B. 76, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1981).
200. Murder, Sentencing, ch. 138, § 12, 1981 Wash. Laws, 535, 541-43.
201. See id.
202. H.B. 76, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1981).
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sentencing review will examine the entire record of the trial. 2 °3
However, the memo did acknowledge that comparative proportionality
review is "an important feature in a sentencing review for it will enhance
uniformity in the imposition of the death penalty., 20 4 The bill's text was
changed in the final law, which reads as follows:
For the purposes of this subsection, "similar cases" means cases
reported in the Washington Reports or Washington Appellate
Reports since January 1, 1965, in which the judge or jury
considered the imposition of capital punishment regardless of
whether it was imposed or executed, and cases in which reports
have been filed with the supreme court under RCW
10.95.120.205
With this last clause, which references the section of the statute that
mandates submission of trial judge reports following all convictions for
aggravated first-degree murder, the legislature expressly required that
the cases covered by these reports be incorporated into the process of
comparative proportionality review.
206
Fourth, and finally, the 1981 bill clarified an ambiguity of the 1977
statute by specifying what was to happen should a death sentence be
vacated and then remanded "for resentencing by the trial judge based on
the record and argument of counsel. '20 7 At least in principle, the 1977
statute left open the possibility that, on remand, a death sentence might
be reimposed by the trial court judge. The 1981 bill, however, stated that
should the State Supreme Court conclude that a death sentence was
wrongly imposed for any of the reasons enumerated in the statute,
including a finding of disproportionality, the court "shall invalidate the
sentence of death., 20 8 More precisely, as the explanatory memorandum
indicated, should any given death sentence be found invalid, "at the re-
sentencing the defendant would get life without parole. 20 9
One year later, the Washington State Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of this statute in State v. Bartholomew.210 The court
203. Explanatory Material, supra note 198, at 18.
204. Explanatory Material, supra note 198, at 18-19.
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (2000).
206. See id.
207. Death Penalty-Aggravated Murder, ch. 206, § 7(5)(b), 1977 Wash. Laws 774, 778.
208. Murder, Sentencing, ch. 138, § 14(1), 1981 Wash. Laws, 535, 544.
209. Explanatory Material, supra note 198, at 20.
210. 98 Wash. 2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170(1982).
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reversed Bartholomew's sentence on the ground that the 1981 statute
failed to limit the evidence that the prosecution may present at the
sentencing phase of capital proceedings. 1 It nevertheless refused to
strike down the statute in its entirety, holding that the constitutional
infirmity could be remedied by application of the severability provision
of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) section 10.95.900.212 More
important for this analysis, when the court considered the adequacy of
the procedural protections devised by the state legislature in order to
meet the concerns articulated in Furman, it endorsed them, and in doing
so expressly cited, among other protections, the "elaborate automatic
review procedure which brings it under the scrutiny of this court. '21 3 As
the court noted in subsequent cases involving such review, that process
must incorporate a review of the trial judge reports in order to determine
whether any given sentence falls afoul of the requirements of
proportionality (although, as indicated in the following Part, its practice
falls far short of this commitment).2t4
IV. THE DEFICIENCIES OF COMPARATIVE
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN WASHINGTON
This Part offers two criticisms of the practice of comparative
proportionality review in the State of Washington. Section A explores
deficiencies in the trial judge reports, which furnish the data regarding
the universe of cases that the court is to consider in conducting its
reviews. Section B examines the way in which the court has actually
proceeded in undertaking such reviews. Section B suggests that the court
is inadequately performing its statutorily mandated reviews. Section A
suggests that, even if it were to attempt to remedy the defects of its
current practice, it would be unable to do so, given the deficiencies of
the data available to it.
211. Id. at 195-96, 654 P.2d at 1183-84.
212. id. at 176,654 P.2d at 1173.
213. Id. at 192,654 P.2d at 1182.
214. See State v. Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 570, 655-56, 888 P.2d 1105, 1154-55 (1995) (reviewing
the trial judge reports to determine presence of a pattern of imposition of the death penalty based on
race of defendant or victim); see also State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631, 680-93, 845 P.2d 289, 317-
24 (1991) (reviewing the trial judge reports to determine whether a sentence was disproportionate);
State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 907, 910-11,822 P.2d 177, 221, 223 (1991) (concluding that, in
order to determine that a sentence is neither arbitrary nor based on illegitimate racial factors, a court
should review the universe of cases set out in RCW 10.95.120).
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A. Washington's Trial Judge Reports and Their Defects
Comparative proportionality review was originally developed in order
to remedy two problems identified in Furman: first, the inconsistent and
arbitrary application of the death penalty, and hence the absence of any
rational basis for distinguishing between those who are sentenced to
death and those who are not; and, second, the concern that
constitutionally impermissible factors, such as race and economic status,
may in fact offer the most salient explanation for this distinction. 215 The
capacity of the Washington State Supreme Court to perform such review
in a meaningful way depends in large measure on the completeness and
accuracy of the information that is included in the trial judge reports. As
David Baldus, the preeminent student of comparative proportionality
review, notes: "The most important role for state courts is to develop a
database that provides an overview of the system and reliable
information on the universe of cases that are used as comparison cases in
individual reviews. '' 216 Yet an analysis of the trial judge reports
submitted to the Washington State Supreme Court indicates a host of
problems which critically compromise the court's capacity to fulfill its
statutory mandate.
This analysis includes all 259 trial judge reports filed with the
Washington State Supreme Court, beginning with those first submitted
in response to adoption of the 1981 capital punishment statute and
running through March 2003.217 Rather than offering an exhaustive
215. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242, 293 (1972).
216. David C. Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of Comparative
Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1582, 1598 (1996); cf Bienen,
supra note 102, at 164 (explaining that the statutory mandate to conduct proportionality review
necessarily implies creating and maintaining an adequate factual record).
217. The most recent trial judge report considered in this study, filed with the Washington State
Supreme Court as of March 24, 2003, is numbered 255. The discrepancy between that number and
the number of trial judge reports submitted since 1981 is explained as follows: (1) Reports of the
Trial Judge Nos. 16/16A concern two different trials for different defendants and incidents; (2)
Reports of the Trial Judge Nos. 34/34A concern two separate trials for different incidents with the
same defendant; (3) Reports of the Trial Judge Nos. 85/85A and 97/97A each represent two separate
reports for the same defendant and incident. Although RCW 10.95.120 requires the State Supreme
Court to consider "cases reported in the Washington Reports or Washington Appellate Reports since
January 1, 1965," in addition to those for which trial reports have been filed, I have not considered
the pre-1981 cases because that would entail consideration of convictions and sentences rendered
under an unconstitutional statute. See Bruce Gilbert, Comparative Proportionality Review: Will the
Ends, Will the Means, 18 SEATILE U. L. REv. 593, 621 (1995). Because the pre-1981 statute was
found unconstitutional, Gilbert argues, it may have generated death sentences that were influenced
by discrimination or other impermissible considerations, which, in turn, could provide a
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account of the deficiencies of the trial judge reports, this section
highlights those that are most troubling in light of the principal purposes
of comparative proportionality review. Although the deficiencies are
interrelated, for the sake of clarity, this section divides these problems
into four categories: (1) reports that are absent, unrevised, and/or late;
(2) reports that fail to provide accurate and/or adequate information
regarding defendants and victim(s); (3) reports that fail to provide
accurate and/or adequate information regarding aggravating and
mitigating factors; and (4) reports that fail to provide accurate and/or
adequate information regarding the racial and ethnic identities of various
participants in capital trials.
1. Absent, Unrevised, and Late Reports
Perhaps the most obvious problem with the Washington State
Supreme Court's database is its omission of cases that should have been
included. A comparison of the trial judge reports on file with the
Washington State Supreme Court with the records compiled by the
Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, which maintains data
on criminal judgments and sentences entered by Washington trial
courts,218 reveals that the court is missing reports for twelve aggravated
constitutionally flawed foundation for finding a contemporary case proportional. See id. In Benn,
Justice Utter stated:
Admittedly, the cases between 1965 and 1981 are less useful in many respects for conducting
proportionality review. In making comparisons, we do not have the benefit of the more detailed
information contained in the questionnaires trial courts have completed since 1981 as required
by RCW 10.95.120. In addition, defendants in those cases were sentenced under earlier
versions of Washington's death penalty statute which have subsequently been declared
unconstitutional.
Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 705, 845 P.2d at 330 (Utter, J., dissenting). While this is a persuasive
justification for not considering pre-1981 cases, there still remains a significant contradiction
between what RCW 10.95.120 formally requires in terms of its definition of "similar" cases and the
universe of cases actually considered by the State Supreme Court in conducting comparative
proportionality reviews.
218. See Sentencing Guideline Comm'n, Power and Duties of the Commission, at
http://sgc.wa.gov/powersandduties.htm (providing powers and duties of the Washington Sentencing
Guidelines Commission, which include maintaining information on criminal judgments and
sentences entered by trial courts) (last visited July 26, 2004). The Sentencing Guideline
Commission stated that in 1981:
The Washington State Legislature enacted the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA"), which
established the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and directed it to recommend to the
Legislature a determinate sentencing system for adult felonies. The principal goal of the new
sentencing guidelines system was to ensure that offenders who commit similar crimes and have
similar criminal histories receive equivalent sentences. Sentences were to be determined by the
seriousness of the offense and by the criminal record of the offender. The Commission
completed the original adult felony sentencing 'grid' in 1982, and the Legislature enacted it
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first-degree homicide convictions.21 9
An inspection of the records kept by the Washington State
Department of Corrections reveals an additional missing record.22°
Leaving aside the fact that these thirteen missing records evidences a
violation of the statutory requirement that trial judge reports be
submitted not in some, but "in all cases in which a person is convicted of
aggravated first-degree murder,, 22' absent these reports, any attempt to
into law in 1983. The Sentencing Reform Act took effect for crimes committed on and after
July 1, 1984. Codified in chapter 9.94A RCW, the SRA contains the guidelines and procedures
used by the courts to impose sentences for adult felonies.
Sentencing Guideline Comm'n, Sentencing Reform Act: Historical Background, at
http://www.sgc.wa.gov/historical.htm (last visited June 29, 2004).
219. The first case included in the database compiled by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission
was filed in 1985 (Robert Strandy, Cause No. 85-1-00487-6 (1985)). It is not unreasonable to
assume that were the Commission's records to extend back to 1981, when the trial judge reports
currently in use were first required by law, the number of reports missing from the State Supreme
Court collection would be larger. In chronological order by date of sentence, convictions for
aggravated first-degree murder on record with the Sentencing Guidelines Commission, but missing
from the trial judge reports, are as follows: Michel McBride, Cause No. 86-1-00523-5 (1986);
Daniel Edwards, Cause No. 87-1-00550-1 (1987); Billy Ballard, Cause No. 91-1-00083-5 (1991);
Miguel Gaitan, Cause No. 93-1-01018-0 (1993); Robert Anderson, Cause No. 97-1-00128-0 (1997);
Chad Walton, Cause No. 97-1-02153-1 (1998); Brandon Backstrom, Cause No. 97-1-01993-6
(1999); Alex Baranyi, Cause No. 97-1-00343-8 (1999); Michael Thorton, Cause No. 98-1-00493-6
(1999); Kevin Cruz, Cause No. 00-1-00284-6 (2002); Christopher Miller, Cause No. 01-1-00311-3
(2002); Donald Durga, Cause No. 01-1-011709-1 (2002). In addition, at least ten defendants present
in the State Supreme Court's database are missing from that maintained by the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission. By trial judge report number, they are as follows: Susan Kroll (No. 60);
Martin Lee Sanders (No. 81); Stanley Runion (No. 99); Constantine Baruso (No. 112); Tommy
Metcalf (No. 128); Cal Brown (No. 140); Darold Stenson (No. 144); William Robinson, Jr. (No.
166); Dwayne Antony Woods (No. 177); Dayva Cross (No. 220).
220. No trial judge report has been filed for David Anderson, Cause No. 97-1-00421-3 (2000).
There is some confusion regarding this case because, according to the Department of Corrections,
the name that corresponds to this cause number is Richard Hampton. A CourtLink search indicates
that the name corresponding to this number is in fact David Anderson, who was convicted by a jury
on four counts of aggravated first-degree murder in 1997 and sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole.
221. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.120 (2000). In a brief filed with the Washington State Supreme
Court, the prosecuting attomey contended that the "absence of a couple dozen reports" does not
pose a legal problem because RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) only requires the court to consider "cases in
which reports have been filed with the supreme court under RCW 10.95.120." Brief for Respondent
at 176-77, Thomas v. State, 150 Wash. 2d 821, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (No. 70727-8). On this reading,
the court is required to consider only those reports that have actually been filed, not those that are
mandated by law. Surprisingly, given this view, the brief proceeds to acknowledge that "the court
should try to ensure that all of the mandated reports get filed." Id. (emphasis omitted). Then, citing
the example of New Jersey, it recommends appointment of a retired judge to the position of
standing master in order "to supervise ... the court's data collection as well as the completion of the
trial judge questionnaires." Id. at 178. Finally, it states that "[t]he collection of accurate data from
all aggravated murders (whether or not the death penalty is imposed) is imperative for
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identify the full range of cases similar to that on review, whether by
seeking those with analogous fact patterns or comparable aggravating
factors, will be incomplete. Moreover, the absence of these reports from
the supreme court's database will frustrate any attempt to determine the
frequency with which convictions for aggravated first-degree murder, in
cases deemed similar to that on review, generate a sentence of death as
opposed to life without possibility of parole. Still more troublesome, all
of the defendants in the thirteen cases missing from the supreme court's
database were sentenced to life without parole.222 Should the court seek
to determine that frequency, the absence of these reports will skew its
calculations in favor of death. 23
In addition, the database maintained by the State Supreme Court
includes cases that either ought not to be in the database or, at the very
least, ought not to be present absent some indication of their current
status. This includes fifteen trial judge reports (17.6% of the cases in
which the death penalty was sought) for defendants who, although
initially sentenced to death, have since been re-sentenced to life without
parole, as well as those who have had their convictions and death
sentences set aside and are no longer on death row.224 The failure to
proportionality review." Id. at 179. Leaving aside what appears to be a direct self-contradiction, this
argument fails to explain why such an extraordinary measure as the appointment of a special master
is necessary in light of its contention that the law's mandate is satisfied if the court merely considers
those reports that are indeed filed. In addition, the brief contends that the defendant has failed to
explain why the absence of some unspecified number of trial judge reports "prevents"
proportionality review. See id. at 177. Granted, the absence of any number of trial judge reports
does not render the conduct of comparative proportionality review literally impossible. The larger
the number of missing reports, however, the less adequate and meaningful such review will be. That
is so regardless of whether the court engages in a quantitative effort to calculate the frequency with
which "similar" aggravated first-degree murders do or do not result in death sentences, or if it seeks
to engage in a qualitative review that compares the facts of any given case on review to cases
deemed similar.
222. See supra note 219.
223. See State v. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d 62, 91, 26 P.3d 271, 287 (2001) (Sanders, J., dissenting).
Justice Sanders stated:
The proportionality database is itself flawed because it ... is missing a staggering number of
cases required by RCW 10.95.130 in which defendants were convicted of aggravated first-
degree murder, but no death penalty was imposed. Even if the court were to consider whether
death was generally imposed in similar cases (which it no longer apparently does), the universe
of cases we are supposed to consider is markedly skewed by these factors against the
defendant, in favor of imposing death, and contrary to the statute.
Id. (emphasis in original). While the number of missing trial judge reports is perhaps not
"staggering," as Justice Sanders suggested, his basic point remains valid.
224. Cases involving defendants once sentenced to death but now re-sentenced to life without
parole include the following: Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d. 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); Jeffries v. Wood, 114
F.3d 1484 (9th Cir. 1997); Rupe v. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1315 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 93 F.3d
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revise these reports in order to reflect changes in the status of these
defendants introduces a significant inaccuracy because, as a matter of
law, these death sentences no longer stand.225 One might maintain, as the
1434 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Brett, 142 Wash. 2d. 868, 16 P.3d. 601 (2001); State v. Finch, 137 Wash.
2d 792, 975 P.2d 967 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wash. 2d 690, 903 P.2d 960 (1995); State v.
Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1989). Additionally, in 1998, David Lewis Rice
was re-sentenced to life without parole as a result of a plea bargain after a judge ordered a new trial,
ruling that Rice's first lawyer had inadequately represented him. See Ronald K. Fitten, In Plea Deal,
Rice Finally Gets Life for '85 Slayings, SEATTLE TIMES, May 28, 1998, at B1. Cases involving
defendants who were sentenced to death but have now had their convictions and sentences set aside
include: Benn v. Wood, 283 F.3d 1040, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002); Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 625
(9th Cir. 1992); Pirtle v. Lambert, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1078, (E.D. Wash. 2001); Harris v. Blodgett, 853
F. Supp. 1239, 1294 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995); Thomas v. State, 150
Wash. 2d 821, 876, 83 P.3d 970, 997 (2004); State v. Clark, 143 Wash. 2d 731, 783-84, 24 P.3d
1006, 1032 (2001); State v. Marshall, 144 Wash. 2d 266, 282, 27 P.3d 192, 200 (2001); State v.
Roberts, 142 Wash. 2d 471, 534, 14 P.3d 713, 747 (2000); State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 458,
858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (1993).
A related complication is posed by cases like that of Timothy Cronin. See State v. Cronin, 142
Wash. 2d 568, 14 P.3d 752 (2000). In 1997, Cronin was convicted of aggravated first-degree
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 577, 14 P.3d at 757. The
Washington State Supreme Court subsequently overturned his conviction due to errors in the
instructions given to the jury. Id. at 581-82, 14 P.3d at 758-59. However, the court also concluded
that because Cronin's first-degree felony murder conviction was unaffected by the instructional
error, his felony murder conviction should be affirmed. Id. at 586, 14 P.3d at 761. Because Cronin
was convicted of aggravated first-degree murder, arguably the law requires that a trial judge report
be filed with the supreme court, as it was. Report of the Trial Judge No. 217 (Timothy Cronin).
However, once his conviction on that charge was overturned, this report should either be removed
from the court's database, or it should be amended to reflect its present status. Neither step,
however, has been taken.
225. The question of whether juvenile defendants should be included in the State Supreme
Court's database is more complicated. In Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld imposition of the death penalty for defendants who were sixteen or
seventeen when they committed their crimes on the grounds that such imposition does not constitute
a violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Id. at 380. However,
one year earlier, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), a plurality had ruled that the death
penalty cannot be imposed on defendants who were fifteen or younger when they committed the
crime on the grounds that a death sentence serves no valid retributive or deterrent purpose in such
cases. Id. at 836-37 (plurality opinion). In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor concluded that
defendants who were under sixteen when they committed their crimes "may not be executed under
the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution." Id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In light of this claim, the Washington State Supreme Court, in State v. Furman, 122
Wash. 2d 440, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993), concluded that, because the state capital punishment statute
did not expressly provide for imposition of the death penalty on minors and did not specify any
minimum age for its imposition, those under eighteen could not be sentenced to death. Id. at 457-
58, 858 P.2d at 1102-03. Included in the State Supreme Court's database, however, are twenty-five
defendants who were juveniles at the time they committed the crimes for which they were
eventually convicted on a charge of aggravated first-degree murder. In three of these cases, the
death penalty was sought, and in Michael Furman's case, it was imposed (but later reversed). Id. at
443, 858 P.2d at 1095. On the one hand, because Washington State's capital punishment statute
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Washington State Supreme Court has done,226 that these cases should
remain in the database on the ground that the statute requires inclusion
of all cases in which "the judge or jury considered the imposition of
capital punishment regardless of whether it was imposed or executed.,
227
228However, if these reports are not updated, and if the supreme court
seeks to calculate the frequency with which convictions for aggravated
first-degree murder generate a sentence of death as opposed to life
without parole, this error will once again skew the results in favor of
clearly requires trial court judges to complete reports for all defendants convicted of aggravated
first-degree murder, reports regarding juvenile defendants must be submitted and maintained in the
State Supreme Court's database. On the other hand, because RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) defines "similar
cases" as those in which "the judge or jury considered the imposition of capital punishment," and
because this punishment cannot be considered in the case ofjuvenile defendants, arguably the courts
should not use these cases when they engage in comparative proportionality review. In his
concurring opinion in State v. Furman, Justice Utter made reference to pre-Furman trial judge
reports filed for juvenile defendants in support of his argument that Furman's sentence should be
reversed not simply on the grounds indicated here, but also on the grounds of disproportionality. Id.
at 461-67, 858 P.2d at 1104-08 (Utter, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Utter noted that none of
the seven other defendants convicted of aggravated first-degree murder since 1981 had received the
death penalty. Id. at 462-67, 858 P.2d at 1105-07 (Utter, J., concurring). Much the same argument,
incidentally, can be made regarding defendants who were convicted of aggravated first-degree
murder, but have also been deemed "mentally retarded," as defined in RCW 10.95.030(2)(a).
Because the statute stipulates that no person falling into this category can be sentenced to death, as
with juveniles, such defendants should be included in the Washington State Supreme Court's
database of trial judge reports because such reports must be filed for all aggravated first-degree
murder convictions. However, they should not be considered when the court conducts its
comparative proportionality reviews because the trial court cannot consider imposition of the death
penalty in these cases. To the best of my knowledge, the only defendant who fits into this category
is Mario Ortiz. See Report of the Trial Judge No. I (Mario Ortiz).
226. In State v. Woods, 143 Wash. 2d 561, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001), the Washington State Supreme
Court expressly rejected the claim that the trial judge reports must be updated after any given death
penalty is overturned or the case in question is remanded for resentencing by an appellate court. Id.
at 612-14, 23 P.3d at 1074-75. To do so, the court determined that the language of RCW 10.95.120
does not confine the universe of cases to be considered for the purposes of comparative
proportionality review to those that are upheld on appeal. Id. at 613, 23 P.3d at 1075. While this is
technically true, the effect of the court's statutory literalism is to permit it to cite, in its future
reviews, death sentences that it once upheld but later rejected. One might argue, as the court stated
in State v. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d 62, 26 P.3d 271 (2001), that the trial judge reports should be
revised only if a sentence is rejected by an appellate court on the ground of disproportionality. Id. at
79 n.5, 26 P.3d at 281 n.5. That will not do, however, because whatever errors occurred at the guilt
and/or sentencing phase(s) of a capital trial may well have affected the jury's ultimate decision.
Because, as indicated in Part IV.B below, the court is committed to the view that it should not
second-guess the jury's decision unless there is compelling reason to do so, the court's refusal to
update the trial judge reports means that the errors remain on the record.
227. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(2)(b) (2000) (for cases after Jan. 1965).
228. The National Center for State Courts recommends removal of such reports. USER MANUAL,
supra note 123, at A-8.
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death. Additionally, if the court justifies a decision to uphold a death
sentence on the basis of information contained in the trial judge reports
for any of these cases, its comparison will be invalid. To do so, as
Justice Handler of the New Jersey State Supreme Court observed,
"produces the anomaly that a reversed sentence, by definition too
unreliable to carry out on the sentenced defendant, is yet reliable enough
for the purpose of comparison with other capital sentences in
proportionality review. 229
Finally, a majority of the trial judge reports included in the supreme
court database were not submitted "within thirty days after the entry of
the judgment and sentence,', 23° as required by law. Specifically, of the
259 trial judge reports, 161 (62%) were submitted late. The period of
lateness ranges from a low of two days23 1 to a high of just under eight
years.232 The latter instance may be extreme, but is by no means
aberrant. A total of seventy-nine, just under 31% of all reports, were
received over a year late; fifty-eight over two years; forty over three
years; and twenty-six over four years. The 161 late reports were received
an average of 660 days past the statutory deadline.233 This chronic
tardiness in the filing of reports raises serious questions about the
compliance of trial judges with the imperatives of the law, and, as the
next subsection explains, poses equally serious questions about the
accuracy of the information these reports contain.
229. State v. Martini, 651 A.2d 949, 989 (N.J. 1994) (Handler, J., dissenting).
230. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.120 (2000).
231. Report of the Trial Judge No. 247 (Jimmee Chea).
232. Report of the Trial Judge No. 100 (Michael Hightower).
233. It appears that the State Supreme Court sought to remedy the problem of late filings through
adoption of a court rule in December 1997. See Superior Court Special Proceedings Rules-
Criminal 6, available at http://courts.wa.gov/courtrules (last visited July 20, 2004). This rule
requires the prosecutor and defense counsel to complete and submit to the clerk of the trial court a
copy of the questionnaire specified in RCW 10.95.120 within fourteen days following the entry of a
judgment and sentence for an aggravated first-degree homicide conviction. Id. Once completed and
served on each of the opposing attorneys, that questionnaire assists in the preparation of the trial
judge's report. That report, as the statute and rule require, must be filed within thirty days after entry
of the judgment and sentence. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.120. Perhaps in response to the
promulgation of this rule, a flurry of very late reports (a total of ten, averaging just over five years
past their respective due dates) were filed with the State Supreme Court during the final month of
2001 and the first three months of 2002. On balance, however, it would appear that this rule has had
little effect in expediting submission of the trial judge reports. Of the seventy-five reports filed since
this rule became effective on January 1, 1998, only twenty-three have been submitted in accordance
with the statutory deadline.
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2. Inaccurate and/or Inadequate Information Regarding
Defendants and Victims
No doubt in part because so many have been filed late, a very large
number of trial judge reports provide insufficient and/or inaccurate
information which cannot help but compromise the State Supreme
Court's ability to conduct meaningful comparative proportionality
review. In several reports, for example, as a result of the passage of time,
trial judges found themselves unable to complete many of the questions
on the form. Two examples, taken from the many that might be cited,
serve to illustrate this problem. First, in Report No. 210 (Cheyenne
Brown), which was submitted approximately three and a half years late,
the trial judge explained that the mitigation packet prepared by
defendant's counsel, containing "official records from many state
agencies in Washington and Minnesota, school records, and extensive
psychological records," was no longer available to her. 3 Therefore, she
continued, "where I do not have a specific recollection of a fact I will
indicate unknown rather than guess., 2 35 The judge then proceeded to
enter "unknown" in response to fifteen different questions in the
report.236 Second, in response to the report's question regarding the
number of jurors of the same race as the defendant and/or victim, the
judge who completed Report No. 90 (Gerald Hankerson), concerning an
African-American co-defendant sentenced to life imprisonment for
murdering a Vietnamese immigrant, indicated the following: "I cannot
recall if any black jurors served., 237 While this response is not surprising
given that this form was submitted some three years after sentencing, it
raises significant questions about the Washington State Supreme Court's
ability to investigate the role of racial prejudice in sentencing patterns
for aggravated first-degree murders.238
234. Report of the Trial Judge No. 210 (Cheyenne Brown).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Report of the Trial Judge No. 90 (Gerald Hankerson).
238. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 95 (Kenneth Schrader), submitted more than five years
late. In response to the same question about jury composition, the judge wrote: "I do not honestly
recall if any jurors were members of minority races. It is possible that one or two may have been."
Id.; see also Report of the Trial Judge No. 208 (Kenneth Comeslast), submitted approximately five
years late, in which the judge wrote, "I do not recall," in response to the same question. Id. Another
example is the Report of the Trial Judge No. 104 (Harold Eirich), submitted approximately three
years late, in which the judge wrote, "[n]o record of race or ethnic origin of jurors has been kept."
Id. A comment of this sort obviously raises questions about whether the judge who presided over
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In many more instances, rather than confessing to a lapse of memory,
judges have simply not furnished answers to questions included in the
form, despite the express instruction: "Please answer each question. If
you do not have sufficient information to supply an answer, please so
indicate after the specific question. 239 Indeed, when all 259 trial judge
reports are considered, the only questions that are answered without
exception are those that ask for the defendant's name, the plea he or she
entered, and whether representation was provided by counsel.24°
Perhaps the most troublesome instance of a question left unanswered
is the final question of section (6) (General Considerations). The task
force that drafted the form from which the present version is derived
indicated that the questionnaire's purpose is to "aid the Supreme Court
in its review of a death sentence by providing the Court with all possible
information regarding the defendant and the proceedings, particularly by
the trial was the same judge who completed the trial judge report. No guesswork is necessary to
confirm this hypothesis in the case of Report of the Trial Judge No. 226 (Marvin Leo). There, the
judge who completed the form wrote, "[t]he trial judge failed to complete this report. He was
defeated in his bid for re-election and I succeeded him as Dept. 2 judge for Pierce County. They
have been unable to get Judge Rudy Tollefson to do this report." Id.
Moreover, and contrary to the clear implication of RCW 10.95.120, which seeks "general
comments of the trial judge concerning the appropriateness of the sentence," see App. A, infra p.
880, at (6)(k), and which requires the trial judge to sign and date the questionnaire, see App. A,
infra p. 880, it appears that some reports have been completed by court staff, long after the fact,
rather than by the judge who presided over the trial. In one trial judge report, question marks appear
throughout the report and all questions seeking information beyond that included in the record itself
are simply left blank. Report of the Trial Judge No. 211 (Dennis Anfinson). In apparent explanation,
the person who completed the report indicated that the "[j]udge is retired-file contained very little
information." Id. Finally, in at least one instance, the trial court judge indicated that the "[t]rial
judge, after completing this report to the best of her information and belief, forwarded the report to
the prosecutor for completion." See Report of the Trial Judge No. 121 (Sterling Jamagin). There is
no indication of whether the report was also submitted to the defense counsel as required by
RCW 10.95.120.
239. App. A, infra p. 868. In some instances, the absence of a response to a question is not
problematic. For example, section (l)(f) of the trial judge report asks whether a psychiatric
evaluation of the defendant was performed. App. A, infra p. 870, at (I)(f). Obviously, if the answer
to that question is "no," then one should not expect a trial judge to answer the following three
questions, all of which are germane only if the answer to the initial question is "yes." These
questions concern the defendant's ability to "distinguish right from wrong," to "perceive the nature
and quality of his or her act," and to "cooperate intelligently in his or her own defense." By the
same token, in cases where the death penalty was not sought by the prosecutor, all of the questions
regarding the special proceeding conducted to determine whether the sentence shall be death or life
imprisonment without possibility of parole become irrelevant and so unnecessary to answer.
240. In what follows, I have elected to focus my inquiry on those questions left unanswered that
are most problematic from the standpoint of comparative proportionality review. Many other
examples, though, might be cited. For example, in seventeen of the reports (6%), no answer is
provided in response to the request for the date on which the report itself was completed.
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eliciting from the trial judge his own unique perspective of the trial."24'
Despite this exhortation, in forty-seven of the 259 reports (19.1%), trial
judges have failed to offer any response to the question asking for
"general comments ... concerning the appropriateness of the sentence,
considering the crime, the defendant, and other relevant factors. 242
Furthermore, when that question is answered, the response is often
perfunctory and uninformative: "[t]he sentence was appropriate"; 243
"[t]he legislature determined the sentence for this defendant. I do not
choose to comment on the legislature's judgment";244 and "[t]he
sentence was entirely appropriate given the gravity of the offense. 245
Problems of the same sort are apparent in all other sections of the
reports on file with the court. For example, section (1) solicits
information about the defendant.246 In response to the questions included
in this section, Report No. 198 (Joseph Schuler II) indicates that the
defendant is a male African-American, but provides virtually no other
information about him.247 Specifically, this report fails to furnish
answers to the following questions: the defendant's date of birth and
marital status; number and age of children; whether the defendant's
father and/or mother are alive or dead; the number of children born to
defendant's parents; information regarding the defendant's formal
education, intelligence level, and IQ score; pertinent psychiatric or
psychological information; the work record of the defendant; prior
convictions; and the defendant's length of residence in Washington and
248the county of conviction. Quite remarkably, this report also provides
241. Mins. (Aug. 25, 1978), supra note 182, at 1.
242. Examples include section (6)(k) in the following trial judge reports: Report of the Trial
Judge No. 18 (Brian Kester); No. 19 (Michael Comethan); No. 35 (David Lennon); No. 46
(Nicholas Giesa); No. 48 (Christopher St. Pierre).
243. Report of the Trial Judge No. 6 (Kenneth Hovland).
244. Report of the Trial Judge No. 11 (Rosaline Edmondson).
245. Report of the Trial Judge No. 40 (John Schoenhals). On rare occasions, a trial court judge
will indicate that he or she disagrees with a sentence imposed by a jury. But typically, the judge's
elaboration of the reasons for the disagreement is not helpful. Consider, for example, Report of the
Trial Judge No. 2 (Arnold Brown), in which the judge answered 6(k) as follows: "[s]ince there were
no mitigating circumstances the failure of the jury not to impose the death penalty was not
appropriate." See also Report of the Trial Judge No. 21 (Leslie Pounds) ("Because of unusual
factual situation life without parole seems a little harsh (defendant's lack of recollection-immunity
granted participant whose involvement was substantial-prior good character of defendant.)").
246. App. A, infra pp. 869-70, at (1).
247. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 198 (Joseph Schuler I1).
248. Id. at (l)(a)-(j).
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no answers to the questions in section (7) (Information about the
Chronology of the Case), which ask for the dates of the defendant's
offense, arrest, trial, and sentence.249
While this report represents an extreme example of apparent judicial
negligence, inspection of the remaining trial judge reports turns up many
others nearly as inadequate in providing basic information about the
biography and character of defendants. 250 For example, in forty-one of
the 259 reports (15.8%), no answer is provided in response to the
question regarding the highest grade completed by the defendant; in
sixty-three reports (24.3%), to the question regarding the defendant's
intelligence level; and in 149 reports (57.5%), to the question regarding
the defendant's IQ score. These deficiencies raise vexing questions
about the capacity of the court to compare the character of various
defendants, to make informed judgments about mental capacity, and so
to determine the degree of culpability to be ascribed to one defendant as
opposed to another.
Somewhat less common, but by no means infrequent, are those
reports in which questions are left unanswered in section (4)
(Information about the Victim), which is intended to provide the
supreme court with a more adequate understanding of the crime in
question, and, specifically, its more or less heinous nature. For example,
Report No. 145 (Cristian Delbosque) fails to answer the questions that
ask whether the victim was related to the defendant by blood or
marriage; for the victim's occupation as well as whether the victim was
an employer or employee of the defendant;25 1 whether the victim was
249. Id. at (7).
250. In section (1) of the 259 trial judge reports, date of birth is omitted in twelve (4.4%); gender
in seven (2.7%); marital status in eleven (4.2%); race in three (1.2%); number and ages of
defendant's children in eight (3.1%); whether defendant's father is living in eight (3.1%); whether
defendant's mother is living in eleven (4.2%); number of siblings of defendant in twelve (4.6%);
whether a psychiatric evaluation was performed on the defendant in nine (3.5%); the existence of
character or behavioral disorders on the part of the defendant in twenty-eight (10.8%); the work
record of the defendant in seven (2.7%); the defendant's prior convictions, if any, in sixteen (6.2%);
and, finally, the length of time the defendant has resided in Washington in nine (3.5%). For other
examples of reports that provide minimal information about the defendant, see Report of the Trial
Judge No. 99 (Stanley Runion); No. 103 (Jos6 Nash); No. 124 (Christopher Bradley); No. 189
(Kevin Boot); No. 193 (David Lewis); No. 197 (Joseph Revay); No. 202 (Gary Ackley); No. 207
(Donnie Ivy); No. 211 (Dennis Anfinson); No. 212 (Sap Kray); No. 213 (Richard Morgan); No. 221
(Steven Phillips); No. 228 (Rosendo Delgado); No. 232 (Kenneth Leuluaialii); and No. 250 (Joseph
Kennedy).
251. Report of the Trial Judge No. 145 (Cristian Delbosque) at (4)(a) & (b).
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acquainted with the defendant; 52 for the victim's length of residency in
Washington; whether the victim was the same race or ethnic origin as
the defendant; whether the victim was of the same sex as the defendant;
whether the victim was held hostage during the crime; whether physical
harm or torture was inflicted upon the victim prior to death and, if so, of
what sort and for how long; for the age of the victim; and, finally, for the
type of weapon employed in the crime.253 Again, while this is perhaps an
extreme example, many other reports provide very little information
regarding the biography of the victim and the way in which he or she
was murdered, once again leaving the court ill-equipped to complete its
task of comparing defendants convicted of "similar" crimes.254 Not
surprisingly, moreover, the reports that provide very little information
regarding the defendant are also those that provide very little
information on the nature of the crime and its victim, thus making it
effectively impossible for the court to derive any benefit from these
reports.
Finally, yet another variation on the problem of incomplete reports
are those whose responses are almost if not entirely limited to questions
that can be answered by checking a "yes" or "no" box; or, alternatively,
those that furnish a bare minimum of comment, but only in response to
those questions that are straightforwardly factual in nature (e.g., number
and ages of defendant's children and defendant's prior convictions). 255
Such reports are largely superfluous for the purposes of proportionality
review because Washington's capital punishment statute stipulates that
within ten days of the entry of a judgment and sentence imposing the
death penalty the clerk of the trial court must transmit to the supreme
court information regarding "the caption of the case, its cause number,
the defendant's name, the crime or crimes of which the defendant was
convicted, the sentence imposed, the date of entry of judgment and
252. Id. at (4)(c). In some reports, the answer provided to this question is suspect. For example, in
Report No. 208 (Kenneth Comeslast), which was filed just short of five years late, the judge
answered, "I believe the victims were acquainted with the defendant but at this time I cannot recall
the extent of their acquaintance." Report of the Trial Judge No. 208 (Kenneth Comeslast).
253. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 145 (Cristian Delbosque) at (4)(d)-(j).
254. For examples of additional reports that provide very little information on the nature of the
crime and its victim, see Report of the Trial Judge No. 197 (Joseph Revay); No. 202 (Gary Ackley);
No. 211 (Dennis Anfinson); No. 212 (Sap Kray).
255. For examples of reports that are limited to box checking and/or the provision of bare factual
information, see Report of the Trial Judge No. 15 (Patrick Jeffries); No. 22 (Fortunato Dictado); No.
27 (John Anderson); No. 28 (Gus Turner).
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sentence, and addresses of the attorneys for the parties. 256 Many trial
judge reports, in other words, do little more than replicate the
information included in the notice submitted by the trial court clerk and,
as such, are of little or no use.
3. Inaccurate and/or Inadequate Information Regarding
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
The absence of adequate information in the trial judge reports
concerning aggravating and mitigating factors particularly compromises
the ability of the Washington State Supreme Court to conduct
meaningful comparative proportionality review. Some trial judge reports
fail to indicate the statutorily specified circumstances that warranted
conviction on a charge of aggravated first-degree murder. A
considerably larger number fail to provide adequate information
regarding any mitigating evidence that may have been introduced during
special sentencing proceedings.
At least one applicable aggravating circumstance must be found in
order to sustain a conviction for aggravated first-degree murder,
regardless of whether that conviction generates a sentence of death or
life without parole, and regardless of whether a conviction results from a
guilty plea or a jury determination.257 The inclusion of twelve reports
(4.6% of the total) that do not indicate any aggravating circumstances,
alleged or found applicable, indicates either that these reports do not
belong in the database maintained by the court or, that they incorporate a
serious legal error.258 This omission makes it impossible to know the
256. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.100 (2000).
257. Id. § 10.95.020. Some trial court judges seem to believe that a guilty plea exempts them
from indicating the aggravating circumstance(s) that provides the basis for conviction on a charge of
aggravated first-degree murder. Because the question concerning aggravating circumstances appears
in the section of the trial judge reports regarding the trial (as opposed to the section on the special'
sentencing proceeding), this belief is without foundation. In two cases, in response to the questions
regarding alleged and applicable aggravating circumstances, the judge wrote "Not applicable," and
explained this entry by referring back to the question concerning the defendant's initial plea. Report
of the Trial Judge No. 152 (Steven McCord); No. 153 (Ernest Benson). Moreover, in another report,
a judge listed "more than one victim and murders part of a common scheme" under the heading of
alleged aggravating circumstances, but then checked two boxes under the heading "Found
Applicable." Report of the Trial Judge No. 196 (Barry Loukaitis). In fact, according to Washington
State's death penalty statute, this is a single aggravating circumstance. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.95.020(10). This error effectively makes this homicide appear more heinous when measured by
number of aggravating circumstances than it was in fact.
258. For trial judge reports that fail to indicate any aggravating circumstances, alleged and/or
applicable, see Report of the Trial Judge No. 24 (Grady Mitchell); No. 55 (Russell Stenger); No. 80
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basis on which a defendant was convicted of aggravated first-degree
murder and thereby deprives the Washington State Supreme Court of
one of the principal means of assessing the heinousness of any given
murder.
The problem posed by inadequate information regarding mitigating
circumstances is far more consequential because the supreme court, in
reviewing a death sentence, is statutorily required to assess the evidence
that persuaded a jury not to afford leniency to a defendant.2 59 At the
close of a special sentencing proceeding, jurors must answer the
following question: "Having in mind the crime of which the defendant
has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? ' 2
60
Because the jury's attention is directed by this question to the presence
or absence of mitigating circumstances as the primary factor to consider
in its deliberations, the failure of the vast majority of trial judge reports
to elicit any significant detail on this issue seriously compromises the
meaningfulness of the supreme court's conduct of comparative
proportionality review.26'
Two questions in the trial judge report deal with mitigating
circumstances introduced during the penalty phase of capital trials. The
first asks whether there was, "in the court's opinion, credible evidence of
(Gabriel Garcia); No. 83 (Ronald Thomas); No. 97 (James Fountain) (here, the aggravating
circumstances are indicated in the subsequently submitted revision, No. 97A); No. 143 (Pedro
Mendez-Reyna); No. 152 (Steven McCord); No. 153 (Ernest Benson); No. 181 (Henry Marshall);
No. 185 (Robert Parker); No. 211 (Dennis Anfinson); No. 222 (Donald Lambert); No. 227 (Brodie
Walradt) (this information may be included in documents which, according to the trial judge, were
appended to the report); No. 233 (Keith Ruch); No. 236 (Duwayne Bender); No. 245 (James
Kinney).
259. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(1) (2000).
260. Id. § 10.95.060(4) (2000). Incidentally, one report includes what is arguably a valid
complaint regarding the formulation of this statutory question: "The question asked of the jury... is
asked in the negative, and the jurors had difficulty understanding the concept, as well as the
question, and the application thereof It is confusing!" Report of the Trial Judge No. 77 (Charles
Tate).
261. The absence of adequate evidence regarding mitigating circumstances is also problematic if
a prosecutor elects to consult the trial judge reports for assistance in determining whether or not to
seek the death penalty. RCW 10.95.040 specifies that "[i]f a person is charged with aggravated first
degree murder as defined by RCW 10.95.020, the prosecuting attorney shall file written notice of a
special sentencing proceeding to determine whether or not the death penalty should be imposed
when there is reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit
leniency." WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.040 (2000). Should a prosecutor seek guidance from the trial
judge reports in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty, little will be gleaned from this
source.
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any mitigating circumstances as provided in Laws of 1981, ch. 138,
§ 7. ' 262 The second asks whether there was "evidence of mitigating
circumstances, whether or not of a type listed in Laws of 1981, ch. 138,
§ 7, not described" in the answer to the previous question.263 The first of
these questions is intended to elicit information about mitigating factors
enumerated by the state legislature (e.g., "[w]hether the defendant acted
under duress or domination of another person;" "[w]hether, at the time
of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct.., was substantially impaired as a
result of mental disease or defect;" and/or "[w]hether there is a
likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the
future"). 264 The second of these questions is included in order to comply
with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Lockett v. Ohio.265 That ruling,
requiring individualized sentencing in capital cases, permits a defendant
to offer as evidence during the sentencing phase "any aspect of [his or
her] character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense" that
may warrant a sentence other than death.266
262. App. A, infra p. 873, at (3)(c).
263. App. A, infra p. 874, at (3)(d).
264. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(5), (6), and (8) (2000).
265. 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
266. Id. at 604. Because both of these questions appear in section (3) of the trial judge
questionnaire (Information Concerning the Special Sentencing Proceeding), App. A, infra pp. 873-
74, at (3), information regarding mitigating circumstances is only solicited from judges when the
death penalty is sought by the state and a special sentencing proceeding is in fact conducted. So
constructed, it is not clear that the two questions in section (3) adequately satisfy the principal
purpose of the trial judge reports. If that purpose is to provide the State Supreme Court with as
much information as possible regarding the factors that justified a sentence of death as opposed to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and if that information is a necessary condition
of meaningful comparative proportionality review, then it is at least arguable that the form should
also seek to draw out any information relevant to this question that was introduced during the guilt
phase. Yet, in section (2) (Information about the Trial), trial judges are simply given a list of
possible defenses (e.g., excusable homicide, insanity, duress, alibi, intoxication), followed by one
column of boxes in which they must indicate whether evidence was introduced regarding any of
these defenses. A second column follows in which they must indicate whether the jury received
instructions regarding these defenses. App. A, infra pp. 871-73, at (2). This checklist fails to solicit
any information introduced during the guilt phase that may bear on the question of mitigating
circumstances, should a special sentencing proceeding ensue. For example, should a defendant
introduce evidence regarding the defense of duress, that information will almost certainly prove
pertinent during the special sentencing proceeding to the statutorily enumerated mitigating
circumstance dealing with the question of whether a defendant "acted under duress or domination of
another person." WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.070(5). Yet the trial judge report does nothing to secure
information about this evidence, unless of course it is reintroduced during the special sentencing
proceeding and the trial court judge, in completing the report, sees fit to introduce that evidence in
response to the questions concerning that proceeding.
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Of the cases in which the death penalty was sought, and a. special
sentencing proceeding was conducted, only very rarely do the trial judge
reports indicate in any detail just what mitigating evidence was
introduced by the defense.267 In eight instances, one or both of the
questions concerning mitigating evidence has been left entirely
unanswered (9.7% of the total), leaving the Washington State Supreme
Court uninformed about a key component of special sentencing
proceedings. In an additional eleven instances (13.4%), the "No" box is
checked in response to both of these two questions. In such instances,
leaving aside the very small number of death penalty "volunteers," it is
difficult to know whether these negatives are indicative of a failure on
the part of defense counsel to introduce such evidence, which raises
questions about the adequacy of legal representation in death penalty
cases, or whether they are indicative of a failure on the part of the trial
judge to record that evidence.
More significantly, in over half of these reports, when a judge has
indicated that credible mitigating evidence has been introduced, his or
her account of that evidence is limited to a single phrase or sentence. To
provide just three examples, in Report No. 174 (Timothy Blackwell), the
trial judge wrote: "The life history of the defendant; 2 68 in Report No. 92
(Marc Darrah), the judge indicated only that "the defendant &
prosecutor stipulated that there was [sic] mitigating circumstances";2 69
and in Report No. 164 (Steven Morgan), the judge reported that the
"defendant's family and several ministers testified," but gave no
indication of the nature of that testimony.270 Moreover, although the
form expressly asks for evidence regarding mitigating circumstances that
the court found "credible, 27' in several reports, trial judges have cited
such evidence only to discount its significance. Thus, in Report No. 140
(Cal Brown), the judge did not indicate in any substantive way the
mitigating evidence that was introduced, limiting his assessment to the
267. In only three instances would I describe the trial judge's account of mitigating circumstances
as adequate. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 70 (Herbert Rice); No. 73 (Michael Furman); No.
220 (Dayva Cross).
268. Report of the Trial Judge No. 174 (Timothy Blackwell).
269. Report of the Trial Judge No. 92 (Marc Darrah).
270. Report of the Trial Judge No. 164 (Steven Morgan). For other examples of trial judge reports
which provided extremely limited account of mitigating circumstances, see Report of the Trial
Judge No. 45 (James Dykgraao; No. 75 (Gary Benn); No. 140 (Cal Brown); No. 175 (Richard
Clark); No. 224 (Nicolas Vasquez).
271. App. A, infra p. 873, at (3)(c).
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following after checking the "yes" box: "but... it did not appear to be
sufficient to merit leniency. ' '272 Similarly, in Report No. 181 (Henry
Marshall), the judge noted: "There was evidence of a mitigating factor
set out in the law, but given the other facts of the case it was not
particularly credible as it all related to his ability to plan and carry out a
plan. The planning of the robbery and the carrying out of the robbery
indicated that he performed these functions quite well., 273 When this
difficulty is considered in combination with the impoverished quality of
the evidence regarding mitigating circumstances in the trial judge
reports, it seems clear that the Washington State Supreme Court is in no
position to reliably determine why any specific case resulted in a
sentence of life imprisonment rather than death.
4. Inaccurate and/or Inadequate Information Regarding Race
and Ethnicity
The trial judge report form does not provide a standardized set of
categories for determining the racial and ethnic identities of various
participants in aggravated first-degree murder trials. 274 Also judges do
not have any reliable means of determining those identities. As a result,
in conducting its death sentence reviews, the Washington State Supreme
Court is unable to gauge the presence or absence of discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty in any systematic way and is thus
unable to meet one of the two primary objectives of comparative
proportionality review.275 This is true with regard to efforts to compare
various cases among the trial judge reports, and it is equally true with
272. Report of the Trial Judge No. 140 (Cal Brown).
273. Report of the Trial Judge No. 181 (Henry Marshall). Ironically, Henry Marshall's death
sentence was subsequently vacated by the State Supreme Court when it held that the trial court erred
in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea when presented with significant
evidence of his mental incompetence. State v. Marshall, 144 Wash. 2d 266, 277-81, 27 P.3d 192,
198-200 (2001).
274. I am fully aware of the problematic nature of such racial and ethnic classifications. My point
is not to commend their employment, but, rather, to indicate how their absence from the trial judge
reports undermines the effort to ferret out instances when constitutionally impermissible factors
influence the deliberation and judgment of juries. For specification of the standardized categories
employed by the federal government, see U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United
States Census 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d6la.pdf (last visited June
29, 2004).
275. State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 910, 822 P.2d 177, 223 (1991) ("Our concern is with
alleviating the types of major systemic problems identified in Furman: random arbitrariness and
imposition of the death sentence based on race.").
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regard to efforts, internal to a single case, to determine the import of
responses to questions that ask whether the victim, jurors and/or
witnesses are or are not of the same race or ethnic identity as the
defendant.
Section (6) of the trial judge report requests information regarding the
race or ethnic origin of the defendant, the victim, the jury, and the
population of the county in which the trial was conducted.276 Related
questions ask whether any evidence indicates that persons of a particular
race or ethnic origin were systematically excluded from the jury;
whether the race or ethnic origin of the defendant, victim, or any witness
was an apparent factor at trial; and whether the jury was expressly
instructed to exclude race and ethnic origin in its deliberations.277 These
questions are intended to elicit the sort of information required by the
court if it is to respond to the concern, articulated in Furman, that
impermissible forms of bias may explain why some are sentenced to die,
whereas most convicted of aggravated first-degree murder are not.
The responses in the trial judge reports to the questions regarding
racial and ethnic identity include, but are not limited to, the following:
African; African-American; Black; Black (Father Black, mother
Caucasian); Albanian Muslim; American Indian-Colville; Anglo-Saxon;
Asian; Asian (Filipino); Cambodian; Caucasian; Caucasian/Cajun;
Caucasian-North American; European/N. American; Hispanic; Indian;
Latino (Mexican); Mexican-American; Native; Native American;
Samoan; Thai; Unknown; White; and White American.278 Setting aside
the racism and sexism evident in certain of these categorizations (e.g.,
Black-Father Black, mother Caucasian); and disregarding the failure in
276. App. A, infra pp. 877-80, at (6).
277. App. A, infra pp. 877-80, at (6).
278. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 1 (Mario Ortiz) (Mexican American); No. 2 (Arnold Roy
Brown) (Caucasian); No. 3 (Dwayne Earl Bartholomew) (White); No. 12 (Gregory Tyree Brown)
(Black); No. 13 (Kwan Fai Mak) (Asian); No. 42 (Kenneth R. Petersen) (European/N. American);
No. 54 (Sandra Entz) (Anglo-Saxon (Caucasian)); No. 70 (Herbert A. Rice, Jr.) (American Indian-
Colville); No. 71 (Patrick G. Hoffman) (Indian); No. 73 (Michael Monroe Furman) (Caucasian-
North American); No. 77 (Charles Curtis Tate) (Black (Father Black, Mother Caucasian)); No. 79
(Sherwood Knight) (African American); No. 80 (Gabriel Garcia) (Hispanic); No. 114 (Kly Bun
Meas) (Cambodian); No. 127 (Joseph Casbon) (Caucasian/Cajun); No. 130 (Cherno Camara)
(African); No. 146 (Martin Rasim Bulichi) (Albanian Muslim); No. 158 (Roderick Shawn Selwyn)
(Native); No. 161 (Nga Ngoeung) (Born in Thailand); No. 197 (Joseph Revay) (Native American);
No. 203 (Marvin Jay Francisco) (Asian (Filipino)/Caucasian); No. 210 (Cheyenne Troy Brown)
(Unknown); No. 224 (Nicolas Solorio Vasquez) (Latino (Mexican)); No. 232 (Kenneth John
Leuluaialii) (Samoan); No. 235 (Aaron Eugene Howerton) (White American).
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many cases to distinguish racial from ethnic identity,2 79 as well as
political or national identity from either; and, finally, leaving aside the
fact that visual observation appears to be the principal means of
determining to which category any given defendant, victim, jury
member, or witness is assigned,2 80 this miscellany cannot help but thwart
the court's effort to determine whether Justice Douglas was correct in
Furman when he stated that the death penalty is selectively applied to
those who lack "political clout" and/or are members of "suspect" or
"unpopular" minorities. 281
That trial court judges have struggled with these issues is apparent.
For example, in Report No. 10 (Steven Carey), the judge identified
Steven Carey as Caucasian, and, in considering the composition of the
jury, he indicated that all twelve of its members were Caucasian as
well.282 His uncertainty about this conclusion, however, is indicated by a
marginal comment, which reads: "Based on visual observation; no
inquiry has been made as to the race or ethnic background of the
,,283jury. In Report No. 33 (Donald Galbert), the judge indicated that the
defendant is "black"; but, then, in response to the question concerning
the demographics of the county in which the trial transpired, apparently
could not decide whether "black" is a racial or an ethnic category and so
checked boxes indicating that it is both.284 Finally, in Report No. 34
(Paul Joseph St. Pierre), the judge indicated that, based on hearsay, he
suspected that the defendant was Italian; but then, in response to the
279. To cite but one illustration of the latter problem, consider Report of the Trial Judge No. 214
(Gary Packer). There, the trial judge indicates that 75-90% of the population of Clark County is of
the same race as the defendant (Caucasian), but that only 25-50% of its population is of the same
ethnic origin as the defendant. Absent some indication of the ethnicity of the defendant, which is not
provided, it is impossible to understand the distinction drawn here and so to draw any clear
conclusions about the operation of prejudice in the trial and/or jury deliberation.
280. On occasion, a defendant's, victim's, or juror's surname is used as a surrogate for visible
appearance. See, e.g., Report of the Trial Judge No. 228 (Rosendo Delgado) (noting the trial judge's
statement that "[t]he victims and defendant (all Hispanic). It appeared there were no Hispanics on
the jury, at least by surname"); Report of the Trial Judge No. 229 (Julio Delgado) (noting the trial
judge's statement that "4 jurors had Hispanic surnames but whether they are Hispanics is
unknown").
281. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
282. Report of the Trial Judge No. 10 (Steven Carey).
283. Id.; see also Report of the Trial Judge No. 26 (Lonnie Link) (indicating that the defendant
"appears to be Caucasian"); No. 216 (Allen Gregory) (noting the judge's statement that "[n]o juror
asked to provide his/her race or ethnic origin. Above numbers are based on appearance only").
284. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 33 (Donald Galbert); see also Report of the Trial Judge
No. 4 (Jimmy Ramil) (noting the same occurrence with respect to the classification "Filipino").
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question concerning the composition of the jury, confessed that "I have
made no effort to determine percentage of Italians., 285 The point to be
drawn from these examples is not so much that the claims made in these
reports are patently wrong. Rather, the point is that in the absence of
standardized categories these claims are often arbitrary if not capricious,
and, as such, cannot help but sabotage the aim of the report's questions
concerning the racial and ethnic identities of various parties to any given
trial.
In addition, the absence of pre-designated categories vitiates any
effort to grasp the more subtle dimensions of discrimination, i.e., those
that, in principle, might be identified by examining any given sentence
in light of the percentage of the county population that is the same race
or ethnic identity as the defendant. In many instances, it appears that trial
court judges have simply guessed when answering this question. For
example, Report No. 79 (Sherwood Knight), dealing with a trial
conducted in 1986, indicates that African-Americans in King County
comprise 10-25% of the total population, whereas Report No. 88 (Ray
Lewis), concerning a trial conducted in the same year, indicates that the
African-American population of King County is under 10%.286 Both
claims, to belabor the obvious, cannot simultaneously be true.287
Similarly, Report No. 109 (Gregory Scott), filed in 1993, states that the
Caucasian population of King County makes up 50-75% of the total
population, whereas the 1990 census indicates that the correct figure is
just shy of 85%.288 Additionally, Report No. 193 (David Lewis) states
that the African-American population of Pierce County in 1999 is
between 10% and 25%, whereas the 2000 census indicates that the total
285. Report of the Trial Judge No. 34 (Paul Joseph St. Pierre). In some cases, the answers
provided to these questions are simply confusing. In one report, the defendant is identified as
Caucasian. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 4 (Dennis Williams). Then, in response to the question
concerning the demographics of the county in which the trial was held, the judge indicated that over
90% of the population is of the same race or ethnic origin as the defendant, and, in apparent
explanation for this claim, contends that "there is a significant Native American population in
Mason County." Id.
286. See Report of the Trial Judge No. 79 (Sherwood Knight); No. 88 (Ray Lewis).
287. In this instance, the second judge got it right. The 1990 U.S. Census data indicates that
African-Americans made up 5% of the total population of King County. See 1990 US Census Data,
at http://homer.ssd.census.gov/cdrom/lookup/1086358727=/1086358739-/1086358746=/
1086358787=/CMD=RET/DB=C90STF3A/FO=FIPS.STATE/FI =FIPS.COUNTY90/F2=STUB.GE
O/FMT=HTML/LEV=COUNTY90/SEL=53,033,King+County/T=P8 (last visited June 29, 2004).
288. Report of the Trial Judge No. 109 (Gregory Scott); see 1990 US Census Data, supra note
287.
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was 7%.289 In such instances, the fault lies not so much with the trial
court judges but with the form itself and, more particularly, its
presupposition that judges are in a position to know and to certify the
accuracy of demographic information that is not within their
professional ken.
To the extent that the trial judge reports are defective in the ways
indicated here, the Washington State Supreme Court's ability to conduct
meaningful comparative proportionality reviews is compromised.
Moreover, even if the supreme court were to attempt to remedy the
deficiencies in the database, it could not do so. The accuracy and utility
of these reports depend on the trial judges' conscientious completion and
timely submission. However, as demonstrated above, this condition has
not been met in a majority of the reports, with the possible exception of
those relating to cases most recently decided. One could attempt to
remedy the failings of the court's database by returning to the trial
record of every past aggravated murder case in order to seek answers to
questions that are now unanswered, incomplete, or erroneous. That,
however, would be a largely pointless gesture because the principal
purpose of the trial judge reports is to collect information that goes
beyond what is contained in those records.
B. Comparative Proportionality Review in Washington and Its
Defects
Since adoption of the current death penalty statute in 1981,290 the
Washington State Supreme Court has struggled to develop a coherent
and consistent method to inform its conduct of comparative
proportionality review. It has largely failed in this effort. As a result, its
performance of such reviews has remained an ad hoc affair that does
289. Report of the Trial Judge No. 193 (David Lewis); 2000 US Census Data, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/53/53053.html (last visited July 3, 2004). The question of
whether judges sometimes offer ill or uninformed guesses in answering this demographic query is
plainly answered by Report of the Trial Judge No. 165 (Clark Elmore). There, the judge indicated
that the Caucasian population of the county is 75-90% of the total population, but then proceeded to
indicate that it may in fact be over 90%, adding a parenthetical comment of "possibly" in order to
explain these inconsistent responses. Report of the Trial Judge No. 165 (Clark Elmore). Another
judge similarly failed to answer the county demographic question, but indicated that a "big majority
of Spokane [is] believed to be of white race." Report of the Trial Judge No. 94 (Daniel Edwards);
see also Report of the Trial Judge No. 235 (Aaron Howerton) (indicating that "most" of the jurors
were of the same race as the defendant).
290. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.010-.900 (2000).
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little to remedy the concerns articulated in Furman regarding the
arbitrary and capricious administration of capital punishment.291 More
specifically, the court has failed to develop a procedure that ensures that
the death penalty is consistently applied to those convicted of the most
heinous murders and, correlatively, that those convicted of less heinous
crimes are not sentenced to die. For the most part, moreover, the court
has not engaged in the sort of inquiry necessary to ensure that
constitutionally impermissible considerations such as race do not taint
the administration of the death penalty. In sum, analysis of the
Washington State Supreme Court's conduct of comparative
proportionality review since 1981 provides little reason to believe that
this procedure has remedied the concerns that initially prompted its
adoption.292
During the period covered by this study, the death penalty was sought
in seventy-eight cases in the State of Washington and imposed in thirty-
one. 293 Twenty sentences were reviewed for proportionality by the
Washington State Supreme Court, but none were vacated for
disproportionality.9 This section examines the defects in the court's
conduct of comparative proportionality review in those twenty cases.
Prior to 1995, the court demonstrated considerable uncertainty regarding
291. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313
(White, J., concurring); id. at 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
292. State v. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 910, 822 P.2d 177, 223 (1991) ("Our concern is with
alleviating the types of major systemic problems identified in Furman: random arbitrariness and
imposition of the death sentence based on race.").
293. MARK LARRANAGA, WASHINGTON DEATH PENALTY ASSISTANCE CENTER, WHERE ARE WE
HEADING? CURRENT TRENDS OF WASHINGTON'S DEATH PENALTY 14 n.63 (2003). Of these thirty-
one, Michael Furman was a juvenile at the time of his offense and his death sentence was reversed
on that basis. Id.; see State v. Furman, 122 Wash. 2d 440, 458; 858 P.2d 1092, 1103 (1993).
294. The following have been analyzed for proportionality by the Washington State Supreme
Court: Dwayne Bartholomew (No. 3), Charles Campbell (No. 9), Kwan Mak (No. 13), Patrick
Jeffries (No. 15), Benjamin Harris (No. 29), Mitchell Rupe (Nos. 7 and 31), David Rice (No. 43),
Brian Lord (No. 49), Gary Benn (No. 75), Westley Dodd (No. 76), Jonathan Gentry (No. 119),
James Brett (No. 125), Blake Pirtle (No. 132), Cal Brown (No. 140), Darold Stenson (No. 144),
Jeremy Sagastegui (No. 160), Clark Elmore (No. 165), Dwayne Woods (No. 177), Cecil Davis (No.
180), James Elledge (No. 183); while the following have not been analyzed for proportionality:
Clark Hazen (No. 39, committed suicide while case on appeal), Michael Furman (No. 73), Sammie
Luvene (No. 135), Charles Finch (No. 154), Richard Clark (No. 175), Michael Roberts (No. 176),
Henry Marshall (No. 181), Covell Thomas (No. 194), Allen Gregory (No. 216), Dayva Cross (No.
220), and Robert Yates (No. 251). As of this writing, four of these defendants have been executed
(Dodd, Campbell, Segastegui, and Elledge), and three of these cases are currently on direct appeal
(Gregory, Cross, and Yates). See OFFICE OF THE AT7ORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
DIVISION, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CASE STATUS REPORT, available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/pubs/
capital-litigation/Capital-LitReport03O4.doc (last visited July 13, 2004).
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each of the three basic elements in the logic of comparative
proportionality review: identification of the relevant universe of cases to
be considered, specification of the criteria to be employed in defining
"similar" cases; and, finally, articulation of a test to be used in
determining whether a sentence under review is or is not
disproportionate. By the close of 1995, the court concluded that the
universe of cases must include all cases in which defendants were
convicted of aggravated first-degree murder, and it had specified the
factors it would consider in identifying a pool of similar cases. Yet, in
reviewing specific cases, the court's method of selecting pools of similar
cases from this universe proved inconsistent at best, and its method of
comparing those cases to those under review in order to determine
proportionality proved altogether unsystematic at best and arbitrary at
worst.
1. Comparative Proportionality Review to 1995
The Washington State Supreme Court's early difficulties with all
three elements of the logic of comparative proportionality review and its
confusion regarding the very purpose of this practice were apparent in
State v. Campbell, 295 the first case it reviewed. 296 In affirming the
sentence and conviction of Charles Campbell, the court announced that
the purpose of comparative proportionality review is to "assure that
'wholly arbitrary, capricious, or freakish sentences' are minimized. ' 297
In other words, rather than affirmatively seeking to ensure consistency in
capital sentencing throughout the state, the court would merely seek to
invalidate those deemed aberrant.298
Although the court acknowledged the statutory provision requiring
295. 103 Wash. 2d 1,691 P.2d 929 (1984).
296. Gilbert, supra note 217, at 604.
297. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 30 n.2, 691 P.2d at 945 n.2 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37, 45 (1984)).
298. This holding is not consistent with the legislative history of RCW 10.95.130, which indicates
that the purpose of comparative proportionality review is to ensure statewide consistency in the
application of the death penalty. See Memorandum from Bill Gales, Senior Counsel, Washington
State Senate Judiciary Committee, to Gene Baxstrom 2 (Oct. 24, 1980). Gales stated:
The supreme court is required to review any death penalty sentence both for trial errors and for
a determination of whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases taking into consideration both the crime and the defendant. This last
requirement is intended to eliminate any possibility of differing standards for the imposition of
the death penalty across the state.
Id.; see Death Penalty-Aggravated Murder, ch. 206, sec. 7(3)(b), 1977 Wash. Laws 778.
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consideration of all "similar cases," it found no trial judge report with
facts comparable to those of Campbell: "While many other defendants
have been charged with aggravated first-degree murder, we find no other
where four aggravating factors in the guilt phase were found to be
present by the jury., 299 Stymied in its effort to abstract a pool of similar
cases from the universe defined by statute, based on the number of
aggravating factors involved, the court abandoned all pretense of
comparative review. Instead, it reverted to inherent proportionality
review: "A case which involves such a multitude of aggravating factors,
we are convinced, would, with great frequency prompt a jury to impose
the death penalty .... Moreover, we are hard pressed to find killings
more premeditated and revengeful than those committed by
defendant. 3 °° Without specifying which cases and trial judge reports it
had inspected, without indicating why it considered the number of
aggravating factors to be the dispositive element in its review, and
without explaining why it did not see any need to consider the character
of the defendant, as the law requires, the court simply asserted that
Campbell's sentence was "clearly" proportionate "to the crime
committed." 301
In several cases following on the heels of Campbell, the court
acknowledged the distinction between inherent and comparative
proportionality review, as well as its statutory obligation to perform the
latter. The court, however, failed to remedy the defects of its analysis in
Campbell, and, in certain respects, aggravated them. For example, in the
second case it reviewed for proportionality, State v. Jeffries,30 2 the court
299. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 30, 691 P.2d at 945. By the end of 1983, eighteen trial judge
reports had been filed with the Washington State Supreme Court, and so, at minimum, this number
was available to the court when it reviewed Campbell's case. In addition, RCW 10.95.130(b)
defines as "similar" all those "reported in the Washington Reports or Washington Appellate Reports
since January 1, 1965." Whether this latter groups of cases should be considered in conducting
comparative proportionality review is debatable. See supra note 217.
300. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 30, 691 P.2d at 945-46.
301. Id. Upon reviewing the factual circumstances of a number of cases tried since adoption of
the 1981 capital punishment statute, Justice Utter stated that the "pattern of filings and of jury
verdicts under our new statute defies any rational explanation .... We can find no basis on the face
of these cases to explain why many of the cases where the death penalty was not sought differ in
substantial degree from any where the death penalty was sought." Id. at 45, 691 P.2d at 954 (Utter,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
302. 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P.2d 722 (1986). See generally W. Ward Morrison, Jr., Comment,
Washington 's Comparative Proportionality Review: Toward Effective Appellate Review of Death
Penalty Cases Under the Washington State Constitution, 64 WASH. L. REV. 11I (1989) (providing a
detailed account of the court's comparative proportionality review in Jeffries).
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ignored the plain language of the statute when it declared that the
universe of cases to be considered does "not include cases where the
death penalty was not sought by the prosecutor., 30 3 As noted above, by
limiting itself to cases in which the death penalty was sought, the court
neglected the far greater number of aggravated first-degree murder cases
in which it is not, and so defeated the very purpose of comparative
proportionality review. 0
The Jeffries court's determination of the appropriate pool of similar
cases was equally flawed. The court first noted the number of
aggravating factors found applicable in Jeffries (two), and, second,
offered summary recapitulations of four other cases in which death
sentences had been imposed (absent any express reference to the trial
judge reports in these cases). On that basis, absent any elaboration, the
court asserted that "these four cases strongly establish that the death
penalty here is not disproportionate., 30 5 No effort was made to explain
why these four cases, with very different fact configurations, were
deemed similar to Jeffries; why other aggravated first-degree murder
cases were not deemed similar; why the number of aggravating
circumstances should preclude consideration of the qualitative features
of the crime and the character of the defendant; or, what criteria, if any,
were employed in determining that the sentence imposed on Jeffries was
indeed proportionate to these other four. Given the poverty of this
review, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that in this instance the
court engaged in a results-oriented inquiry that provided a veneer of
statutory compliance to a sentence deemed appropriate on grounds never
expressly stated in the opinion.
303. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 430, 717 P.2d at 740. In his dissenting opinion in State v. Rupe,
108 Wash. 2d 734, 743 P.2d 210 (1987), Chief Justice Pearson explained why the State Supreme
Court typically confines its proportionality inquiries to cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed: "In examining the special circumstances in death penalty cases, we have a substantial
record before us, but in comparing death penalty cases to those in which the death penalty was not
imposed we are limited to the facts elicited from the trial courts by this court's standard
questionnaire." Id. at 786, 743 P.2d at 239 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Given
the quality of information elicited by those questionnaires, it is perhaps not surprising (although it
remains legally indefensible) that the court most often limits its comparative inquiries to death
sentence cases.
304. Comparative proportionality review is meaningful only if the universe of reports includes
those defendants who were convicted of aggravated first-degree murder, but for whom the death
penalty was not sought, as well as those for whom the death penalty was sought but not imposed.
See supra Part II.A.
305. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d at 430, 717 P.2d at 740.
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In State v. Harris,30 6 also decided in 1986, the court tacitly
acknowledged that it had erred in Jeifries by confining its review of
cases to those in which the death sentence had in fact been imposed.3 °7
However, as in Campbell, the court conceded that it could identify no
other cases involving contract killings in which the death penalty had
been sought: "[t]herefore, there is no evidence to be considered whether
the present case is disproportionate. 3 °8 The court, though, was able to
identify three post-1981 cases involving contract killings as an
aggravating factor, but in which the death penalty had not been
sought.30 9 On the face of it, this alone would appear to argue against the
proportionality of Harris's sentence, 310 especially given the court's
declaration that "it is our duty under the similarity standard to assure that
no death sentence is affirmed unless in similar cases throughout the state
the death penalty has been imposed generally."01 1 Yet the court did not
draw that conclusion. Instead, after noting that the statute "provides little
guidance to determine at what point a sentence becomes proportionate or
disproportionate,' 31 2 it stated: "We are satisfied the imposition of the
death penalty was not 'wantonly or freakishly' imposed., 31 3 In defense
of this ruling, the court noted: "No errors were made in the guilt and
sentencing phases of the defendant's trial; the trial court made every
effort to ensure the defendant's trial proceedings were fair and just. 314
However, to offer this as a justification for affirming a death sentence is
306. 106 Wash. 2d 784, 725 P.2d 975 (1986).
307. See id. at 798, 725 P.2d at 982.
308. Id., 725 P.2d at 982-83.
309. Id. at 798-99, 725 P.2d at 983.
310. Granted, the court did distinguish Harris from the three other cases involving contract
killings by noting that Harris had received a one-year sentence for a prior manslaughter charge,
whereas the other defendants "showed little, if any, prior records that rose to the seriousness of
defendant's." Id. at 799, 725 P.2d at 983. However, as Justice Utter noted in his dissent, two of
these three murders were far more brutal than that committed by Harris. Id. at 803-06, 725 P.2d at
985-86 (Utter, J., dissenting). Moreover, in addition to disregarding the fifteen years between
Harris's prior and present convictions, the court also ignored the fact that two of the three
defendants it cited had been imprisoned for various offenses much closer to the time of their
convictions for aggravated first-degree murder. Id.
311. Id. at 798, 725 P.2d at 982 (quoting Moore v. State, 213 S.E.2d 829, 864 (Ga. 1975))
(emphasis in original).
312. Id., 725 P.2d at 982.
313. Id. at 799, 725 P.2d at 983.
314. Id. The court in fact erred on this point. Harris's conviction was eventually overturned by a
federal district court and he was released from prison. Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1294,
1300 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affd, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995).
840
Conduct of Comparative Proportionality Review
to abdicate the court's statutory mandate to conduct an independent
assessment of proportionality. As Bruce Gilbert noted:
The jury has never made a factual determination on the
proportionality of the sentence. They have looked at no similar
cases, and are presumably basing their decision solely on the
facts of their individual case. While the presumption that a jury
sentence is valid is relevant to whether the defendant deserves to
die, or any other factual determination the jury has been asked to
decide, comparative proportionality review is not such a
determination.31 5
In State v. Rupe,316 decided in 1987, the court finally conceded that
the Washington statute requires it to consider all convictions for
aggravated first-degree murder, regardless of whether the death penalty
was sought or imposed.31 7 Resolution of this first issue in the logic of
comparative proportionality review did not, however, lead to successful
resolution of the second (determination of the pool of cases to be
deemed "similar" to any specific case under review), or, for that matter,
the third (determination of what conditions must be met in order to find
a sentence disproportionate). With respect to the second, the Rupe court
could find only a single death sentence case (David Rice), which,
although not yet reviewed by the court, exhibited the same combination
of aggravating factors (multiple victims were murdered as part of a
common scheme or plan; the murders were committed in order to
conceal the perpetrator's identity; and, lastly, they were committed in the
course of a first-degree robbery).31 8 Apparently unwilling to rest its
conclusion on a single case it had yet to review, again without
explanation, the court declared that the presence of two of the three
aggravating factors found applicable in Rupe sufficed to render other
cases comparable. 319 Employing this criterion, the court then identified
four cases in which defendants had received the death sentence; two in
which defendants were sentenced to life without parole, although the
prosecution had sought the death penalty; one in which the prosecutor
did not seek the death penalty; and another in which the defendant
315. Gilbert, supra note 217, at 622-23.
316. 108 Wash. 2d 734, 743 P.2d 210 (1987).
317. See id. at 767-68, 743 P.2d at 229.
318. See id. at 768, 743 P.2d at 229.
319. See id. at 768-69, 743 P.2d at 229-30.
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pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life without parole.320 Without
explaining why an even split in these sentencing decisions was sufficient
to satisfy the criterion of "generality," the court affirmed Rupe's
sentence.32 1 Rupe's sentence was eventually reversed,322 leading to his
re-sentencing to life without parole.
323
In addition, the Rupe court conceded that RCW section 10.95 requires
it to consider the character of the defendant as well as that of his or her
crime in deciding questions of proportionality.32 4 Reading Rupe's
character as an additional justification for a death sentence proved to be
a tricky matter, however, because, as the court acknowledged, his
"background is unusual among those convicted of first-degree
aggravated murder": "Rupe has no prior criminal record. There is
evidence that, most of his life, he was active in his community, respected
and liked by others. 325 However, the court discounted this mitigating
evidence, stating that "[t]he Legislature has clearly contemplated that the
death sentence is appropriate for crimes such as he has committed.1
3 26
Deference to the legislature, however, is no more defensible than is
deference to a jury. In both instances, the court fails to engage in an
independent inquiry regarding whether any given death sentence
constitutes a departure from the sentences generally imposed on other
defendants, considering both the crime and the defendant.
The court offered yet another twist in its ongoing struggle to
determine the relevant criteria of similarity when it affirmed the death
320. See id.
321. Id.
322. State v. Rupe, 93 F.3d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1996).
323. Nancy Bartley, Rupe Spared Death Penalty for Final Time, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000,
at Al.
324. See Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d at 770, 743 P.2d at 230.
325. Id. During Rupe's sentencing hearing, approximately fifty persons testified on his behalf. d.
at 780, 743 P.2d at 235. He had been involved in many activities, including the Boy Scouts, the
Civil Air Patrol, and the Mason County Search and Rescue Council. Id. at 780, 743 P.2d at 235-36.
Moreover, he had served in the Army, had never previously committed a crime, and was arguably
mentally disturbed. Id. at 781-83, 743 P.2d at 236-37. In dissent, Chief Justice Pearson, after
comparing Rupe's case to others involving first-degree robbery and multiple victims, concluded:
Rupe's case is the sole case in which the victims did not suffer prior to death and the defendant
acted under the influence of an extreme mental disturbance. Just as the murders in this case
were wanton and freakish in light of Rupe's entire personal history, so the imposition of the
death penalty is wanton and freakish in light of the other defendants.
Id. at 788, 743 P.2d at 239 (Pearson, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
326. Id. at 770, 743 P.2d at 230.
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sentence imposed on Brian Lord in State v. Lord.327 Here, the court first
reiterated its belief that the purpose of comparative proportionality
review is to alleviate "the types of major systemic problems identified in
Furman: random arbitrariness and imposition of the death sentence
based on race. ' 3 S It then rejected any approach that seeks to achieve
these ends by simply comparing "numbers of victims or other
aggravating factors" that may "superficially make two cases appear
similar"329 (as the court itself had done in previous years), and it did so
on the ground that capital crimes are "unique and cannot be matched up
like so many points on a graph., 330 Recognizing, though, that the very
project of proportionality review requires some articulated basis for
327. 117 Wash. 2d 829, 916, 822 P.2d 177, 226 (199 1). One year after Rupe, the court elaborated
its criteria of similarity in State v. Rice, 110 Wash. 2d 577, 757 P.2d 889 (1988). In Rice, the court
announced that it would consider the "heinous nature of [the] crimes, the number and severity of the
aggravating factors, and the number of... victims." Id. at 628, 757 P.2d at 917. However, in
applying this expanded set of criteria, it concluded that the most relevant cases for purposes of
comparison were Jeffries, Campbell, and Rupe. Id. at 625-27, 757 P.2d at 915-16. Citing these
highly questionable precedents to justify its decision in Rice, the court thereby piled problematic
precedent upon problematic precedent, rendering it ever more difficult for a future defendant to
mount a successful proportionality challenge. Note, incidentally, that the court used Rice, prior to
reviewing his case, to justify Rupe, and then used Rupe to justify its decision in Rice. Rice, 110
Wash. 2d at 625-26, 757 P.2d at 915-16; Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d at 768, 743 P.2d at 229. From this
sort of circular reasoning, citing two cases to render each other proportionate, it would appear that
no exit is possible. Once again, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that in this instance, as in
others, the court engaged in selective identification of cases in order to sustain a particular outcome.
This conclusion seems all the more plausible given the court's conclusion on three points. First,
there was credible mitigating evidence introduced during the sentencing phase of Rice's trial
(specifically, a lack of criminal history and a history of mental illness). See Rice, 1 10 Wash. 2d at
627, 757 P.2d at 916. Second, the court's examination of the trial judge reports turned up four other
cases in which there was "credible evidence of a mental disorder or diminished mental capacity,"
but in which the death penalty was not imposed. Id. Third, the relevance of these other four cases
was dismissed on various grounds, including the relative youth of two of the other defendants, the
severity of their respective mental problems, and the fact that, in one, only a single juror had voted
against the death penalty. Id. at 627-28, 757 P.2d at 916-17. While the first and second points do
arguably distinguish these cases from Rice (whereas the third is irrelevant to comparative
proportionality review), they are nonetheless vexing in light of the court's earlier refusal to
distinguish between, for example, Campbell and Rupe. Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d at 770, 743 P.2d at 230.
In the former, the trial court did not find any mitigating evidence credible, State v. Campbell, 103
Wash. 2d 1, 30, 691 P.2d 929, 945-46 (1984). But, in the latter, the court made extensive findings
of such evidence. Rupe, 108 Wash. 2d at 780-83, 743 P.2d at 235-37. If that difference is deemed
of insufficient relevance in determining comparative proportionality, then it is hard to know why the
relatively minor differences identified in Rice should be deemed sufficient to distinguish his case
from others in which the death penalty was not imposed.
328. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d at 910, 822 P.2d at 223.
329. Id. (quoting In re Jeffries, 114 Wash. 2d 485, 490, 789 P.2d 731, 736 (1990)).
330. Id.
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comparison, the court proceeded to invoke the work of the analytic
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein in defense of what it called a "family
resemblance approach": 331
Although the cases where death was imposed do not necessarily
have one characteristic or set of attributes in common, we
nonetheless recognize that they are somehow related. This
relation cannot easily be described; it consists of a complicated
network of overlapping similarities-much like members of the
same family, who can be recognized as relatives, even though
they do not all share any one set of features. Thus, we examine
prior cases for those which belong together because they
resemble each other.
332
It is not clear that a defendant sentenced to death should find it
reassuring when a State Supreme Court indicates that its proportionality
review will be predicated on what it calls the "impressionistic"
identification of unspecified resemblances that render various cases
somehow related.333 Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of this appeal, the
court then proceeded to indicate the resemblances it now deemed most
germane: the nature of the crime committed, the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury, the defendant's personal history, and,
finally, the defendant's criminal record.334 Aside from rendering the
review process ostensibly more sophisticated in a theoretical sense, it
does not appear that the court's appropriation of one of the central
metaphors of an Austrian philosopher effected any substantive changes
in its method of folding these criteria of similarity into judgments of
proportionality. As in the past, the court justified its affirmation of
Lord's death sentence by citing the results of its previous reviews, with
the aim of showing that his crime, character, and record were more
heinous than those of his predecessors. Yet, in making this argument, the
court cited only those cases that served its present purpose (specifically,
those characterized by deaths that involved neither torture nor protracted
suffering-e.g., Rupe, Harris, and Jeffries), while those that might
render its conclusion problematic by virtue of their greater brutality
(e.g., Campbell's revenge murder of two women and a child) made no
331. Id. at 911, 822 P.2d at 223; see LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
§§ 65-67 (1958).
332. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d at 911,822 P.2d at 223.
333. State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631, 680, 845 P.2d 289, 317 (1993).
334. Id.
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appearance in the court's opinion.335
The court offered its most ambitious pre-1995 effort to make good on
its "family resemblance" approach when, in 1993, it affirmed the death
sentence imposed on Gary Benn.336 To begin, the court isolated thirty
trial judge reports regarding defendants convicted of murdering two or
more persons, as was Benn,.337 Following a bare-bones recitation of the
content of these reports, as well as a still more abbreviated review of the
arguments advanced by the prosecution and defense regarding the cases
each believed were or were not comparable, the court once again
acknowledged the "difficulties inherent to the identification of 'similar
cases."' 338 That noted, the court then removed most cases from this pool
without, in a majority of instances, explaining why it did so (although it
did suggest that, more often than not, the factors that appear to exempt
defendants from the death penalty include mental disturbances, guilty
pleas, and/or youthfulness).339 What remained following this process of
335. In order to discount the significance of "similar" cases in which the death penalty was not
sought, with reference to each of the four prongs of its new test, the court simply cited one or two
trial judge reports without any elaboration. Lord, 117 Wash. 2d 829, 911-14, 822 P.2d 177, 224-25.
For example, with regard to its analysis of the nature of the crime, the court cited two trial judge
reports which, like Lord, involved only a single victim, but which, unlike Lord, involved defendants
with no prior convictions for a violent crime. Id. at 911, 822 P.2d at 224. The court thereby ignored
trial judge reports filed in other rape/murder cases involving at least three aggravating factors, as
was the case with Lord. Id. at 911-12, 822 P.2d at 224. On this point, see Justice Utter's dissent in
State v. Lord. In Lord, Justice Utter stated:
The majority focuses on those cases in which the death penalty was actually imposed. It
expends precious little ink in describing a few similar cases in which the death penalty was
either not imposed or not sought by the prosecutor. It does not list all of the similar cases.
When the majority does mention such cases, it does not describe the aggravating factors and
mitigating factors in those cases. It does not describe the defendant's prior convictions in those
cases. It superficially distinguishes those cases from this one without meaningfully comparing
all of the relevant factors in those cases to the ones in this case. The majority then concludes
that Lord's sentence is proportionate, because, in the majority's view, the death penalty has
been imposed in similar cases.
Id. at 939-40, 822 P.2d at 239 (Utter, J., dissenting). Justice Utter then proceeded to identify five
cases, all involving rape/murder and at least three aggravating circumstances, in which the death
penalty was not imposed by the jury or in which the state never sought the death penalty. Id. at 943,
822 P.2d at 241 (Utter, J., dissenting). In addition, he identified four more cases, which, although
not involving the same number and type of aggravating circumstances, were nonetheless similar in
terms of the nature of the crime, the existence of a prior record, and the absence of credible
evidence of mitigating circumstances. Id. at 944-45, 822 P.2d at 241-42 (Utter, J., dissenting). In
each of the four, either the state did not seek the death penalty or the jury did not impose it. Id.
336. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 680, 845 P.2d at 317; see also Gilbert, supra note 217, at 607-12
(providing a detailed analysis of the court's review in Benn).
337. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 681-83, 85 P.2d at 318-21.
338. Id. at 691, 845 P.2d at 323.
339. Id. at 692, 845 P.2d at 323. In his analysis of its review of Benn's sentence, Gilbert argued
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exclusion was a pool of seven defendants, four of whom had been
sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole and three of
whom had been sentenced to death.340 The three sentenced to death,
however, included one defendant whose case had never been reviewed
by the court (Clark Hazen, who committed suicide while incarcerated),
as well as two others (Patrick Jeffries and Mitchell Rupe) whose reviews
were suspect for the reasons indicated above.3 4 1 Relying on this
unreliable group, the court affirmed Benn's sentence on the ground that
this group "does not contain an arbitrary frequency of life without parole
sentences over death sentences. 342 As before, the court justified its
conclusion by citing its deference to the jury:
This court may systematically seek to undo and thus eradicate
arbitrariness in sentencing. It will have limited success,
however, in systematizing the unpredictable impulse toward
mercy among juries which must decide cases that are ultimately
as unique as each defendant. We have not sought to substitute
this court's judgment for that of the jury. 343
In addition to granting the impossibility of conducting comparative
proportionality review in a way that satisfies its designated purposes,
this conclusion appears to suggest the court's willingness to affirm the
jury's determination in any given case, so long as it can find a small
handful of "similar" cases that resulted in death sentences, no matter
how disproportionate they may be when compared to the overall
universe of cases.344
that the court was inconsistent in excluding from the pool of similar cases those that exhibited one
or more of these three factors. Gilbert, supra note 217, at 615. For example, the court excluded
young defendants who did not receive the death penalty from its pool of similar cases. Id. Yet,
without explanation, it then included in its pool of similar cases an eighteen-year old (Clark Hazen)
who was sentenced to death. Id. Gilbert concluded: "The only plausible reason that the Hazen case
was included by the majority was to make Bern's sentence appear more proportionate." Id.
340. Id. at 692, 845 P.2d at 323.
341. Id. at 684 n.9, 845 P.2d at 319 n.9 (stating that Clark Hazen committed suicide in prison
before his conviction or sentence could be reviewed).
342. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d at 692, 845 P.2d at 323.
343. Id. at 692-93, 845 P.2d at 324.
344. Registering this concern in his dissent, Justice Utter reviewed fifteen cases not deemed
similar by the court (including two the court did not list in its pool of thirty), none of which resulted
in a death sentence. Id. at 700, 845 P.2d at 328 (Utter, J., dissenting). Adding these cases to those
the majority found similar, Justice Utter determined that the death penalty is imposed on members
of this pool of twenty-seven at a rate of approximately 11%. Id. at 706, 845 P.2d at 330 (Utter, J.,
dissenting). That, he concluded, does not begin to approach the requirement that death sentences be
affirmed only if this penalty is imposed "generally" in similar cases. Id. at 709, 845 P.2d at 332
846
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In sum, during its first decade of comparative proportionality review
the Washington State Supreme Court did in time correctly conclude that,
at least in principle, RCW section 10.95.130 requires it to include in its
universe all cases in which defendants were convicted of aggravated
first-degree murder, regardless of whether the death penalty was or was
not sought or imposed. Turning from the universe of cases to the pool of
similar cases to be abstracted from that universe, over the course of its
first decade the court moved from its initial position, in which it
essentially abandoned the project of comparative proportionality review
in favor of inherent review, to its eventual articulation of Lord's four
criteria of similarity. Yet, as the cases reviewed above indicate, the
court's actual selection of cases deemed similar was unsystematic at best
and, at worst, chosen with an eye to a pre-determined outcome. Finally,
in terms of the third element of the logic of comparative proportionality
review, the actual disposition of these cases, to all appearances the court
selectively cited those elements of previously affirmed cases that would
warrant an affirmation of proportionality, while ignoring those that
might complicate or contradict that judgment.
2. Comparative Proportionality Review After 1995
In 1995, at the close of the Washington State Supreme Court's first
decade of comparative proportionality review, Justice Utter concluded
that the court's conduct of such review "increases rather than decreases
the likelihood the death penalty will be imposed in an arbitrary and
standardless manner, in violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution., 345 Justice
Utter's criticism echoed a federal district court opinion from the
previous year, which held that the Washington State Supreme Court
failed to "fulfill the essential function of ensuring the evenhanded,
rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under Washington
law. 346 Although the supreme court would eventually disavow this
(Utter, J., dissenting). "I cannot," he closed, "ease the requirements of comparative proportionality
review to the point where it becomes an empty ritual." Id.
345. State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 219, 828 P.2d 29, 72 (1995) (Utter, J., dissenting).
346. Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir.
1995). Among other issues, this habeas petition raised the question of whether the Washington State
Supreme Court had conducted an adequate proportionality review in Harris's case. Id. at 1286.
Answering this question in the negative, the federal court identified five flaws in the court's
practice. First, although RCW 10.95.130 specifies where to find similar cases, it does not define
what counts as a similar case, and the court has failed to clarify how this determination should be
847
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criticism, 347 in a trio of death sentences affirmed in 1995 it nonetheless
took the district court's ruling as an opportunity to assess and reconsider
its prior approach to the conduct of such review.348 Together, these
decisions established the basic template for the court's conduct of
comparative proportionality review since that date. However, they also
display the ongoing defects of that conduct.
As the law requires, 349 the court since 1995 has remained formally
committed to a universe of cases that includes all convictions for
aggravated first-degree murder, regardless of whether the death sentence
was imposed or executed. Moreover, since 1995, in each of its reviews
the court has applied a four-prong test in identifying a pool of similar
cases and in determining whether the sentence, when compared to other
members of that pool, is disproportionate. That test requires a
consideration of the nature of the crime, the number of aggravating
circumstances, the defendant's criminal history, and, finally, the
defendant's past.350 The standardization of this test, however, has done
little to remedy the arbitrary nature of its pre-1995 reviews, and so,
today, the court remains unable to offer a meaningful account of why
some are sentenced to die, while the vast majority are not.
In the first of these three 1995 cases, State v. Gentry,351 the court once
again applied the four family resemblances (nature of the crime,
made. Id. at 1288. Second, when conducting any given review, there is no procedure for the parties
to be notified of which cases the court considers similar until they receive its ultimate
determination. Id. at 1286. Third, when no similar case can be identified, as in Campbell, no
alternative procedure is available to inform the conduct of comparative proportionality review. Id. at
1289. Fourth, the court has not indicated the standards it employs in assessing proportionality
through reference to the cases ultimately selected for the purposes of comparison. Id. Finally, the
court presents information from the trial judge report filed in Harris's case, as in other cases, as
findings of fact, although "it is anyone's guess whether the Report of the Trial Judge under RCW
10.95.120 is intended to be findings of fact." Id. at 1290.
347. The Washington State Supreme Court indicated that because the Ninth Circuit, in affirming
Harris, did not reach the question of proportionality, it did not consider itself bound by the district
court decision. In re Benn, 134 Wash. 2d 868, 928, 952 P.2d 116, 147 (1998) ("The existence of an
analytically flawed federal district court decision is not a compelling reason to vacate this
defendant's death sentence or reconsider the proportionality review in his case.").
348. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d at 207-09, 212, 892 P.2d at 66-67, 69 ("Without determining the merits
of these challenges under this court's current proportionality review, we take this opportunity to
revisit the development of such review in Washington and evaluate the continued viability of our
present approach."); see State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628, 683, 904 P.2d 245, 275 (1995); State v.
Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 570, 654-58, 888 P.2d 1105, 1154-56 (1995).
349. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.130(b) (2000).
350. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d at 687-88, 904 P.2d at 277.
351. 125 Wash. 2d 570, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995).
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aggravating circumstances, prior convictions, and personal history)
articulated in Lord.352  However, its consideration of the single
aggravating circumstance consisted of nothing more than citation of the
relevant statutory category (the crime was committed to protect the
identity of the defendant); and its consideration of the nature of the
crime consisted of the claim that Gentry's offense was at least as brutal
as that of Lord, which, because it culminated in an affirmed death
sentence, rendered Gentry's case not disproportionate.353 No other cases
that might have complicated this conclusion were cited or considered.
With respect to the third family resemblance, the defendant's prior
record, the court merely cited Gentry's previous convictions, but offered
no consideration of any other cases, thereby rendering it impossible to
decipher the sense in which this constituted a specifically comparative
review. 354 Finally, with respect to the defendant's personal history, the
court offered a bare bones citation of six trial judge reports, including
those for David Rice and Westley Allan Dodd, in which evidence of
mitigating circumstances such as youth, child abuse, or mental illness
had not been sufficient to exempt defendants from a sentence of death.355
In the second of these three cases, State v. Brett,356 the court once
again returned to its view that the purpose of the proportionality review
provision of RCW section 10.95 is not to ensure statewide consistency
in capital sentencing, but merely to identify cases that are grossly
disproportionate.3  The justification it proffered for this view was new,
however. Specifically, the court stated that the legislative provisions
intended to channel jury discretion (e.g., the requirement that at least one
aggravating factor be found applicable) "ensure proportionality and
eliminate the ability of the jury, in all but the most aberrant case, to
impose the death sentence in a wanton and freakish manner., 358 The
352. Id. at 656, 888 P.2d at 1155.
353. See id. at 656-57, 888 P.2d at 1155-56.
354. See id. at 657, 888 P.2d at 1155-56.
355. Id. In his dissenting opinion in Gentry, Justice Utter indicated that an examination of the trial
judge reports turned up at least twelve cases involving multiple murders (which Gentry's did not),
murders involving extreme and prolonged suffering on the part of the victim (which Gentry's may
or may not have, depending on how one reads the autopsy evidence), and a victim who was
particularly vulnerable by virtue of age (as was the case with Gentry). Id. at 669-71, 888 P.2d at
1161-63 (Utter, J., dissenting). On the face of it, all of these murders appear more brutal than that
committed by Gentry, and yet in none was the death penalty imposed. Id.
356. 126 Wash. 2d 136, 892 P.2d 29 (1995).
357. See id. at 212-13, 892 P.2d at 68-69.
358. Id. at 210-11,892 P.2d at 68.
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court thus came very close to rendering its own reviews superfluous. By
this account, except in extraordinary instances, the legislatively
prescribed procedures that structure jury deliberation are presumed to
ensure against disproportionality.359
Having thus (mis)construed its task, the court then quite remarkably
repudiated any attempt to extract a smaller pool of similar cases from the
universe of cases available to it based on the number or kind of
aggravating factors, the "family resemblances" articulated in Lord, or,
for that matter, any other criterion. Instead, conflating the distinction
between universe and pool, the court defined as "similar" all cases for
which trial judge reports had been filed or cases reported in the
Washington Reports or Washington Appellate Reports since January 1,
1965.360 In defense of this violation of the logic of comparative
proportionality review, the court contended that this definition remedied
one of the due process concerns expressed by the federal district court.36 1
Specifically, by conflating the distinction between universe and pool, the
court rendered it impossible for a defendant to claim that he or she could
not know the criteria employed in identifying the cases the court found
comparable to his or hers (or, it might be added, to contest those criteria
as well as their application in isolating some smaller pool from the larger
universe of cases).362 Finally, absent any elaboration of what it had
indeed found in this larger universe, and absent any discussion of
specific cases other than that of Brett, the court declared that "after
carefully reviewing the totality of similar cases," it deemed Brett's case
"not disproportionate": "There is no unique or distinguishing
characteristic of the Defendant or of this crime which makes imposition
of the death penalty wanton and freakish. ' ' 363 In sum, after discarding all
359. Justice Utter addressed this point in his dissent:
If the imposition of death in a given case were proportionate simply by virtue of coming within
the scope of RCW 10.95, the legislative requirement in RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) that we compare
the aggravated murder case at hand to other 'similar' aggravated murder cases would be
senseless. It is an elementary tenet of statutory construction that we do not construe provisions
to be nullities .... If RCW 10.95 'ensures proportionality' can there ever be a
'disproportionate' case? If so, by what process, and according to what standards, are we to
identify it? The designated majority offers no guidance.
Id. at 218-19, 892 P.2d at 72 (Utter, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 211, 828 P.2d at 68.
361. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d at 208, 828 P.2d at 66; Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239, 1288-89
(W.D. Wash. 1994), affd, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995).
362. See Brett, 126 Wash. 2d at 212-13, 828 P.2d at 69.
363. Id. at 213, 828 P.2d at 69. By adopting yet another "method" for conducting comparative
proportionality review in Brett, the court aggravated the problems caused by the court's previous
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previous attempts to render this process meaningful, the court abandoned
any effort to articulate a method to inform its deliberations and, instead,
opted to substitute an uncontestable declaration of its unexplained
affirmation. 36
In affirming the death sentence imposed on Blake Pirtle,365 the final
member of the trio of cases reviewed in 1995, the court consolidated the
366basic template for all reviews conducted since that date. In its opinion,
the court essentially split the difference between Lord and Brett, and it
did so in a way that, arguably, combined the most troublesome aspects
of each. Citing Brett, the court in Pirtle restated its assumption that
juries will not render aberrant judgments; 367 and, again citing Brett, it
reaffirmed its commitment to consider as similar all cases specified by
RCW section 10.95.130(2)(b). 368  Although rejecting the "family
resemblance" test articulated in Lord on the grounds that it had proved
"somewhat unwieldy as more and more cases were reported, 369 the
court nonetheless adopted the very same "resemblances" it had
identified as most salient in that case. Specifically, and without
explaining why these criteria and only these merit consideration, the
court stated that in conducting comparative proportionality analyses, it
would assess the nature of the crime, the number of aggravating
circumstances, the defendant's criminal history, and, finally, the
defendant's past.370
vacillation on this question. Because virtually every review conducted prior to and including Brett
was decided on a novel basis, the authority of all these judgments is compromised. This has
potentially lethal consequences for those sentenced to death. See id. at 214-16, 828 P.2d at 70-71
(Durham, J., concurring) ("In virtually every recent death penalty case decided by this court, a
different definition of proportionality has been promulgated. The resulting confusion is
unacceptable" because, arguably, any given determination of "proportionality itself depends on the
consistency of a proportionality analysis.").
364. Justice Utter stated:
Even if 'aberrant' or 'wanton and freakish' were the standard, and it is not, it is impossible to
conclude a given sentence is not 'aberrant' or 'wanton and freakish' without engaging in some
process of reflection, whatever that may be. The designated majority requires that one simply
take its word on so important a question as whether a defendant properly may be executed,
without revealing what that process is. It thus forecloses any possibility of review or even
discussion of its conclusion.
See id. at 230, 828 P.2d at 77 (Utter, J., dissenting).
365. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628, 904 P.2d 245 (1995).
366. See id. at 683-89, 904 P.2d at 275-77.
367. Id. at 686, 904 P.2d at 276.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 687, 904 P.2d at 276.
370. Id. at 686, 904 P.2d at 276.
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Applying these criteria, the Pirtle court concluded that "there is no
factor or combination of factors which marks this as an unusual, let
alone wanton or freakish, death penalty case.",371 Although the court
cited no specific case in defense of this conclusion, it did note, first, that
only 20% of the cases on file involved, as did Pirtle, three or more
aggravating factors; second, that approximately one-third involved, as
did Pirtle, more than a single victim; and, finally, that only 3% of the
cases involved, again as did Pirtle, defendants with more than ten prior
convictions.372 It is difficult to know how much weight to ascribe to
these quantitative determinations because the court also reiterated its oft-
made claim that the determination of proportionality is not "a statistical
task" that "can be reduced to a number," and that "numbers can" only
"point to areas of concern., 373 Yet when it considered those matters that
371. Id. at 688, 904 P.2d at 277.
372. Id. at 687-88, 904 P.2d at 277
373. Id. at 687, 904 P.2d at 277. Were the court to engage in a serious effort at frequency
analysis, it would almost certainly discover several areas of significant concern. First, for example,
all other things being equal, one would assume that the greater the number of victims in any given
case, the more likely it is that the death penalty will be sought. Indeed, it is true that of the total
number of convictions for aggravated murder, the death penalty has been sought in 27% of the cases
involving a single victim; 34% when there were two; and 47% when there were three. However, the
death penalty was sought in only 20% of the cases involving four victims, never in those involving
five victims or, for that matter, in the lone case involving ten. Granted, the death penalty was sought
for two co-defendants convicted of jointly murdering thirteen persons (although it was imposed on
only one of the two, Kwan Mak, and his sentence was subsequently set aside). Mak v. Blodgett, 970
F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). However, in 2000, Robert Yates evaded a likely death sentence in
Spokane County after confessing to the murder of thirteen victims, only to be sentenced to death
two years later in Pierce County for the killing of two. Christine Clarridge, Death Sentence for Yates
Elicits Tears, but None for Joy, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at Al. Finally, the sole person
convicted of murdering a larger number, Gary Ridgway, was able to escape an almost certain death
sentence by pleading guilty to killing forty-eight women. Kershaw, supra note 4, at Al. If nothing
else, these calculations suggest that body count cannot be taken as a reliable predictor of whether or
not a defendant will be sentenced to death, which implies in turn that those responsible for a far
smaller tally cannot be confident of escaping the death chamber.
Second, again all other things being equal, if the court takes the number of aggravating factors as
an indicator of the heinousness of any given crime, as the court clearly does, one would expect that
the percentage of death sentences sought and imposed would increase as the number of aggravating
circumstances rises. However, that does not consistently hold true. Setting aside the cases in which
the number of aggravating circumstances is not indicated in the trial judge reports, 47% of the
remaining convictions for aggravated first-degree murder involved a single aggravating factor. In
25% of these cases the death penalty was sought, and in 5% it was imposed. In cases involving two
aggravating factors (29% of the total), the rate at which the death penalty was sought remained the
same (25%), but the rate at which it was imposed rose from 5% to 28%. In cases involving three
aggravating factors (15% of the total), the rate at which the death penalty was sought jumped from
25% to 47%, and the rate at which it was imposed increased from 28% to 37%. To this extent, these
numbers correspond, at least in rough terms, to what one might reasonably anticipate. However,
when one considers the cases involving four aggravating factors (6% of the total), the death penalty
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can be quantified, with the exception of Pirtle's crime, which it
described in a brief paragraph, it offered nothing other than the bare
figures noted here. Because one can only guess which cases provided the
basis for these percentages, these figures are impossible to challenge.
Turning to matters that are not susceptible to quantitative analysis, by
refising to cite specific cases the court in Pirtle avoided the
comparability challenges that might otherwise follow. But this omission
also renders it impossible to fathom the basis for its affirmation of this
sentence. This is most readily apparent when the court considered
Pirtle's character, which it described through reference to the mitigating
evidence introduced during the sentencing phase of the trial.374 Noting
that Pirtle proffered evidence of drug abuse, alcohol addiction, and an
abusive family history, the court contended that "an examination of the
aggravated murder reports shows that some mitigators-for instance,
mental illness or extreme emotional distress-may lead prosecutors and
juries not to seek or impose the death penalty. Neither addiction nor a
history of abuse as a child appears to have such an effect.' ,375 It is
difficult to know how the court can sustain this claim given the extreme
poverty of the trial judge reports, especially when it comes to their
accounts of mitigating circumstances. Moreover, assuming that the
information contained in these reports is correct, its claim in this regard
is simply wrong. Addiction and childhood abuse are in fact often offered
as credible mitigating evidence in cases that have not generated death
sentences, 376 and so it is impossible to know what led the court to the
was sought in a whopping 73% of the cases, but the rate of imposition dropped from 37% to 27%.
Finally, when one considers the very small number of cases involving five or more aggravating
factors, the rate at which the death penalty was sought decreased significantly (from 73% to 43%),
but its rate of imposition increased dramatically (from 27% to 67%).
Of course, one might contend that the court's overall rationale in the cases it has reviewed for
proportionality becomes explicable not when one considers any of the four prongs of the Pirtle test
individually, but only when one considers their cumulative combination in any given case. In order
for that claim to prove credible, however, the court would have to abstract from the four prongs of
its current test some generalized measure of defendant culpability, and then compare each
defendant's degree of culpability with that of others, again using the same abstracted standard in
order to avoid the problems that crop up when the court seeks to compare cases on the basis of
factual similarity. That, however, the court has not done.
374. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d at 688, 904 P.2d at 277.
375. Id.
376. Cases considering these factors include: Report of Trial Judge No. 8 (Charles Bingham); No.
20 (William Martin); No. 44 (Dennis Williams); No. 45 (James Dykgraao; No. 50 (Sean
Stevenson); No. 52 (Christopher Blystone); No. 53 (James Thompson); No. 58 (Gene Kane); No. 64
(Jonathan Woods); No. 65 (Jeffrey Lane); No. 68 (Damn Hutchinson); No. 77 (Charles Tate); No.
80 (Gabriel Garcia); No. 93 (Timothy Caffrey); No. 95 (Kenneth Schrader); No. 182 (Joey Ellis);
No. 186 (Gerald Davis). These reports expressly cite alcohol and/or childhood abuse as credible
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conclusion that Pirtle's "mitigation evidence was, at best, average."
377
Still more troubling, once the court recorded this conclusion, it then
began to cite Pirtle as precedential authority in affirming the same
conclusion under equally suspect circumstances.378
Since Pirtle, the court has applied this four-prong test to each of the
death penalty cases it has reviewed on direct appeal.379 The court has
vacillated, however, with respect to its refusal, in Brett as well as Pirtle,
to cite specific cases to justify its conclusions. 380 When it has elected to
do so, the court typically cites only those cases that did in fact culminate
in death sentences and that were subsequently reviewed and affirmed.38'
It thereby violates what it expressly affirmed in Rupe: the Washington
statute requires consideration of all convictions for the crime of
aggravated first-degree murder, including those in which the death
penalty was not sought. That in turn cannot help but bias its review
toward affirmation. For example, in State v. Brown,382 the court first
cited the affirmed death sentences imposed on Westley Allen Dodd,
Mitchell Rupe, Patrick Jeffries, Gary Benn, Benjamin Harris, and
Jonathan Gentry in order to sustain its claim that Brown's crime was at
least as heinous as those committed by these defendants.383 Second, it
cited the cases of Gentry, Benn, Harris, and Jeffries in order to justify its
claim that the number of aggravating factors found applicable in
mitigating evidence in the cases of defendants not sentenced to death. It is true that the mere citation
of such mitigating evidence does not allow one to know for certain that the jury was influenced by
that evidence when rendering its sentencing decision. However, the Washington State Supreme
Court is in no position to know this either.
377. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d at 688, 904 P.2d at 277.
378. See, e.g., State v. Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d 250, 310, 985 P.2d 289, 323 (1999) (holding that
Clark Elmore's personal history did not excuse his crime despite his history of abuse as a child, the
court relied on State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 940 P.2d 546 (1997), which, in turn, was based
on Pirtle's erroneous conclusion).
379. See State v. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d 62, 80, 26 P.3d 271, 281 (2001); State v. Woods, 143
Wash. 2d 561, 616 , 23 P.3d 1046, 1076 (2001); State v. Davis, 141 Wash. 2d 798, 880, 10 P.3d
977, 1023-24 (2000); Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d at 308, 985 P.2d at 322; State v. Sagastegui, 135
Wash. 2d 67, 92, 954 P.2d 1311, 1324 (1998); Brown, 132 Wash. 2d at 555-56, 940 P.2d at 562;
State v. Stenson, 132 Wash. 2d 668, 759, 940 P.2d 1239, 1285 (1997).
380. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d at 685-86, 904 P.2d at 276; State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 211, 892
P.2d 29, 68 (1995).
381. Cases in which comparative proportionality review is limited to affirmed death sentences
include: Woods, 143 Wash. 2d at 616, 23 P.3d at 1076; Davis, 141 Wash. 2d at 880, 10 P.3d at
1023-24; Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d at 308, 985 P.2d at 322; Sagastegui, 135 Wash. 2d at 92, 954 P.2d
at 1324; Brown, 132 Wash. 2d at 555-56, 940 P.2d at 562.
382. 132 Wash. 2d 529, 940 P.2d 546 (1997).
383. Id. at 557 n.56, 940 P.2d at 562 n.56.
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Brown's case was consistent with (or in some cases less than) the
number in these other cases.384 Third, it cited Rupe, Harris, and Benn in
order to show that Brown's prior record was more extensive than these
other defendants.385 Finally, it cited Dodd, Brian Lord, and David Rice
in order to show that the sort of mitigating evidence adduced in Brown's
case (childhood abuse and various mental as well as personality
disorders) has not precluded the court from affirming death sentences in
the past.386 Consideration of each of the four prongs of the Pirtle test
consumes a single brief paragraph, and none involves any comparative
analysis of the companion cases it cited or any treatment of aggravated
murder convictions that did not result in death sentences.
387
On other occasions, the court has not cited specific cases in its
reviews, which renders it difficult at best to know on what basis the
court rests its conclusions. For example, in State v. Stenson,3 8 8 the court
stated that "this case involved a greater degree of premeditation than in
many other cases of first-degree aggravated murder. '3 89 However,
because no other cases are cited, it is impossible to grasp the rationale
for this inherently comparative judgment. The court's failure becomes
still more glaring when, in considering one or more prongs of the Pirtle
test, it offers no comparative reference whatsoever, instead limiting itself
to a mere restatement of the facts immediately relevant to the prong in
question.390 Again using Stenson as an example, in considering the
relevant mitigating circumstances, the court's "analysis" consisted of the
following statement: "The Defendant did have some criminal history,
including felony drug convictions, although none of the prior crimes
were crimes of violence., 391 The qualification registered at the end of
this sentence is precisely the sort that should in principle invite rigorous
examination of the defendant's character and biography in order to
determine whether the sentence imposed in his case was
384. Id. at 558 n.60, 940 P.2d at 563 n.60.
385. Id. at 558 n.62, 940 P.2d at 563 n.62.
386. Id. at 559 n.66, 940 P.2d at 563 n.66.
387. Id. at 556-59, 940 P.2d at 562-63.
388. 132 Wash. 2d 668, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).
389. Id. at 759, 940 P.2d at 1285.
390. Id. at 759-60, 940 P.2d at 1285.
391. Id. at 760, 949 P.2d at 1285. By the same token, in considering the applicable aggravating
circumstances in this case, the court's review consisted of the following: "The aggravating
circumstances are that there was more than one murder victim and that Frank's murder was
committed to conceal the identity of Denise's murderer." Id. at 759-60, 949 P.2d at 1285.
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disproportionate. The court, though, offered no such analysis, thereby
making a mockery of the purpose of comparative proportionality review
as well as its own four-prong test.
The Washington State Supreme Court is currently in a position to
affirm any death sentence that comes before it by picking and choosing
among the death penalty cases it has previously reviewed and affirmed.
While the charade of the four-prong test articulated in Pirtle is formally
perpetuated, perhaps a more candid statement of the court's true test was
advanced in 1999 when it affirmed the death sentence imposed on Clark
Elmore: "If the facts of Elmore's case are similar to some of the facts
taken from cases in which the death penalty was upheld, the
proportionality review is satisfied. 3 92 To all appearances, the court now
finds application of this test virtually effortless. Should, for example, a
defendant sentenced to death have little or no prior criminal record,
Mitchell Rupe's case can be pressed into service in order to show that
the court has in the past upheld death sentences imposed on defendants
who had no prior record (which renders it impossible to ever generate
the conclusion that a sentence is disproportionate on this basis).393
Should a defendant have a history of diagnosed mental disorders, the
cases of David Rice and Westley Allan Dodd can be trotted out in order
to demonstrate that the court in the past has upheld death sentences
imposed on defendants who were at least as disturbed as the present
defendant.3 94 Should a defendant be sentenced to death on the basis of
two aggravating factors, the court can put to work the cases of Jonathan
Gentry, Gary Benn, and Benjamin Harris to show that the court has
upheld sentences when only a single aggravator was found applicable,395
or, if only a single aggravator is found applicable, the court can cite
Gentry, Benn, and Harris once again in order to show that a case under
review is not disproportionate.
396
392. State v. Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d 250, 308, 985 P.2d 289, 322 (1999).
393. See, e.g., State v. Sagastegui, 135 Wash. 2d 67, 94, 954 P.2d 1311, 1325 (1998) (stating that
the court affirmed the death sentence imposed on Rupe even though he, like Sagastegui, had little or
no criminal record).
394. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 132 Wash. 2d 529, 559 n.66, 940 P.2d 546, 563 n.66 (1997)
(stating that the court has upheld death sentences imposed on defendants, including Dodd and Rice,
who suffered from personality disorders similar to, or more severe than, that suffered by Brown).
395. See, e.g., Elmore, 139 Wash. 2d at 309, 985 P.2d at 323 (stating that the court has upheld
death sentences imposed on defendants, including Gentry, Benn, and Harris, when only a single
aggravator was found applicable).
396. See, e.g., State v. Elledge, 144 Wash. 2d 62, 81, 26 P.3d 271, 282 (2001) (stating that the
court has upheld death sentences imposed on defendants, including Gentry, Benn, and Harris, when
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True, the precise cast of characters alters slightly from one review to
another, if only in the sense that each time another death sentence is
affirmed an additional name becomes available to cite in authorizing
subsequent affirmations. That said, the script now changes only in order
to accommodate each new defendant, the plot unfolds with mechanical
uniformity, and the dreary drnoument never varies. Even when analysis
is confined to the small number of death penalty cases reviewed by the
Washington State Supreme Court since 1981, it is impossible to
construct a reasoned account that explains why all were deemed
sufficiently proportionate to warrant affirmation of their respective death
sentences. A less flawed comparative proportionality analysis would
require a far more sophisticated method than the court currently employs
as well as a far more detailed analysis of death sentence cases than it
currently provides. Moreover, even if the court were to commit itself to
such a method, it is not clear how it could fulfill this pledge given the
irremediable deficiencies of the trial judge reports on which it would
have to predicate such an inquiry.
Taking note of the atrophy of the court's comparative proportionality
review into a pro forma ritual, shortly before he retired from the bench,
Justice Utter offered an apt characterization of the history I have traced
here. 397 What the court in Brett characterized as
'an increasingly broad approach' to defining 'similar cases' is
more aptly described as the gradual degeneration of judicial
review in capital cases, a process which reaches its low point
with the introduction into our proportionality analysis of a new,
and curiously elusive, concept: all murders falling within the
purview of RCW 10.95 are, ipso facto, proportionate-except
when they are not.398
Except, Justice Utter might have added, that they are never in fact not.399
only a single aggravator was found applicable).
397. See State v. Brett, 126 Wash. 2d 136, 226, 892 P.2d 29, 76 (1995) (Utter, J., dissenting).
398. Id.
399. The sophistry apparent in the court's conduct of comparative proportionality reviews has
apparently proven too much for at least one of its current members to bear. Thus, in Elledge, Justice
Sanders condemned the court for initiating its review in any given case on the basis of the premise
that "the defendant is 'qualified' for the death penalty so long as it is not 'wantonly and freakishly'
imposed, notwithstanding how many others may have engaged in similar conduct who were not
executed." 144 Wash. 2d at 88, 26 P.3d at 285 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The
statutory requirement of comparative proportionality review, Justice Sanders concluded, "has
degenerated through numerous iterations into the current 'wanton and freakish' standard, finally
becoming little more than lip service to the important protection proportionality review was
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V. THE FAILURE OF COMPARATIVE
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW AND THE FUTURE OF
THE DEATH PENALTY
In Gregg v. Georgia,400 Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens
expressed considerable confidence in the capacity of the safeguards
adopted by Georgia and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 to
prevent arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty:
No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death
sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative
guidelines. In addition, the review function of the Supreme
Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns
that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any
significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here.4°'
Echoing this claim in State v. Rupe, the Washington State Supreme
Court upheld Washington's death penalty law on the basis, of its
confidence in these same safeguards: "Defendant's arguments were
addressed by the Supreme Court in Gregg, and we find that analysis
equally applicable here. 4 °2 However, as was the case in Gregg, the
Rupe court upheld a statute that had just been adopted and rarely
applied. Nearly three decades later, we are in a position to assess
whether state courts are indeed providing the protection promised in
Gregg. Reviewing the studies that have examined this question, James
Acker and Charles Lanier concluded: "A wealth of empirical research
now exists on the operation of capital punishment statutes, and much of
that evidence suggests that the premises underpinning the Gregg
decision are fallacious. Arbitrariness and discrimination continue to
plague the administration of death penalty legislation. ' 4°3 Evidence from
the State of Washington with respect to the conduct of comparative
proportionality review furnishes no reason to believe otherwise.
If Acker and Lanier are correct, then there are good grounds for
concluding that the death penalty, as currently applied in the State of
Washington, is unconstitutional. First, because the concerns that led the
originally intended to offer." Id.
400. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
401. Id. at 206-07 (plurality opinion).
402. State v. Rupe, 101 Wash. 2d 664, 698, 683 P.2d 571, 592 (1984).
403. James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Statutory Measures for More Effective Appellate
Review of Capital Cases, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 211,215 (1995).
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U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate all death penalty statutes in effect in
1972 remain, equally if not more, valid today, Washington's death
penalty statute is unconstitutional under Furman v. Georgia.4 °4 Neither
Gregg nor Rupe overruled Furman, and Furman stands today for the
proposition that a capital punishment statute, in order to conform to the
imperatives of the Eighth Amendment, must achieve two objectives: it
must limit imposition of the death penalty to the small group of
defendants for which it is appropriate, and ensure that the members of
this small group are selected rationally and consistently. 4 5 Leaving aside
the disproportionate application of the death penalty to those who
murder white victims, 40 6 as well as the failure of the death penalty's
infrequent imposition to deter,40 7 the lack of any meaningful way of
distinguishing those who receive the death penalty from those who do
not has not been remedied by the- procedural reforms adopted by
Washington in 1981. The administration of the death penalty in
Washington does not ensure that the death sentence is restricted to the
404. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
405. See id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
406. See generally LARRANAGA, supra note 293 (analyzing racial and geographical disparities in
the administration of capital punishment in Washington). Larranaga found that in the majority of
counties in the state (57%) death notices have never been filed, and that in 74% of those counties no
death sentence has ever been imposed. Id. at 17. With respect to racial disparities, Larranaga
concluded that since 1981,
death has been imposed at a higher rate against African-Americans as compared to Caucasians.
Additionally, death is sought and imposed at a significantly lower rate when the victim is
African-American. And finally African-American defendants charged with killing a Caucasian
victim have a significantly higher percentage of death notices filed and death sentences
imposed.
Id. at 26. Moreover, at the time Larranaga completed his study, in a state with an African-American
population of 3.2%, see United States Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington
Quick Facts, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/53000.html (last visited June 30, 2004), five
of the ten on death row were African-Americans, all but one of whom were convicted of killing
white victims. These findings are especially troubling in light of the Washington State Supreme
Court's denial, in 1995, that race plays any role in determining who is and is not sentenced to death.
See State v. Gentry, 125 Wash. 2d 570, 655, 888 P.2d 1105, 1154 (1995) ("In this case, there is no
evidence that race was a motivating factor for the jury, and contrary to the Defendant's suggestion,
a review of the first degree aggravated murder cases in Washington does not reveal a pattern of
imposition of the death penalty based upon the race of the Defendant or the victim."); see generally
David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638
(1998) (providing a recent study dealing with racial disparities and the death penalty on a national
level).
407. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring) (stating that "a major goal of the
criminal law-to deter others by punishing the convicted criminal-would not be substantially
served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat essential to
influence the conduct of others").
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most heinous criminals guilty of the most brutal murders, and,
correlatively, it fails to ensure that those who are convicted of murders
as brutal as those committed by those who are in fact sentenced to death
receive that same punishment. Because the Washington capital
punishment statute operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, it
violates the Eighth Amendment and so cannot stand.
Second, even if an appeal to the Eighth Amendment proves
unpersuasive, a meaningful comparative proportionality review is
nonetheless required by article 1, section 14 of the Washington State
Constitution, which prohibits the infliction of cruel punishment.4 °8 The
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment does not
control the Washington State Supreme Court's interpretation of article 1,
section 14; and, in State v. Fain, °9 the court reaffirmed its holding that
Washington's prohibition of cruel punishment is broader than that
provided by the Eighth Amendment.410 Moreover, in State v. Roberts, 1
the court reiterated its conviction that the imposition of a capital
sentence is cruel if it is imposed without an individualized determination
that the punishment is appropriate.1 2 That imperative is all the more
pressing because, via adoption of RCW section 10.95, and in particular
its requirement of proportionality review by the State Supreme Court,
the legislature has given defendants a legitimate expectation that capital
sentences will be imposed in a way that is fair. Specifically, it entitles
them to the expectation that similarly situated defendants will be
afforded the same punishment and that those who are not so situated will
be punished differently.413
Comparative proportionality review is the only mechanism, which, at
least in principle, enables system-wide evaluation of jury decision-
making in order to ensure that the death penalty is not applied in an
408. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 14.
409. 94 Wash. 2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980).
410. Id. at 392,617 P.2d at 723.
411. 142 Wash. 2d 471, 14 P.3d 713 (2000).
412. Id. at 502, 14P.3dat 731.
413. In this context, it is worth noting that in 1997 the state legislature passed a bill, S.B. 5093,
55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997), that would have eliminated the requirement that the State
Supreme Court conduct comparative proportionality reviews in conjunction with its mandatory
review of all death sentences. Id. That bill, however, was vetoed by Governor Gary Locke, who
stated: "I am a strong supporter of the death penalty. However, I am also a strong supporter of
fairness. The proportionality review has not yet resulted in the reversal of any death sentences.
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arbitrary and capricious manner or on the basis of impermissible
discrimination. To ensure that such application does not occur, the court
must compare each aggravated murder conviction against all others, and
in order to do that its review must be based on complete and accurate
information. However, given the deficiencies of the trial judge reports,
combined with those evident in the court's own conduct of comparative
proportionality review, it cannot be maintained that individual
defendants are presently protected from arbitrary, discriminatory, or
otherwise unfair death sentences.414 As such, the death penalty in
Washington violates the state constitution's prohibition of cruel
punishments.
Third, in Hicks v. Oklahoma,415 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when a state enacts a criminal statute setting out a procedure for the
imposition of a particular penalty, a defendant has a "substantial and
legitimate expectation" that he or she will be deprived of liberty only if
the state complies with the procedural requirements of that statute.41 6
Accordingly, a defendant convicted of aggravated first-degree murder
and sentenced to death in Washington has a due process right to
appellate proportionality review in conformity with RCW section 10.95.
True, as noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Pulley v. Harris417
that the federal constitution does not require such review. 41 8 That,
however, is irrelevant to this argument. Because the Washington statute
establishes the procedural protection of proportionality review, as the
federal district court reiterated in Harris v. Blodgett,419 the State
Supreme Court is obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause to ensure that this analysis complies with the state statute
and that it is performed in way that is meaningful a.4 2 This is all the more
414. See State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash. 2d 631, 640, 683 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1984). The court
stated:
Since the death penalty is the ultimate punishment, due process under this state's constitution
requires stringent procedural safeguards so that a fundamentally fair proceeding is provided.
Where the trial which results in imposition of the death penalty lacks fundamental fairness, the
punishment violates article 1, section 14 of the state constitution.
Id.
415. 447 U.S. 343 (1980).
416. Id. at 346.
417. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
418. Id. at 41-43.
419. Hams v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp 1239, 1286 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affid, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir.
1995).
420. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346.
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so when the state seeks to deliberately extinguish human life, which, the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, demands a heightened degree of
procedural due process scrutiny, or what Margaret Radin has called
46 A421
"super due process. In other words, when the potential harm to a
defendant extends to the taking of his or her life, concerns about the
potential for arbitrary state action are greatest, and so safeguards against
such arbitrariness must be the most scrupulous. However, for the reasons
indicated in this Article's discussion of the State Supreme Court's actual
conduct of comparative proportionality review, it cannot be maintained
that such review has in fact been conducted in a meaningful way; and,
for the reasons indicated in its discussion of Washington's trial judge
reports and their deficiencies, even if the Washington State Supreme
Court were to seek to remedy the deficiencies of its conduct, it could not
do SO. 42
2
Arguably, if one could somehow overcome the problems posed by the
defects of the trial judge reports, and were the Washington State
Supreme Court to render its conduct of comparative proportionality
review less hollow than it presently is, certain constitutional infirmities
might be alleviated. Other state supreme courts have attempted to do so.
Most notably, in 1988 New Jersey appointed a special master, David
Baldus, who developed a complex statistical methodology in order to
determine the frequency with which death sentences are or are not
imposed on different groups of defendants whose overall level of
culpability is comparable.423 (This methodology was subsequently
modified as a result of recommendations advanced by a second special
master in 1999).424 However, rather than explore these efforts to
421. Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1150 (1980).
422. See generally Robert McAuliffe, A Procedural Due Process Argument for Proportionality
Review in Capital Sentencing, 21 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 385 (1988) (elaborating on this due
process argument, although not specifically in regard to Washington).
423. See DAVID C. BALDUS, SPECIAL MASTER, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
PROJECT: FINAL REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT (Sept. 24, 1991) (recommending a
method for the conduct of comparative proportionality review by the New Jersey Supreme Court);
see also State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685, 689-703 (N.J. 1994) (providing a helpful account of the
methodology adopted as a result of the report submitted by Baldus). See generally David Weisburd,
Good for What Purpose? Social Science, Race, and Proportionality Review in New Jersey, in
SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 258 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999) (reviewing
some of the principal problems inherent in New Jersey's statistical approach).
424. For an account of the modifications adopted in response to the second master's report, see In
re Proportionality Review Project, 735 A.2d 528 (N.J. 1999) and In re Proportionality Project (11),
757 A.2d 168 (N.J. 2000).
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rationalize a system that remains infected by the same problems
identified more than three decades ago, this Article's conclusion
suggests that no matter how salutary such reforms might be, they should
not distract us from an appreciation of the way in which comparative
proportionality review discloses and compounds the fundamental
dilemma on which the law has foundered since Gregg in its effort to
develop a coherent jurisprudence of capital punishment. If comparative
proportionality review, no matter how refined, cannot successfully
overcome this dilemma, if such review simply rearticulates that dilemma
in a new guise, then it would appear that Justice Blackmun was correct
when he concluded that no amount of tinkering can salvage the
machinery of state-imposed death.425
The key premise of contemporary capital punishment jurisprudence is
that the
penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our
concept of humanity.426
On the basis of this premise, in Woodson v. North Carolina,427 the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected a statute that provided for a mandatory death
sentence for specific offenses on the ground that such a law denies to the
sentencing authority the discretion that is crucial if that authority is to
take into account the individual character of the defendant and the
particular circumstances of his or her offense.428 Such a statute "treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death., 429 One
implication of Woodson was elaborated two years later when, in Lockett
v. Ohio,430 the Court held that because "[t]he need for treating each
defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness
425. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (denying
review).
426. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
427. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
428. Id. at 304 (plurality opinion).
429. Id.
430. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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of the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases," the
sentencer cannot be precluded from "considering any aspect of the
defendant's character and record or any circumstances of his offense as
an independently mitigating factor.,
431
Yet it is precisely this sort of unrestricted discretion that led Justice
Douglas in Furman to conclude that the death penalty, as then
administered by the states, violated the Eighth Amendment ban on
punishments that are selectively applied.432 Mandatory death penalty
statutes of the sort invalidated by Woodson were found to be arbitrary
because they require all persons convicted of a given capital offense to
be sentenced to death, regardless of relevant factors such as past criminal
record or the likelihood of future criminal conduct.433 Death penalty
statutes that grant unfettered discretionary authority to sentencers were
also found to be arbitrary because their actual operation renders it
impossible to fathom why some are sentenced to die while others are
not, and because they leave open the possibility that defendants may be
sentenced to die on the basis of legally irrelevant factors such as race.434
While the Gregg plurality sought to channel juries' discretion by
denying them the authority to- deem certain crimes worthy of death,
thereby reducing the likelihood that individuals convicted of similar
crimes will receive different sentences,435 the Lockett Court endowed
juries with the authority to render their sentencing decisions on the basis
of any and all mitigating factors they consider relevant, thereby
increasing the likelihood that individuals convicted of similar crimes
will receive different sentences.436
As numerous commentators have remarked, the bulk of post-Furman
capital jurisprudence can be understood as an attempt to negotiate these
competing imperatives, 437 each of which expresses a rival conception of
fairness, neither of which we can reject in good constitutional
conscience. One conception requires us to take into account the
individual character and circumstances of particular defendants in
431. Id. at 605, 607 (plurality opinion).
432. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
433. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-05 (Stewart, J., concurring).
434. Furman, 238 U.S. at 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
435. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-99 (1976) (plurality opinion).
436. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion).
437. The best account of the U.S. Supreme Court's attempt to negotiate this dilemma remains that
provided by Steiker & Steiker. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 41, at 417-18.
864
Vol. 79:775, 2004
Conduct of Comparative Proportionality Review
determining what penalty is appropriate, while the other requires us to
impose the same penalty on defendants convicted of the same crime. The
U.S. Supreme Court has itself noted that these competing imperatives
"can be in some tension ''438 and so can require "somewhat contradictory
tasks. 439 Indeed, it is precisely the effort to navigate between this
jurisprudential Scylla and Charybdis that ultimately led Justice
Blackmun, nearing retirement from the Court, to declare that these two
requirements are "not only inversely related, but irreconcilable ' 440 and,
on that basis, to conclude that the death penalty cannot be administered
in a way that comports with the federal constitution.441 If the operation
of capital punishment's competing legal imperatives ensures that
disparate sentencing for defendants who commit comparable crimes is
inevitable, then arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty is
inevitable as well.
The fundamental conceptual and practical problems involved in
comparative proportionality review, no matter how sophisticated its
conduct, duplicate this fundamental dilemma. Its aim is to ensure that
similarly situated defendants are treated the same, but that no defendant
is condemned to death absent full judicial consideration of the elements
that render his or her situation unlike all others. The basic predicament
inherent in comparative proportionality review stems from the
assumption that it is possible to identify, with some legally adequate
measure of exactitude, just what makes some capital cases similar but
others dissimilar, and hence what renders some deathworthy but others
not. Only this premise renders tenable the belief that state high courts are
indeed capable, on rationally defensible grounds, of vacating the
judgment of a jury whose discretionary authority, when not adequately
channeled by state statutes, results in a disproportionate sentence.
On the one hand, if appellate courts are to make good on the statutory
requirement that they consider both the crime and the defendant, and do
so in a way that comports with the requirement of individualized
sentencing, they must engage in a particularized analysis of each death
sentence in order to find out what, if anything, distinguishes this case
from that of others who have been sentenced to death. However, that
inquiry renders it difficult if not impossible to assemble a class of
438. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994).
439. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6 (1994).
440. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1155 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (denying review).
441. See id. at 1145-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (denying review).
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defendants on the basis of which one can make a comparative judgment
about whether the death penalty is or is not generally imposed and so
whether any given sentence is or is not disproportionate. On the other
hand, the interest in legal uniformity necessarily draws courts away from
consideration of the distinguishing circumstances of any given case
through the application of comparative methods--e.g., frequency
analysis-that abstract from the peculiarities of individual defendants
and their crimes. However, that inquiry renders it difficult if not
impossible to attend adequately to the factors which, because they
distinguish a case on review from those with which it is compared, may
warrant sparing a defendant's life.
The result of this dilemma, in Washington and elsewhere, is an
unhappy history of decisions in which courts render judgments on the
basis of considerations which, arguably, are no less arbitrary than the
jury discretion its review was originally intended to remedy. "Is it," asks
Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court, "worse to kill for
money or for hatred?... Is it worse to kill to support a gambling habit or
to support a drug habit? Is it worse to kill a relative or a stranger? To
pose those questions is to pose insoluble moral conundrums. 442 To give
the appearance of solving these conundrums by conducting a
proportionality review that seems to abide by the hallmarks of legal
rationality, when it is based in fact on judgments of culpability, which,
as a rule, are neither articulated nor defended, is to perpetuate the myth
that the death penalty can indeed be administered in a principled way
that comports with the claims of fairness. It is, under the guise of the
law, to reproduce rather than to remedy the arbitrariness Gregg was held
to resolve.
If we continue to believe that the unique nature of the death penalty
requires an unusually heightened measure of due process protection, and
if state high courts have failed to provide such protection, and if our
three decade experiment with comparative proportionality review is a
symptom of as well a contributor to that failure, then the conclusion to
be drawn seems inescapable. As Justice Handler wrote, in dissenting
from the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Martini:
443
Today's decision serves as further confirmation of the failure of
our experiment with capital punishment. The Court's early
belief that it could fashion a constitutionally-legitimate process
442. State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1142 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting).
443. 651 A.2d 949 (N.J. 1994).
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for imposing the death penalty ... has foundered on yet another
rock-proportionality review. The inconsistency, subjectivity,
and moralizing evident in today's decision are the inevitable
products of a futile endeavor: the quest to devise and to apply a
standard of due-process protection commensurate with the
gravity of a death sentence .... [T]he Court must either reject its
effort to carry out capital punishment or accommodate itself to
the juridical brutality of imposing death without due-process
protections commensurate to its awesome finality.
The Washington State Supreme Court was perhaps refreshingly
candid when, in Pirtle, it acknowledged that "[a]t its heart,
proportionality review will always be a subjective judgment as to
whether a particular death sentence fairly represents the values inherent
in Washington's sentencing scheme for aggravated murder.,
445
However, it is not at all clear that this confession should allay any of the
concerns now daily being voiced about the fundamental fairness of the
death penalty's administration. Even those who believe that the U.S.
Supreme Court was mistaken in holding that comparative proportionality
review is not constitutionally required should not be deluded into
thinking that what is constitutionally mandated can in fact be coherently
implemented, or that its conduct can salvage a body of death penalty
jurisprudence that is constitutionally infirm. Although oft-cited, Justice
Marshall's claim in Godfrey v. Georgia446 is worth recalling: "The task
of eliminating arbitrariness in the infliction of capital punishment is
proving to be one which our criminal justice system-and perhaps any
criminal justice system-is unable to perform." 447 The history of
comparative proportionality review provides additional testimony
regarding the law's inability to devise and apply a standard of due
process protection that is adequate to our well-founded conviction that
death is indeed different.
444. Id. at 1001 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
445. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash. 2d 628, 687, 904 P.2d 245, 277 (1995).
446. 446 U.S. 420 (1989).




(to be indicated by Clerk of Supreme Court)
Questionnaire approved
for use pursuant to Laws
of 1981, ch. 138, § 12.
REPORT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Aggravated First Degree Murder Case
Superior Court of County, Washington
Cause No.
State v.
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer each question. If you do not have
sufficient information to supply an answer, please so indicate after the specific
question. If sufficient space is not allowed on the questionnaire form for answer
to the question, use the back of the page, indicating the number of the question
which you are answering, or attach additional sheets.
If more than one defendant was convicted of aggravated first degree murder
in this case, please make out a separate questionnaire for each such defendant.
The statute specifies that this report shall, within thirty (30) days after the
entry of the judgment and sentence, be submitted to the Clerk of the Supreme
Court, to the defendant or his or her attorney, and to the prosecuting attorney.
- "Blank Trial Judge Report RCW 10.95.120," available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate trial courts/supreme/clerks/ (last visited June 28, 2004)
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Race or ethnic origin of defendant:
(b) Number and ages of defendant's children:
(c) Defendant's Father living:
If deceased, date of death:
Defendant's Mother living:
If deceased, date of death:
Yes El No [
Yes El No [
(d) Number of children bom to defendant's parents:
(e) Defendant's education--check highest grade completed:
[ 0 0D 0 ] ] 0 ] 0 0 [ College: [ [ [ E










(f) Was a psychiatric evaluation performed: Yes E No l
If yes, did the evaluation indicate that the defendant was:
(i) able to distinguish right from wrong? Yes El
(ii) able to perceive the nature and quality Yes El
of his or her act?
(iii) able to cooperate intelligently in his or
her own defense?
Yes E] No El
(g) Please describe any character or behavior disorders found or other
pertinent psychiatric or psychological information:
(h) Please describe the work record of the defendant:
(i) If the defendant has a record of prior convictions, please list:
Offense Date Sentence Imposed
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(2) Information about the Trial




Not Guilty by reason of insanity E]
(b) Was the defendant represented by counsel?: Yes El No El
(c) Please indicate if there was evidence introduced or instructions given
as to any defense(s) to the crime of aggravated first degree murder:
Evidence Instruction(s)
Excusable Homicide E] El







_ _ _E E
_ _ _E E
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(d) If the defendant was charged with other offenses which were tried in the
same trial, list the other offenses below and indicate whether defendant
was convicted:
Convicted





Yes [] No El
(e) What aggravating circumstances, as set forth in Laws of 1981, ch. 138
§ 2, were alleged against the defendant and which of these circumstances
were found to have been applicable?:
Aggravating Circumstances Alleged Found Applicable
Yes [ No [-
Yes [] No El
Yes El No E]
Yes [] No El
(f) Please provide the names of each other defendant tried jointly with
this defendant, the charges filed against each other defendant, and the
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Name:
Offenses Charged Disposition
(3) Information Concerning the Special Sentencing Proceeding
(a) Date of Conviction:
Date special sentencing proceeding commenced:
(b) Was the jury for the special sentencing proceeding composed of the
same jurors as the jury that returned the verdict to the charge of
aggravated first degree murder? Yes El No E]
If the answer to the above question is no, please explain:
(c) Was there, in the court's opinion, credible evidence of any mitigating
circumstances as provided in Laws of 1981, ch. 138, § 7?
Yes El No []
If yes, please describe:
Was there evidence of mitigating circumstances, whether or not of a
Washington Law Review
type listed in Laws of 1981, ch. 138, § 7, not described in answer
to (3)(c) above? Yes E] No fl
If yes, please describe:
(e) How did the jury answer the question posed in Laws of 1981, ch. 138,
§ 6(4), that is: "Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has
been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?"
Yes E] No []
(f) What sentence was
imposed?
(4) Information about the Victim
(a) Was the victim related to the defendant by blood or marriage?
Yes El No El
If yes, please describe the relationship:
(b) What was the victim's occupation, and was the victim an employer or
employee of the defendant?
(c) Was the victim acquainted with the defendant, and if so, how well?
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(d) If the victim was a resident of Washington, please state:
Length of Washington residency:
County of residence:
Length of residency in that county:
(e) Was the victim of the same race or ethnic origin as the defendant?
Yes E No [-
If no, please state the victim's race or ethnic origin:
(f) Was the victim of the same sex as the defendant?
Yes l No E
(g) Was the victim held hostage during the crime?
Yes l No El
If yes, for how long:
(h) Please describe the nature and extent of any physical harm or torture
inflicted upon the victim prior to death:
875
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(i) What was the age of the victim?
(j) What type of weapon, if any, was used in the crime?
(5) Information about the Representation of Defendant
(If more than one counsel represented the defendant, answer each question
separately as to each counsel. Attach separate sheets containing answers for
additional counsel.)
(a) Name of counsel:
(b) Date on which counsel was secured:
(c) Was counsel retained or appointed? If appointed, please state the
reason therefor:
(d) How long has counsel practiced law, and what is the nature of
counsel's practice?
(e) Did the same counsel serve at both the trial and the special sentencing
proceeding, and if not, why not?
876
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(6) General Considerations
(a) Was the race or ethnic origin of the defendant, victim, or any witness
an apparent factor at trial?
Yes El No Fl
If yes, please explain:
(b) What percentage of the population of the county is the same race or
ethnic origin as the defendant?
Race Ethnic Origin





Over 90% El El
If there appears to be any reason to answer this question with respect
to a county other than the county in which the trial was held, please
explain:
877
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(c) How many persons of the defendant's or victim's race or ethnic origin
were represented on the jury?
Defendant:
Victim:
Further explanation or comment:
(d) Was there any evidence that persons of any particular race or ethnic
origin were systematically excluded from the jury?
Yes ] No El
If yes, please explain:
(e) Was the sexual orientation of the defendant, victim, or any witness an
apparent factor at trial?
Yes [] No El
If yes, please explain:
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(0 -Was the jury specifically instructed to exclude race, ethnic origin, or
sexual preference as an issue?
Yes F1 No l
(g) Was there extensive publicity in the community concerning this case?
Yes [] No [
(h) Was the jury instructed to disregard such publicity?
Yes E] No El
(i) Was the jury instructed to avoid any influence of passion, prejudice or
any other arbitrary factor when considering its verdict or its findings
in the special sentencing proceeding?
Yes E] No El
(j) Please describe the nature of any evidence suggesting the necessity for




(k) General comments of the trial judge concerning the appropriateness of
the sentence, considering the crime, the defendant, and other relevant
factors:
(7) Information about the Chronology of the Case
(a) Date of offense:
(b) Date of arrest:
(c) Date trial began:
(d) Date jury returned verdict:
(e) Date post-trial motions ruled on:
(f) Date special sentencing proceeding began:
(g) Date sentence was imposed:
(h) Date this trial judge's report was completed:
TRIAL JUDGE
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